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This dissertation  contains three  chapters.  In  the  first  chapter,  I  investigate whether 
restrictive  loan  covenants disrupt  or  improve firm  operating  performance.  Using  
an  instrumental  variables  approach  to  address  the  endogenous  relationship  between  
covenant  strictness and  firms’  efficiency, I  find  stricter loan  covenants cause  an  
increase  in  profitability and  a  reduction  in  operating  cost.  Stricter  covenants improve 
performance only  in  firms with  poor governance:  those  without  large shareholder  
ownership,  with  weaker  shareholder  rights,  facing  softer  competition  in  their  product  
market,  or  with  inside  director  dominated  boards.  The evidence is  consistent  with  
the  view  that  the  design  of  debt  contracts can  mitigate agency  costs  in  firms that  
lack  alternative  governance  mechanisms.  
A small  number  of  interconnected  banks increasingly  dominate the  syndicated loan  
market,  one  of  the  largest  sources of  external finance for  firms.  In  the  second  chapter,  I  
use  measures  from  network  analysis  to  test  whether lender  interconnectedness  benefits  
borrowers through  efficiency  gains,  or  is  harmful  due  to  increased  market  power.  
Traditional  measures  of  industry  concentration  are  not  relevant  in  the  syndicated 
loan  market  because  lenders  share information and  resources.  Using  bank  mergers to  
identify  exogenous  variation  in  lenders’  interconnectedness,  I  find  that  an  increase  
in  lender  network  centrality reduces  firms’  cost  of  borrowing. The effects are  larger
 for  borrowers with  higher  levels  of  information asymmetry,  consistent  with  theories  
suggesting  that  facilitating information sharing increases  lending  efficiency. 
The third  chapter  examines whether creditor protection rights  affect the  structure 
of  corporate debt.  Improving legal  protection of  creditor interests  may  expand  firms’  
access to  debt  markets,  but  also  increases  creditors’ rights  to  intervene with  firm  
policies.  Using  variation  from  legal  rulings  in  Delaware,  I  find  that  increasing  creditor 
protection leads to  a  reduction  in  senior  secured  debt  and  an  increase  in  unsecured  
bonds,  especially  for  firms close  to  bankruptcy. Reducing  creditors’ ability  to  sue 
managers for  breach  of  fiduciary duty  leads to  a  large increase  in  secured  debt  with  
more restrictive  covenants.  The results  suggest  that  legal  protection of  creditor 
interests  affects firms’  choice  of  debt  
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 1  
— Chapter  1  — 
Tough Love:  The  Causal  Effects  of  Debt  
Covenants  on Firm  Performance  
1.1  Introduction 
Do  loans with  restrictive  covenants disrupt  or  improve borrowers’  operating  perfor- 
mance?  The effect  of  loan  covenants on  firm  efficiency  is  an  important economic  
question  because  bank  loans are  one  of  the  most  important sources of  external fi-  
nance for  firms.  Estimating the  causal  effect  of  restrictive  debt  covenants on  firm  
performance is  a  challenging  task,  because  the  design  of  a  loan  contract  is  endogenous  
to  firm  characteristics (Jensen  and  Meckling (1976)).  Using  an  instrumental  variables  
(IV)  approach  to  address  this  identification  issue,  the  main  contribution of  this  paper  
is  to  show  restrictive  loan  covenants have a  causal  impact  on  borrowers’  profitability 
and  cost  efficiency. 
Theory  suggests  restrictive  debt  covenants may  have both  a  positive and  a  
negative effect  on  firms’  operating  performance.  On  the  one  hand,  covenants can  have 
a  negative effect  on  profitability by  constraining managers’ flexibility to  make optimal  
decisions,  and  by  altering  the  choice  of  projects and  financial  policies  (Jensen  and  
Meckling (1976),  Tirole (2010)).  On  the  other  hand,  restrictive  loan  covenants can  
also  have a  positive effect  on  firm  performance by  disciplining  the  manager (Myers  
(1977),  Dewatripont  and  Tirole (1994)).  The optimal  set  of  covenants therefore
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should  balance the  conflicts of  interest  between  creditors and  shareholders in  a  way  
that  maximizes the  value  of  the  firm  (Smith  and  Warner  (1979)).  Yet,  due  to  the  
separation  of  ownership  and  control,  self-serving managers have an  incentive  to  set  
covenants looser  than  what  is  optimal  for  the  firm  in  order  to  protect  their  jobs,  
maintain their  flexibility, and  maximize their  personal  utility  (see  Donaldson  (1963),  
Myers (1977)).  Therefore,  when  intense  agency  conflicts occur  between  managers 
and  shareholders,  creditors can  promote corporate efficiency  by  putting  the  business  
under  a  shorter  leash  with  more restrictive  debt  covenants (Baird  and  Rasmussen  
(2006)).  
The main  challenge  in  estimating the  causal  effect  of  stricter debt  covenants on  
firm  performance  is  finding variation  in  covenant  strictness that  is  exogenous  to  firm  
characteristics. Poorly  performing  firms are  more likely  to  get  stricter debt  covenants 
(see  Aghion  and  Bolton  (1992),  Nini  et  al.  (2009),  and  Roberts  and  Sufi  (2009a)), 
or  firms may  choose  tighter  covenants to  signal  positive private information (see  
Demiroglu  and  James  (2010) and  Beyhaghi  et  al.  (2016)).  I  address  this  endogeneity  
issue  using  an  IV approach.  
A valid  instrument  for  covenant  strictness needs  to  affect the  propensity  of  banks 
to  impose stricter covenants,  but  it  must  be  unrelated  to  borrower characteristics. 
A variable  that  satisfies both  conditions is  the  number  of  defaults in  the  portfolio 
of  the  lead  lender  in  the  six-month  period  prior  to  the  origination  of  the  loan.  
Consistent  with  the  findings of  Murfin  (2012),  I  find  that  when  banks experience  
defaults in  their  loan  portfolios they  impose more restrictive  debt  covenants on  new  
loans.  Importantly, the  change  in  covenant  strictness is  driven  by  shocks that  affect
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only  the  lead  arranger  (the  supply side)  and  is  plausibly  exogenous  to  unobserved  
borrower characteristics. To  make the  exclusion  restriction  more plausible,  I  mitigate 
the  possibility  that  unobservable industry- or  location-specific  factors  affect both  
borrowers’  future performance and  defaults in  the  lead  arranger’s  portfolio  (see  
Hertzel  and  Officer (2012)).  To  this  end,  I  exclude from  the  default-count  measure the  
defaulting  firms that  come  from  the  same  industry  or  state as  the  firm  that  receives  
the  new  loan.1  The identifying  assumption  is  that  the  defaults of  firms located  in  
different  states and  different  industries  affect the  performance of  a  firm  only  through  
the  strictness of  the  debt  contract  with  the  lead  arranger.  
I  find  that  stricter debt  covenants have a  positive and  economically  large effect  
on  profitability (ROA).  In  particular, a  one  standard  deviation exogenous  increase  
in  covenant  strictness causes  a  2.6%  increase  in  profitability one  year  after  the  start  
of  the  loan.  The effect  is  economically  larger in  the  subsample of  borrowers that  
have a  past  credit relationship  with  the  lead  arranger,  because  these  firms are  less  
likely  to  engage  in  loan  shopping due  to  high  information costs  (see  Sharpe (1990) 
and  Rajan  (1992)).  Stricter  covenants also  lead  to  a  reduction  in  firms’  operating  
costs,  which  suggests  firms operate  at  a  lower  unit  cost  and  increase  their  profit
1Consider,  for  example,  the  loan  Bank  of  America made  to Gap,  Inc.  on  June 25,  2003.  To construct  
the  IV,  I  count  how  many  active  loans  in  the  portfolio of  Bank  of  America defaulted  in  the  180-day  
period  leading up  to Gap’s  loan,  that  is,  12/25/2002-06/25/2003.  In  this default-count  variable,  I  
do not  include defaults  of  firms  from  the  same  state  or  industry as  Gap.  For  example,  two  of  the  
companies  that  defaulted  six  months  prior  to the  loan  Bank  of  America made  to Gap  are  United  
Airlines  (headquartered  in  Illinois)  and  Weirton  Steel  (headquartered  in  West  Virginia).  Therefore,  
the  IV will not  satisfy  the  exclusion  requirement if  we  believe  the  defaults  of  a steel  company  from  
West  Virginia (Weirton  Steel)  and  an  airline  company  from  Illinois  (United  Airlines)  correlate  with 
unobserved  factors  that  determine  the  operating performance  of  an  apparel  company  in  California 
(Gap).
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margins.  Although  I  do  not  find  evidence that  covenants affect employment, wages,  
or  advertising  expenses,  there  is  weak  evidence suggesting  that  firms reduce  R&D  
expenses and  innovation. 
I  investigate whether the  positive effect  of  covenant  strictness on  firm  performance 
is  due  to  managerial myopia. For  instance,  in  response  to  stricter covenants,  managers 
might  try  to  boost  short-run profitability at  the  expense of  long-run  performance,  
they  might  try  to  manipulate earnings,  or  choose  riskier  projects.  The evidence is  
not  consistent  with  this  conjecture.  Stricter  covenants do  not  lead  to  a  reversal  in  
long-run  profitability, and  do  not  increase  earnings management or  operational  risk.  
The positive effects of  debt  covenants on  profitability raise  the  following  question:  
if  stricter covenants improve firm  performance,  why  do  firms not  always  adopt  stricter 
terms?  Agency  conflicts.  Due  to  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control,  managers 
could  choose  loan  terms  that  maximize their  personal  utility  instead  of  shareholders’. 
For  instance,  managers prefer  looser  covenants to  reduce  the  possibility  of  a  covenant  
violation  that  would  allow  creditors to  take control  of  the  management (see  Roberts  
and  Sufi  (2009b),  Nini  et  al.  (2012)).  Therefore,  managers, who  make decisions  on  
behalf of  shareholders,  might  exploit  their  position  to  the  detriment  of  firms’  operating  
efficiency, especially  when  the  firm  does not  have strong governance  mechanisms  in  
place to  mitigate these  agency  conflicts.  
I  hypothesize that  if  financial  covenants mitigate managerial agency  costs  and  
have a  disciplinary  effect  that  forces  managers to  improve operating  efficiency  (Harris  
and  Raviv  (1990)),  stricter covenants should  have a  positive effect  only  on  firms that  
lack  alternative  governance  mechanisms  to  monitor and  discipline  the  manager. To
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test  this  hypothesis,  I  investigate whether stricter covenants have a  larger effect  on  
profitability for  firms with  larger manager-shareholder conflicts.  Specifically,  agency  
conflicts are  greater  and  managers are  less  likely  to  maximize operating  efficiency  if  
firms face  softer  competition  in  their  product  market,  if  they  lack  large monitoring 
shareholders (blockholders),  if  inside  directors dominate the  board, or  if  managers 
are  entrenched and  protected  from  takeovers.2  I  find  that  an  exogenous  increase  in  
covenant  strictness increases  operating  efficiency  only  in  firms with  higher  agency  
conflicts between  managers and  shareholders.  Therefore,  the  heterogeneous impact  of  
debt  covenants on  performance suggests  that  the  design  of  debt  contract  terms  can  
substitute for  alternative  external or  internal  governance  mechanisms.  
This paper  builds  on  previous work  that  investigates how firm  characteristics 
determine  the  choice  of  loan  covenants.  For  example,  Demiroglu  and  James  (2010) 
show  that  firms’  expected performance affects the  selection  of  loan  covenants.  Nini  
et  al.  (2009) find  that  under-performing  firms are  more likely  to  receive  covenants 
restricting  investment.  These papers show  that  firm  performance is  an  important 
determinant  of  covenant  selection,  and  highlight why  it  is  difficult  to  estimate 
the  causal  effects of  loan  covenants without  variation  that  is  independent  of  firm  
characteristics.This paper  contributes to  the  literature by  offering  empirical  evidence 
consistent  with  theory  that  suggests  that  financial  covenants have a  causal  effect
2Without  being exhaustive,  the  following work  supports  the  view that  poor  governance  leads  to poor  
firm  performance:  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1986,  1997),  Bertrand  and  Mullainathan  (2003),  Gompers  
et  al.  (2003),  Cremers  and  Nair  (2005),  Bebchuk  and  Cohen  (2005),  Chen  et  al.  (2007),  Edmans  
(2009),  Giroud  and  Mueller  (2010,  2011),  and  Cohen  and  Wang (2013).
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on  firms by  controlling agency  problems (Myers  (1977),  Smith  and  Warner  (1979),  
Berlin  and  Mester  (1992)).  
This paper  is  also  related  to  studies that  investigate the  effects of  covenant  
violations  on  firm  outcomes,  such  as  financial  policy  (Chava  and  Roberts  (2008),  
Roberts  et  al.  (2009)),  performance (Nini  et  al.  (2012)),  unemployment  (Falato  and  
Liang  (2016)),  and  establishment closures (Ersahin  et  al.  (2016)).  Covenant  violations  
allow  creditors to  intervene with  firm  policies  directly,  so  these  studies estimate the  
effects of  ex  post  creditor intervention.  This paper  tests  a  different  hypothesis.  Can  
creditors affect firm  performance  without  intervention  by  making more restrictive  
covenants ex  ante?  This hypothesis is  different  because  it  suggests  that  imposing  
strict loan  covenants at  origination  has a  causal  impact  on  firm  performance through  
managerial incentives.  By  exploiting an  exogenous  source of  variation  in  covenant  
strictness, the  empirical  evidence in  this  paper  is  consistent  with  theory  that  suggests  
that  the  design  of  loan  contracts plays an  important role  in  aligning  incentives  between  
managers and  shareholders (Dewatripont  and  Tirole (1994)).  
The paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  I  describes  the  data and  details of  the  
empirical  methodology. Section  II  presents  the  baseline  results,  and  section  III  
discusses  the  governance  role  of  debt.  In  section  IV,  I  test  the  robustness  of  the  
results,  and  section  V concludes.
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1.2  Data  and Empirical  Strategy  
1.2.1  Data  and Summary  Statistics  
My  empirical  analysis  focuses  on  primary issues  of  syndicated loans,  one  of  the  largest  
sources of  external finance for  firms.  Loan  Pricing Corporation’s (LPC)  Dealscan  
database contains borrower-lender  information of  bank  loan  agreements,  including  
financial  covenants and  performance-related  restrictions.  According  to  LPC’s  product  
manager, Dealscan  covers 98%  or  more of  global  syndicated loans but  varies  in  years.3  
I  merge loan,  lender,  financial  covenant,  and  pricing  data from  Dealscan  with  quarterly  
accounting  information from  Compustat  using  the  link  by  Chava  and  Roberts  (2008).  
The merged  Dealscan-Compustat  sample consists of  relatively  large firms,  because  
large firms have access to  the  market  for  syndicated loans.  I  exclude financial  
firms because  their  profitability and  investment  profiles significantly differ  from  
non-financial  firms.  I  do  not  exclude utility  firms from  the  analysis,  but  the  results  
do  not  change  when  I  drop  these  observations.  I  also  exclude loans whose  primary 
purpose is  to  finance leveraged  buyouts,  because  after  the  buyout,  these  firms usually  
go  through  severe restructuring  and  are  likely  to  experience cash  flow  increases  even  
without  changes  in  efficiency  (Hillier  et  al.  (2011)).  
My  final  dataset  consists of  3,701  loan  packages.  A loan  package can  contain  
multiple loans,  or  facilities,  of  different  types  (e.g.,  term  loans,  revolvers,  bridge 
loans),  and  each  facility  may  have different  characteristics, such  as  different  maturity,
3This  statement  comes  from  the  online  presentation  of  Dealscan  in  WRDS  from  LPC’s  product  
manager:  http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/E-Learning/_000Video/Overview_of_ 
Dealscan/index.cfm .
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amount,  and  spread.  However,  covenants pertain  to  the  whole  loan  package and  are  
the  same  for  all  loan  facilities in  this  package. To  avoid  duplicating  covenant  and  
accounting  information, therefore,  the  observations  in  my  sample are  at  the  package 
level.  
For  every loan  in  the  data, I  identify  the  name of  the  borrower, the  lender,  the  
primary type  and  purpose of  the  loan,  as  well  as  its maturity and  amount.  I  follow  
Chava  and  Roberts  (2008) and  define  loan  maturity as  the  number  of  months between  
the  earliest  loan  origination  date and  the  latest  maturity date in  the  loan  package. 
To  define  loan  amount,  I  use  the  sum  of  all  the  amounts  in  a  loan  package. 
The Appendix  provides definitions for  all  variables,  and  Table  1.1  provides sum- 
mary  statistics for  my  sample.  I  winsorize the  data at  the  1st  and  99th  percentile  
to  mitigate the  effects of  outliers.  An  average  firm  has approximately  $3.3  billion  in  
assets, and  annual  profitability (EBITDA/Assets)  of  15%.  The maturity and  amount  
of  an  average  loan  package is  four  years  and  $475  million,  respectively.  Approximately  
47%  of  the  loans are  secured  (backed  by  collateral),  and  9.7  banks participate in  the  
syndication. The number  of  participating banks is  an  important control  for  contract  
strictness, because  a  large number  of  participants can  potentially reduce  the  incentive  
of  lead  arrangers  to  screen  and  monitor the  syndicated loan  (see  Gopalan  et  al.  (2011) 
and  Sufi  (2007)).  The summary  statistics are  consistent  with  the  averages reported  in  
previous studies using  Dealscan  as  a  primary source of  loan  information (see  Ivashina  
(2009)),  Roberts  and  Sufi  (2009b),  Murfin  (2012)).  
The main  dependent  variable  and  measure of  profitability that  I  use  in  this  paper  
is  ROA measured  as  EBITDA/Assets,  calculated  on  a  rolling  four-quarter basis.  I  use
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EBITDA instead  of  net  income because  EBITDA captures operating  cash  flows  more 
directly  than  net  income,  and  excludes the  effects of  capital  structure or  taxation.  I  
decompose EBITDA/Assets  into  two  parts,  EBITDA/Sales  and  Sales/Assets,  and  
study how covenant  strictness affects these  measures  of  efficiency. This identity,  
known  as  DuPont  identity,  is  informative because  it  explains whether operating  
efficiency  (EBITDA/Sales)  or  asset use  efficiency  (Sales/Assets)  drives the  change  in  
profitability. I  also  use  two  measures  of  cost  efficiency: cost  of  goods  sold  divided  by  
sales,  and  administrative  expenses divided  by  sales.  
I  have excluded from  the  regressions  all  firms that  violate  a  financial  covenant  
at  loan  origination  and  within a  year  from  origination.4  Covenant  violations  are  
technical  defaults that  allow  creditors to  accelerate loan  payments and  pave the  way  
for  creditors to  directly  intervene with  firm  policies.  I  exclude from  the  sample firms 
that  violate  a  covenant  within the  first  three  quarters  to  mitigate the  possibility  that  
firm  outcomes  are  directly  driven  by  creditor intervention.5  I  also  exclude from  the  
analysis  facilities after  renegotiations  or  covenant  violations  that  appear  as  new  loans 
and  whose  origination  date starts before the  expiration of  the  previous loan.  
With  accounting  and  loan  data in  place,  I  construct the  two  main  variables  of  
interest:  covenant  strictness and  the  number  of  defaults the  lead  arrangers  have 
suffered  six  months prior  to  making the  loan.  I  construct these  variables  along  the
4Amir  Sufi  generously  provides  the  data on  covenant  violations  on  his  website.  
5I  am  particularly  thankful  to Cem  Demiroglu  for  this suggestion.  Nini  et  al.  (2012)  find  that  
firm  profitability  increases  after  covenant  violations,  and  therefore  I  expect  that  excluding  loan  
violations  to work  against  the  principal  findings  of  this paper.
 10  
lines  of  Murfin  (2012),  and  give  a  brief  description  of  the  process  and  summary  
statistics in  the  next  two  subsections.  
Loan Covenant  Strictness  
To  measure the  strictness of  loan  covenants,  I  use  a  new  measure from  Murfin  (2012),  
based  on  the  probability of  a  covenant  violation.  Unlike  a  covenant-intensity index  
that  simply counts the  number  of  covenants in  a  debt  contract,  this  measure of  
covenant  strictness combines the  total  number  of  covenants,  how tightly  they  are  
set,  and  also  adjusts  for  the  variance-covariance  of  the  accounting  ratios on  which  
these  covenants are  based.  As  a  result,  this  measure of  covenant  strictness provides a  
superior  measure compared  to  other  measures  researchers  have used  in  the  literature.6  
For  example,  Hertzel  and  Officer (2012),  Kjenstad  et  al.  (2013),  and  Bradley  and  
Roberts  (2015) use  a  covenant-intensity index,  which  simply counts the  number  of  
covenants in  the  loan  contract.  Counting the  number  of  covenants (covenant  intensity)  
does not  necessarily  imply  covenants are  stricter, especially  if  these  restrictions  are  
boilerplate covenants the  firm  will  most  likely  not  violate.  For  example,  consider  two  
firms with  a  financial  covenant  that  requires  both  firms to  keep  their  Debt/EBITDA  
ratio  below 3.  If,  at  the  time  of  contracting,  firm  A’s  EBITDA/Debt  ratio  is  1,  but
6Demerjian  and  Owens  (2014)  hand-collect  5,278 covenants  from  a sample  of  2,100 loans  of  the  
original  Tearsheets  in  Dealscan  and  find  that  the  definitions  of  the  financial  ratios  on  which  
covenants  are  defined  are  not  homogeneous.  They  find,  for  example,  356 different  definitions  
for  Fixed  Charge  Coverage  covenants  in  Dealscan.  In  this case,  constructing this ratio using 
Compustat  data could  potentially  contain  measurement  error.  To address  this issue, I  construct  
the  accounting ratios  based  on  the  definitions  of  the  most  popular  and  homogenous  covenants  
according to Demerjian  and  Owens.  However,  the  authors  conclude  measurement  error  is  not  
likely  to significantly  affect  the  results,  and  argue  in  favor  of  a comprehensive  measure  of  contract  
strictness  such  as  the  one  Murfin  (2012)  uses.
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is  2.8  for  firm  B,  then  simply counting the  number  of  covenants cannot  capture the  
fact  that  firm  B  is  more likely  to  violate  the  covenant.  Demiroglu  and  James  (2010) 
create a  measure of  covenant  tightness  that  captures this  effect,  but  this  measure 
does not  account  for  the  total  number  of  covenants in  the  debt  contract.  
The measure of  covenant  strictness that  I  use  in  this  paper  proxies for  the  
probability that  the  firm  will  violate  at  least  one  covenant  over  the  next  quarter.  The 
Appendix  describes  how to  estimate covenant  strictness following  Murfin’s method.  
In  Table  1.1,  the  median  of  loan  covenant  strictness, or  the  probability of  violating  
at  least  one  covenant,  is  18.3%.  Creditors intentionally impose tight  covenants at  
the  time  of  origination,  and  loosen  them  later  through  renegotiations  as  information 
asymmetry  between  lenders  and  borrowers declines  (see  Garleanu  and  Zwiebel (2009)).  
Roberts  et  al.  (2009) show  that  over  90%  of  long-term  debt  covenants are  renegotiated  
prior  to  their  stated  maturity, not  necessarily  due  to  financial  distress,  but  because  
the  terms  of  the  initial  covenant  are  particularly strict. This evidence is  similar  to  
Denis  and  Wang  (2014),  who  find  evidence that  creditors exert strong control  rights  
over  their  borrowers’  operating  and  financial  policies  in  a  state-contingent  manner  
through  covenant  renegotiations.  
Instrumental  Variable:  Lenders’  Defaults  
The instrument  for  covenant  strictness that  I  use  in  this  paper  is  the  number  of  
defaults lead  arrangers  have suffered  to  their  loan  portfolios in  the  six-month  period  
before issuing  a  new  loan.  I  count  the  number  of  defaults from  firms whose  S&P 
long-term  debt  rating  switched  to  default  or  selective default  during  the  period
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that  the  firm  had  an  outstanding  loan  with  the  bank.  The purpose of  the  default  
count  measure is  to  extract variation  in  covenant  strictness from  factors  that  are  
idiosyndcratic to  the  creditor and  affect the  supply side of  strictness, and  at  the  
same  time  are  unrelated  to  firm  characteristics and  do  not  affect the  demand  side of  
covenant  strictness. 
Dealscan  provides information on  all  lenders  participating in  a  syndicated loan.  I  
only  count  the  number  of  defaulting  firms in  the  portfolio of  lead  arrangers  and  not  
of  participating banks.  Gopalan  et  al.  (2011) show  that  failing  to  screen  or  monitor 
borrowers that  perform  poorly has a  detrimental  effect  on  the  reputation  of  lead  
arrangers,  and  makes attracting  participants in  future syndications harder.  Lead  
lenders  are  therefore  more likely  to  change  their  monitoring in  response  to  a  larger 
number  of  defaults in  order  to  improve their  reputation  as  loan  underwriters.  
Lead  arrangers  have an  average  of  1.3  (median  is  zero)  defaults in  their  loan  
portfolio six  months before making a  new  loan.  In  constructing the  default-count  
measure,  I  exclude defaults of  firms that  have the  same  one-digit  SIC  code  or  are  
headquartered in  the  same  state as  the  new  borrower. This procedure mitigates the  
concern  that  industry- or  location-specific  risk  drives the  change  in  strictness, and,  
therefore,  makes it  less  likely  that  industry  contagion  affects covenants strictness (see  
Hertzel  and  Officer (2012)).  On  the  other  hand,  if  changes  in  covenant  strictness 
come  from  lender-idiosyncratic shocks,  such  as  the  number  of  defaults in  a  lender’s  
portfolio, then  one  can  more easily  argue  that  contract  changes  come  from  the  supply 
side and  are  therefore  exogenous  to  firm  performance.
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1.2.2  Empirical  Strategy  
The most  straightforward  method  to  estimate the  impact  of  covenant  strictness on  
firm  efficiency  is  via  an  OLS  regression.  In  subsection  B.1,  I  explain  why  estimates of  
OLS  regressions  could  be  biased  downward.  In  subsection  B.2,  I  describe  the  IV/2SLS  
methodology that  I  use  in  this  paper  to  get  unbiased  estimates for  the  impact  of  
covenant  strictness on  firm  efficiency. 
Simultaneity  
The purpose of  this  section  is  to  illustrate why  the  OLS  estimates of  covenant  strictness 
on  firm  efficiency  are  biased  downward  in  the  presence  of  simultaneity. To  understand  
the  effect  of  simultaneity in  OLS  estimates,  consider  the  following  simple system  of  
equations,  where y  is  firm  efficiency  and  x  is  covenant  strictness: 
yt  +1  =    xt  +  ut  +1  (1.1)  
xt  =  ↵  yt  +1  +  vt  .  (1.2)  
The coefficient    represents  the  effect  of  covenant  strictness on  firm  efficiency. To  get  
an  unbiased  and  consistent  estimate of   ˆ =    +  C  ov  (  xt  ,  ut  +1)  /V  ar  (  xt),  we  need  the  
exogeneity  condition  C  ov  (  xt  ,  ut  +1)  =  0.  In  a  system  of  equations as  in  (1)  and  (2),  
the  absence of  the  exogeneity  condition,  the  bias is  given  from  the  formula shown
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below and  depends  on  the  signs  and  relative  magnitudes of  the  coefficients ↵  and    .7  
C  ov  (  x,  u  )
V  ar  (  x  )  
=  
↵  (1     ↵    )  V  ar  (  u  )
↵2  V  ar  (  u  )  +  V  ar  (  v  )  
(1.3)  
Assume  stricter covenants have a  positive impact  on  firm  efficiency, so  the  true    
is  positive.  Also,  the  existing literature suggests  more profitable firms tend  to  get  
looser  covenants (see,  Nini  et  al.  (2009),  Rauh  and  Sufi  (2010)),  and  therefore  ↵  is  
negative.  Then  from  equation  (3),  it  becomes  evident that  the  bias term  is  negative 
and  the  estimated  coefficient   ˆ of  covenant  strictness is  negatively biased.  
IV/2SLS Regressions  
To  obtain  the  IV/2SLS  estimates,  I  start  by  estimating the  following  first-stage 
regression  similar  to  Murfin  (2012):  
S  tr  ictnessi,t  =  ↵j  +  ↵t  +  X  
0  
i,t  b  +     D ef  aul  tsi,t     +  ✏i,t  .  (1.4)  
In  this  regression,  subscript i refers  to  the  firm,  j refers  to  the  three-digit  SIC  code  
of  the  firm,  t refers  to  the  loan’s origination  year,  and  t- refers  to  the  six  month  
period  before the  loan  issuance.  If     is  positive one  default  to  the  lead  arranger’s  loan  
portfolio six  months prior  to  this  loan  increases  covenant  strictness by     ,  or  in  other  
words,  increases  the  probability that  the  borrower will  violate  at  least  one  covenant  
over  the  next  quarter  by     .
7For  more  details  on  how  the  bias  of  the  estimator  could  be  positive  or  negative  see  Roberts  and  
Whited  (2012).
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In  the  second-stage  regression,  I  exploit  the  variation  in  covenant  strictness coming  
from  the  number  of  defaults to  lenders’  loan  portfolios and  estimate the  effect  of  
covenant  strictness on  future efficiency. The second-stage  regression  therefore  is  
 (  R  O  A )i,t  +1  =  ↵j  +  ↵t  +  X  
0  
i,t  b  +     \S  tr  ictnessi,t  +  ⌘i,t  .  (1.5)  
The dependent  variable  in  the  second-stage  regression  is  the  change  in  firms’  prof- 
itability one  year  after  the  origination  date of  the  loan.  The coefficient     next  to  the  
predicted  strictness is  the  estimate for  the  change  in  firms’  operating  efficiency  due  
to  changes  in  covenant  strictness. The main  measure of  efficiency  that  I  examine is  
profitability (ROA),  but  I  also  use  the  same  empirical  methodology for  the  other  profit  
and  cost-efficiency  measures.  Along  with  the  point  estimates of  covenant  strictness, 
I  use  the  Anderson  and  Rubin  (AR)  Wald  test  to  test  the  null  hypothesis that  the  
instrument  is  not  relevant  and  weak.  
1.3  Empirical  Results  
In  this  section,  I  present  the  empirical  evidence from  estimating the  causal  effect  
of  covenant  strictness on  operating  efficiency. The main  variable  of  interest  is  the  
change  in  profitability (ROA)  one  year  after  the  loan.  In  the  first  part  of  this  section,  
I  verify  the  validity  of  the  IV by  regressing  debt  covenant  strictness on  the  number  
of  defaults on  the  portfolio of  the  lead  arranger  180  days prior  to  the  origination  
of  the  loan.  In  the  second  part,  I  present  the  results  from  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  
profitability on  debt  covenant  strictness.
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1.3.1  First  Stage:  The  Effect  of  Lender  Defaults  on Covenant  Strictness  
To  extract variation  in  covenant  strictness that  is  exogenous  to  firm  characteristics, I  
first  regress  covenant  strictness on  the  number  of  recent  defaults in  the  loan  portfolio 
of  the  lead  arranger  as  in  equation  (4).  A positive and  significant     in  this  regression  
indicates an  increase  in  the  number  of  defaults in  the  portfolio of  the  lead  arranger  
shortly before making a  new  loan  leads to  an  increase  in  covenant  strictness of  new  
loans.  To  ensure lenders  change  the  strictness of  debt  covenants independently  of  
firm  characteristics, I  construct the  default-count  variable  so  that  it  includes  only  
defaults coming  from  firms in  different  industries  and  different  states from  the  current 
borrower. This procedure  does not  significantly affect the  strength of  the  instrument  
(relatedness),  but  makes the  exclusion  restriction  more plausible.  
Table  1.2  shows  the  results  of  estimating equation  (4)  following  the  methodology 
of  Murfin  (2012).  This step  is  important in  proving the  instrument  is  relevant.  The 
baseline  regression  in  the  first  column  has no  fixed  effects and  includes  controls only  for  
firm  characteristics, such  as  debt/assets (control  for  leverage),  fixed-charge coverage  
(cash  flow),  current ratio  (liquidity),  and  total  assets (size),  loan  characteristics 
such  as  loan  maturity, the  number  of  participating lenders,  the  amount  of  the  loan,  
and  the  loan  spread.  The coefficient  of  lender  defaults is  positive and  statistically 
significant,  which  implies  shocks in  the  portfolio of  the  lead  lender  affect the  strictness 
of  covenants in  new  loans.  The economic  magnitude of  the  estimated  coefficient  in  
the  second  column  suggests  a  one-standard-deviation  increase  in  lenders’  defaults
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(=2.2)  increases  covenant  strictness approximately  by  1.8%  (=2.2*0.82), or  in  other  
words,  the  median  firm  is  1.8%  more likely  to  violate  a  covenant  in  the  next  quarter.8  
The results  in  Table  1.2  suggest  the  IV satisfies relatedness.  In  the  first-column 
regression  of  Table  1.2,  using  no  loan  or  lender  characteristics or  fixed  effects,  the  
F-statistic  is  significant  at  the  1%  level.  To  isolate other  macroeconomic factors,  or  
industry  and  firm  characteristics that  could  affect covenant  strictness, I  use  year,  
industry,  rating,  loan  purpose,  and  lender  fixed  effects in  the  middle  column.  The 
role  of  fixed  effects in  the  regressions  is  to  absorb  the  variation  in  covenant  strictness 
explained  within a  certain  year,  within a  certain  lender,  a  certain  industry,  rating  
group,  and  loan  purpose.  The introduction of  these  fixed  effects does not  significantly 
change  the  magnitude or  the  statistical  significance of  the  effects of  lenders’  defaults 
in  covenant  strictness. 
Lenders  may  change  their  risk  profile after  experiencing defaults in  their  portfolio, 
and  may  shift  toward  safer  firms.  If  lenders  indeed  switch  to  safer  or  more profitable 
firms after  suffering more defaults,  the  effect  of  defaults on  lenders  portfolios should  
yield  the  opposite  effect  on  covenant  strictness, because  safer  borrowers can  get  loans 
with  looser  covenants,  and  therefore  defaults would  lead  to  either no  effect  or  looser  
covenants.  To  address  the  possibility  that  unobserved  firm  characteristics drive the  
results,  the  last  column  on  Table  1.2  presents  the  first-stage-regression  results  using  
firm  fixed  effects.  In  this  regression,  the  coefficients are  driven  from  variation  of
8A 1.8%  increase  in  strictness  means  that  over  a one-year  horizon,  the  probability  that  the  median  
firm  will violate  at  least  one  covenant  rises from  54.7%  to 59.2%.  The  probability  of  violating 
a covenant  one  year  after  the  beginning of  the  loan  is  calculated  using the  following formula:  P  
t    T  p  (1    p  )t     1,  where  p  stands  for  covenant  strictness,  or  the  probability  of  violating a covenant  
in  the  next  quarter.
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strictness within the  firm,  and  suggest  that  a  larger-than-average number  of  defaults 
in  the  portfolio of  the  lender  leads to  an  increase  in  the  strictness of  this  firm’s debt  
covenants.  The panel  dataset  is  unbalanced,  and  more than  half the  firms in  the  
sample have at  most  two  loans.  As  a  result,  the  time-series  variation  within firms is  
not  sufficient to  exploit  using  firm  fixed  effects.  For  the  remainder  of  my  empirical  
analysis,  therefore,  I  use  industry  (SIC-3)  fixed  effects instead  of  firm  fixed  effects,  
even  though  with  firm  fixed  effects,  the  economic  magnitudes of  the  second-stage  
regressions  increase.  Finally,  using  lender  fixed  effects,  I  also  control  for  the  effects of  
unobserved  lender  characteristics on  debt  contracting.9  
Financial  Crisis  Subsample  
The regressions  in  Table  1.2  do  not  include  loans originated  during  the  financial  
crisis of  2007-2009.  During  the  crisis,  a  greater  number  of  corporate defaults in  
the  portfolio  of  a  lead  lender  might  not  necessarily  reflect  the  lender’s  inability  to  
appropriately  screen  and  monitor its borrowers,  but  could  be  the  outcome  of  an  ailing  
economy.  Therefore,  even  if  lenders  do  not  experience a  larger than  average  number  of  
defaults in  their  portfolio, they  might  still  impose stricter covenants due  to  an  overall  
tightening  of  credit standards during  the  financial  crisis.10  As  a  result,  the  number  of  
defaults in  the  lead  lender’s  portfolio (the  IV)  does not  have a  statistically significant
9Another  common  method  researchers  use  in  the  literature  is  demeaning the  dependent  variable  
(default  count)  by  subtracting the  average  default  count  by  lender. Gormley  and  Matsa (2014)  
assert  that  demeaning the  dependent  variable  produces  inconsistent  estimates,  and  recommend  
using fixed  effects  instead.  For  this reason,  I  use  lender fixed  effects  for  all  regressions.  
10See  the  Federal  Reserve  survey  of  senior  loan  officers  (Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  
System)
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effect  on  debt  covenant  strictness (regression  results  not  tabulated).  Therefore,  to  
ensure that  the  IV remains  valid  throughout  the  sample period,  the  empirical  analysis  
in  this  paper  excludes the  financial  crisis.  
1.3.2  The  Causal  Effect  of  Covenant  Strictness  on Firm  Performance  
With  a  valid  instrument  for  covenant  strictness, I  regress  the  change  in  profitability 
one  year  after  the  origination  of  the  loan  on  the  first-stage estimates of  covenant  
strictness as  in  equation  (5).  The first  three  columns of  Table  1.3  present  the  OLS  
regression  results  using  the  endogenous  IV of  interest,  covenant  strictness. The last  
three  columns present  the  IV/2SLS  regression  results  after  using  an  instrument  for  
covenant  strictness. In  all  regressions,  I  use  industry  (SIC-3),  lender,  year,  loan  
purpose,  and  rating  fixed  effects.  In  columns 3  and  6,  I  replace  industry  fixed  effects 
with  more restrictive  borrower fixed  effects.  I  cluster standard  errors at  both  the  
firm  and  lender  level.  According  to  Petersen  (2009),  clustering at  the  firm  level  
addresses the  bias in  the  standard  errors due  to  time-series  correlation  within firms,  
and  clustering at  the  lender  level  addresses the  bias from  correlation  within lenders.  
To  control  for  mean  reversion  and  non-linearity  in  the  regressions,  I  also  include  
lagged profitability and  its squared  value.  
The results  from  the  OLS  regressions  in  the  first  three  columns of  Table  1.3  
indicate stricter covenants do  not  affect future profitability. The regression  in  the  
first  column  uses  the  full  sample,  and  the  results  suggest  covenant  strictness has a  
negative and  statistically insignificant  effect  on  profitability. However,  this  empirical  
strategy  causes  difficulty  in  distinguishing  whether restrictive  covenants have no  effect
 20  
on  firm  performance,  or  whether the  negative correlation  between  ROA and  covenant  
strictness (simultaneity)  creates a  downward  bias for  OLS  estimates.  
The results  change  considerably  once  we  focus  on  variation  in  covenant  strictness 
that  comes  from  the  number  of  defaults in  the  lender’s  loan  portfolio, and  is  therefore  
plausibly  exogenous  to  firm  characteristics. Column  4  of  Table  1.3  presents  the  
results  of  the  full  sample IV/2SLS  regressions.  The effect  of  covenant  strictness on  
profitability is  positive and  economically  large.  To  evaluate the  relative  magnitude,  
an  increase  in  covenant  strictness by  10%,  which  is  equivalent to  the  difference  in  
strictness between  A-  and  BBB-rated  firms,  leads to  a  1.3%  increase  in  profitability. 
I  also  report  the  p-value from  the  Anderson-Rubin  (AR)  (1949) Wald  test,  which  
is  robust  to  weak  instruments.  The null  hypothesis in  this  test  is  that  the  IV is  not  
relevant,  and  therefore,  rejecting  the  null  becomes  harder  as  the  instrument  becomes  
weaker.  In  this  sense,  the  AR  p-value in  column  4  of  Table  IV implies  that  we  can  
reject  the  null  hypothesis that  the  instrument  is  not  relevant  and  weak.11  
Covenant  Strictness  and Borrower-Lender  Relationship 
When  a  lender  makes covenants on  a  new  loan  more restrictive  after  experiencing a  
larger number  of  defaults in  its loan  portfolio, borrowers could  choose  another  lender
11  Stock  and  Yogo (2005)  simulate  critical  values  based  on  which  we  can  reject the  null  that  an  
instrument is  weak  if  the  minimum eigenvalue  of  the  first-stage  F-statistic  matrix,  known  as  the  
Cragg-Donald  F-Statistic,  is  above  these  critical  values.  The  Cragg-Donald  F-statistic  in  column  4 
is  9.2,  which  lies between the  10%-15%  thresholds  reported  in  Stock  and  Yogo (2005)  (see  Table  
5.2)  and  implies  the  instrument would  be  considered  weak  if  we  limited  the  size  of  an  IV Wald  test  
to at  most  0.1 above  its  nominal  value.  The  evidence  in  this section  suggest  that  the  instrument 
is  not  obviously  weak.
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offering  slightly looser  covenants.  Why  do  borrowers,  whose  performance  has not  
changed,  accept stricter covenants  instead  of  seeking a  different  lender?  
A potential reason  for  borrowers to  accept stricter covenants from  their  lender  
is  that  firms want  to  maintain their  existing relationship  with  their  lender.  Banks  
that  have a  past  credit relationship  with  a  firm  have private information about  theses  
firms.  As  a  result,  due  to  the  adverse-selection problem,  switching to  another  lender  is  
costly  for  firms (see  Greenbaum et  al.  (1989),  Sharpe (1990),  and  Rajan  (1992)).  For  
instance,  Petersen  and  Rajan  (1994,  1995)  show  that  borrowing from  many  different  
lenders  increases  the  cost  of  debt  and  reduces  the  amount  of  credit available  to  firms,  
whereas Bharath  et  al.  (2011) find  that  firms obtain  better  loan  terms  by  borrowing 
from  a  lender  with  an  existing relationship.  The key  result  in  Boot  (2000) and  Boot  
and  Thakor  (2000) is  that  relationship  lending  is  immune  to  banking competition  
and  mostly  affects transaction  lending.  
If  borrowers with  good  credit quality  pick  lenders  that  offer looser  covenants,  
the  estimates from  the  full-sample regressions  are  likely  to  be  biased  downward.  
I  hypothesize that  stricter covenants should  have a  larger effect  on  the  operating  
efficiency  of  firms that  have an  existing relationship  with  their  creditor, because  
these  firms are  less  likely  to  switch  to  a  different  lender  after  banks start  making 
covenants  more restrictive.  To  proxy for  relationship  lending  between  firms and  the  
lead  arranger,  I  restrict  my  attention  to  the  group  of  firms that  have borrowed  at  
least  twice  from  the  same  lead  arranger  in  the  past  5  years.  
In  Table  1.3,  I  show  the  regression  results  for  the  group  of  firms that  have an  
existing relationship  with  a  bank.  Columns (2)  and  (3)  present  the  estimation  results
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of  OLS  regressions  in  the  subsample of  firms that  have an  existing relationship  with  
their  creditor, using  industry  and  firm  fixed  effects,  respectively.  The OLS  regression  
results  within this  subsample are  similar  to  the  full-sample OLS  estimates in  equation  
(1);  debt  covenant  strictness does not  appear  to  affect firm  performance.  
In  columns (5)-(6),  the  results  of  the  IV/2SLS  regressions  are  considerably  different.  
Focusing  only  on  the  group  of  firms that  maintain their  lending  relationships,  I  find  
the  economic  effect  of  strictness on  profitability increases  considerably. Specifically,  
a  10%  increase  in  strictness leads to  a  2.5%  increase  in  profitability over  the  next  
four  quarters.  The AR  p-value in  column  4  is  such  that  we  reject  the  null  that  the  
instrument  is  not  relevant  and  weak  at  the  1%  level,  whereas the  Cragg-Donald  
statistic is  11.37  and  the  Kleibergen-Paap  Lagrange multiplier  F-statistic  is  38.233.12  
Overall,  these  statistics suggest  the  regressions  do  not  suffer  from  the  weak  instrument  
problem.  Using  firm  fixed  effects in  column  (6),  the  results  remain  robust.  Specifically,  
an  increase  in  debt  covenant  strictness above  the  firm’s average  has a  statistically and  
economically  large positive effect  on  firm  performance.  Taken  together,  the  results  in  
Table  1.3,  suggest  that  stricter covenants have a  positive effect  on  firm  performance.  
The  Effects  of  Covenant  Strictness  on Long-Run Profitability  
The empirical  evidence suggests  stricter debt  covenants lead  to  an  increase  in  firm  
profitability one  year  after  loan  origination.  However,  strict debt  covenants may  
benefit  the  firm  in  the  short-term, but  at  the  expense of  long-run  profitability. I
12According to Stock  and  Yogo (2005),  the  critical  values  for  the  Cragg-Donald  statistic  at  the  5%  
significance  level is  8.96 when  the  worst  bias  relative  to OLS  estimates  is  15%.  Therefore,  I  can  
only  reject the  null  that  the  bias  relative  to OLS  estimates  is  15%  or  more.
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investigate this  possibility  in  Table  1.4,  by  testing  the  effects of  debt  covenant  
strictness on  firm  performance  two  and  three  years  after  the  loan  origination  date.  
Columns 1-3  in  Table  1.4  present  the  respective  results  of  OLS  regressions  of  firm  
profitability after  one  year,  two  years,  and  three  years  on  debt  covenant  strictness. 
Columns 4-6  present  the  respective  estimates from  IV/2SLS  regressions.  
The regression  results  in  Table  1.4  suggest  stricter covenants have a  positive effect  
on  firm  profitability one  year  after  the  origination  of  the  loan,  but  have no  significant  
long-run  effects on  firm  performance.  Because firms renegotiate  their  loan  terms  
frequently, covenant  thresholds  could  change  after  renegotiation,  which  is  consistent  
with  a  lack  of  long-run  effects of  covenants on  firm  performance.  For  instance,  
Roberts  and  Sufi  (2009b)  argue  that  almost  90%  of  loans are  renegotiated  prior  
to  their  stated  maturity leading  to  considerable amendments  to  their  initial  terms.  
Denis  and  Wang  (2014) present  similar  evidence, and  find  renegotiations  can  lead  to  
either more restrictive  or  looser  contract  terms,  depending  on  the  post-renegotiation 
environment and  the  performance of  the  firm.  The ability  to  renegotiate  loan  contract  
terms  highlights the  special  role  of  private debt  agreements  in  mitigating information 
asymmetry  between  lenders  and  borrowers,  by  setting tight  loan  covenants ex  ante,  
and  relaxing  them  ex  post  through  loan  renegotiations  (see  Garleanu  and  Zwiebel 
(2009)).  
1.3.3  The  Effects  of  Covenant  Strictness  on Cost  Efficiency  and R&D  
The evidence so  far  suggests  an  increase  in  debt  covenant  strictness has a  positive effect  
on  profitability. In  this  section,  I  investigate in  more detail  how stricter covenants
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affect profitability. The DuPont  identity  is  a  helpful  starting point  in  this  analysis.  
Specifically,  I  break  down  profitability (EBITDA/Assets)  into  two  components,  profit  
margins (EBITDA/Sales)  and  asset turnover  (Sales/Assets),  and  then  test  how 
exogenous  variation  in  covenant  strictness affects these  efficiency  measures.  
The regression  results  in  the  first  two  columns of  Table  1.5  suggest  the  increase  in  
profitability is  driven  by  an  increase  in  profit  margins.  The coefficient  of  covenant  
strictness in  the  first  column  is  0.0015  and  indicates a  10%  increase  in  strictness 
leads to  a  1.5%  increase  in  profit  margins.  However,  covenant  strictness does not  
affect asset turnover.  One  explanation  is  that  changes  in  asset turnover  require  time  
and  long  term-adjustments  for  the  firm.  Therefore,  it  seems intuitive that  changes  
in  profit  margins drive the  observed  effect  on  profitability, at  least  in  the  short  run,  
because  firms can  more easily  improve their  performance either by  increasing  prices  
or  by  reducing  cost.  
To  verify  whether firms indeed  reduce  cost,  I  also  study how covenants affect 
two  of  the  most  common  measures  of  cost  efficiency: cost  of  goods  sold  over  sales,  
and  administrative  expenses over  sales.  I  find  that  stricter contracts do  not  have a  
significant  effect  on  administrative  expenses,  but  they  reduce  the  cost  of  goods  sold.  
In  particular, a  10%  increase  in  debt  covenant  strictness leads to  a  1.3%  decrease  
in  operating  cost.  The empirical  evidence suggests  therefore  that  debt  covenants 
increase  profitability mostly  by  reducing  cost.  However,  although  statistically weak,  
the  regression  in  column  (5)  suggest  that  stricter covenants also  have a  negative 
effect  on  R&D  expenses.  Specifically,  one  within-firm standard  deviation increase  in
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covenant  strictness (  ⇡  10%)  leads to  a  0.58%  reduction  in  R&D,  or  a  reduction  of  
one  third  of  its standard-deviation. 
I  do  not  find  evidence that  stricter loan  covenants affect wages,  advertising,  
and  employment.13  Falato and  Liang  (2016) find  that  covenants violations  lead  
to  a  reduction  in  employment. The results  in  this  study suggest,  unlike technical  
violations  of  financial  covenants that  provide the  first  signal  of  financial  distress,  the  
tightening  of  covenants at  origination  may  not  yet  necessitate  significant  changes  in  
more persistent  variables  such  as  wages  or  employment. 
1.3.4  The  Effects  of  Covenant  Strictness  on Earnings  Manipulation and 
Risk  Shifting  
To  ensure compliance with  stricter covenants and  avoid  a  costly  violation,  managers 
may  try  to  manipulate earnings to  show  temporary  earnings or  sale  increases  (see  
DeFond  and  Jiambalvo  (1994) Burgstahler  and  Dichev  (1997)).  In  this  case,  tighter  
covenants may  not  necessarily  cause  an  increase  in  operating  efficiency, but,  instead,  
managers may  manipulate earnings to  loosen  credit constraints. However,  it  is  difficult  
to  test  this  hypothesis directly  because  banks could  impose more restrictive  covenants 
on  firms that  are  more likely  to  manipulate earnings.  To  address  this  simultaneity, 
I  use  exogenous  variation  in  covenant  strictness to  test  directly  whether stricter 
covenants  lead  to  an  increase  in  earnings management. 
To  test  whether firms engage  in  earnings management, I  estimate discretionary 
current accruals  using  Jones  (1991),  and  its modified  version  from  Dechow  et  al.
13Results are  not  tabulated  in  the  main  text,  but  are  available  in  the  appendix  Table  ??  .
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(1995),  and  regress  discretionary accruals  on  the  IV for  covenant  strictness. The 
results  in  Table  1.6  suggest  that  an  exogenous  increase  in  covenant  strictness does 
not  have a  significant  impact  on  earnings management. 
I  also  investigate whether stricter covenants induce  managers to  increase  the  
riskiness  of  the  projects they  undertake.  To  measure operational  risk,  I  calculate the  
trailing  standard  deviation of  four  quarterly  changes  in  ROA.  Although  relatively  
noisy,  this  measure derives  risk  based  on  profitability instead  of  financial  prices.  The 
evidence in  Table  1.7  suggest  that  strictness covenants also  lead  to  a  reduction  in  
operational  risk,  although  the  effect  becomes  statistically significant  only  after  six  
quarters.  
Taken  together,  the  results  in  this  section  are  not  consistent  with  the  managerial 
myopia hypothesis.  First,  the  positive effects of  covenants on  performance  do  not  
reverse  after  two  or  three  years  (see  Table  1.4),  and  there  is  no  evidence suggesting  
that  managers manipulate earnings,  or  take on  more risk.  
1.4  The  Governance  Role  of  Debt  
1.4.1  The  Interplay  of  Debt  Governance  with Corporate  Governance  
Mechanisms  
The positive effects of  loan  covenants on  operating  performance raise  the  following  
question:  if  stricter loan  covenants improve profitability, why  firms do  not  demand  
stricter debt  covenants in  the  first  place?  The optimal  set  of  financial  covenants
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should  balance agency  conflicts between  creditors and  shareholders in  a  way  that  
maximizes the  value  of  the  firm  (Smith  and  Warner  (1979)).  
Managers,  however,  who  negotiate the  strictness of  loan  covenants with  creditors, 
have an  incentive  to  set  covenants looser  than  what  would  be  optimal  for  the  firm  
to  protect  their  job,  maintain their  flexibility, and  maximize their  personal  utility  
(Donaldson  (1963) and  Myers (1977)).  Due  to  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control,  
therefore,  it  is  possible  that  managers might  select  debt  contract  terms  that  may  
not  be  optimal  for  the  firm.  Consequently, changes  in  covenant  strictness could  lead  
to  significant  efficiency  gains  for  the  firm,  especially  when  firms lack  alternative  
governance  control  mechanisms  to  protect  shareholders’  interests.  
The corporate governance  literature has numerous examples that  highlight how 
agency  conflicts between  managers and  shareholders lead  to  considerable inefficiencies  
and  reduce  firm  value  (Bertrand  and  Mullainathan  (2003),  Bebchuk and  Cohen  (2005),  
Chhaochharia  and  Grinstein (2007),  Cohen  and  Wang  (2013)).  I  hypothesize that  if  
creditors promote corporate efficiency  with  stricter covenants by  disciplining  managers, 
covenants should  mostly  affect firms that  lack  alternative  governance  mechanisms  to  
protect  shareholders’  interests  (poorly  governed  firms). This hypothesis is  based  on  
theoretical  and  empirical  evidence that  highlights the  monitoring and  disciplining  
role  of  debt.14
14Without  being exhaustive,  the  following papers  discuss the  role  of  covenants  in  monitoring and  
aligning the  incentives of  the  manager  with shareholders:  Holmstrom  and  Tirole  (1997),  Park  
(2000),  Dichev  and  Skinner  (2002),  Gorton  and  Winton  (2003),  Ryan  and  Wiggins  (2004),  Roberts  
and  Sufi  (2009b),  and  Rauh  and  Sufi  (2010)).
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To  test  this  hypothesis,  I  split  the  sample into  two  groups:  firms with  high  and  
firms with  low agency  conflicts between  managers and  shareholders.  Specifically,  
a  firm  is  poorly governed  (i.e.,  has high  agency  conflicts between  shareholders) in  
the  following  cases:  the  fraction  of  its shares owned  by  blockholders is  below the  
sample median;  the  number  of  anti-takeover  provisions is  above  the  sample median;  
the  firm’s concentration  in  its product  market  is  above  the  median;  and  the  share of  
independent  directors is  below 50%.  I  examine the  effect  of  debt  covenant  strictness 
on  profitability separately  for  well-governed  and  poorly governed  firms,  and  present  
the  results  of  all  regressions  in  Table  1.8.  
Governance  Mechanism:  Blockholder  ownership 
I  first  investigate the  effect  of  covenant  strictness on  profitability of  firms with  
high  and  firms with  low institutional blockholder  ownership.  Blockholders are  large 
shareholders that  own  more than  5%  of  the  firm’s outstanding  shares.  Institutional 
and  large investors are  usually  active  shareholders that  have a  greater  incentive  to  
monitor managers and  are  more likely  to  intervene when  managers do  not  run  the  
firm  efficiently (see  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1986),  La  Porta  et  al.  (2002),  and  Gillan  
and  Starks (2007)).  Therefore,  high  institutional blockholder  ownership  is  a  common  
proxy in  the  corporate governance  literature for  institutional monitoring, or  high  
internal  governance  (see  Cremers and  Nair  (2005),  Cremers et  al.  (2007),  Chen  et  al.  
(2007),  Edmans (2009),  and  Fich  et  al.  (2015)).  If  stricter debt  covenants have 
a  positive effect  on  firm  profitability due  to  increased  monitoring of  the  manager,
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increasing  covenant  strictness should  have a  larger effect  on  profitability of  firms 
without  large shareholders.  
The results  of  Table  1.8  suggest  an  increase  in  covenant  strictness has a  large 
positive effect  on  profitability when  large shareholders are  not  present.  In  the  first  
column  of  Panel  A in  Table  1.8,  the  effect  of  debt  covenant  strictness on  firm  
profitability is  almost  twice  as  large if  we  focus  only  within firms with  low blockholder  
ownership.  Specifically,  I  find  that  in  firms whose  institutional blockholder  ownership  
is  below the  sample median,  a  10%  increase  in  covenant  strictness leads to  a  2.1%  
increase  in  profitability one  year  after  the  loan.  Moreover,  if  stricter debt  covenants 
increase  firm  efficiency  and  profitability because  of  the  increased  monitoring of  
management, stricter debt  covenants should  not  affect firms that  already  have a  
strong form  of  internal  governance.  The results  in  Panel  B,  Table  1.8,  are  consistent  
with  this  hypothesis,  suggesting  an  increase  in  covenant  strictness does not  have a  
statistically significant  effect  on  profitability of  firms with  high  blockholder  ownership.  
Governance  Mechanism:  Product  Market  Competition 
I  also  hypothesize that  managers are  less  likely  to  improve efficiency  when  they  are  
insulated  from  competitive threats  (see  Giroud  and  Mueller  (2011)),  and  therefore  an  
exogenous  increase  in  covenant  strictness should  have a  larger effect  on  these  firms.  
According  to  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997),  competition  is  one  of  the  strongest  forms 
of  corporate governance  mechanisms,  forcing  firms to  minimize  costs  and  improve 
efficiency. To  this  end,  I  split  firms into  two  groups  based  on  the  level  of  competition  
in  their  product  market.  To  proxy for  competition, I  use  a  text-based  measure of
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competition  from  Hoberg  and  Phillips, TNIC HHI  (see  Hoberg  and  Phillips (2010a), 
Hoberg  and  Phillips (2010b)).15  
Table  1.8  (third  column)  presents  the  results  of  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  firm  
profitability on  debt  covenant  strictness for  the  subsample of  firms that  operate  in  
product  markets with  low competition  (Panel  A)  and  high  competition  (Panel  B).  
The results  for  the  low-governance subsample in  Panel  A suggest  a  10%  increase  in  
strictness leads to  a  2.8%  increase  in  firm  profitability. On  the  contrary, in  Panel  B,  
an  increase  in  debt  covenant  strictness for  firms that  operate  in  highly  competitive 
product  markets does not  yield  an  economically  large or  statistically significant  effect  
on  firm  profitability. In  this  sense,  the  results  in  the  third  column  of  Table  1.8  suggest  
debt  covenant  strictness acts as  a  corporate governance  substitute, and  are  similar  
to  Giroud  and  Mueller  (2010,  2011),  who  show  corporate governance  mechanisms  
matter  more when  competition  in  firms’  product  market  is  lacking.  
Governance  Mechanism:  Shareholder  Rights  
Gompers et  al.  (2003) provide evidence that  firms with  more shareholder  rights  
perform  better,  and  Bertrand  and  Mullainathan  (2003) find  that  when  managers are  
protected  from  takeovers,  they  tend  to  run  firms less  profitably and  less  efficiently. 
Therefore,  if  strict debt  covenants act  as  a  disciplining  device  for  managers, stricter 
debt  covenants should  have a  larger effect  on  firms with  more anti-takeover  provisions
15Unlike  traditional  industry classifications,  Hoberg and  Phillips  use  textual  analysis  based  on  10K  
reports  to define  industries based  on  the  product  description  of  each  firm.  Using these  more  
refined definitions  of  industries, which  are  updated  yearly  and  have  the  same  coarseness  as  SIC-3 
industry classification,  the  authors  calculate  the  Herfindahl  Hirchman  index (HHI).
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and  fewer  shareholder  rights.  To  test  this  hypothesis,  I  collect  data on  the  number  of  
governance  provisions for  each  firm  (G-index).  The governance  index,  first  constructed 
by  Gompers et  al.  (2003),  is  a  count  measure from  1-24  based  on  the  number  of  
anti-takeovers  provisions and  the  (lack  of)  shareholder  rights.16  Matching data on  
shareholder  rights  significantly reduces  my  sample,  because  a  large portion of  firms 
in  Dealscan  are  private.  
In  the  second  column  of  panels A and  B  of  Table  1.8,  I  test  whether strict 
debt  covenants have a  larger effect  on  performance if  managers are  entrenched from  
takeovers.  I  group  firms in  high- and  low-governance  groups  based  on  whether the  
governance  index  is  above  or  below the  sample median.  The IV/2SLS  regression  
in  panel  A suggests  an  increase  in  debt  covenant  strictness has a  positive effect  on  
profitability, but  the  effect  is  statistically significant  only  for  firms whose  G-index is  
above  the  median.  
Governance  Mechanism:  Board Independence  
I  next  investigate whether stricter debt  covenants have a  larger effect  on  performance 
of  firms whose  board is  dominated  by  inside  directors.  Monitoring the  manager is  the  
most  important task  for  outside  directors (Byrd  and  Hickman  (1992)).  I  hypothesize 
that  if  the  majority of  directors are  not  independent  (outsiders),  managers are  less  
likely  to  optimize  firm  performance,  and  therefore  an  increase  in  debt  covenants 
strictness should  matter  more for  this  type  of  firms.  Specifically,  in  the  last  column  of  
Table  1.8,  I  test  how variation  in  debt  covenant  strictness affects firms with  a  majority
16Andrew  Metrick  has  generously  made  the  data available  on  his  website.
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of  inside  directors (panel  A)  and  firms with  a  majority of  independent  directors 
(panel  B).  The results  suggest  an  increase  in  debt  covenant  strictness does not  have a  
significant  effect  on  the  profitability of  firms with  a  majority of  independent  directors 
(  >  50%).  Focusing  on  the  subsample of  firms with  a  majority of  inside  directors 
changes  the  results  considerably. Specifically,  I  find  a  10%  increase  in  debt  covenant  
strictness leads to  a  1.9%  increase  in  profitability, although  the  effect  is  statistically 
significant  only  at  the  10%  level.  These results  complement  the  previous findings 
and  are  consistent  with  the  idea  that  debt  covenants act  as  a  governance  substitute, 
leading  to  a  positive and  economically  large increase  in  firm  performance.  
1.4.2  The  Effects  of  Covenant  Strictness  on Performance  Through In- 
centives  
Previous studies examine the  association  between  covenant  violations  and  firm  
outcomes.  For  instance,  Chava  and  Roberts  (2008),  Roberts  et  al.  (2009),  and  Nini  
et  al.  (2012) find  that  covenant  violations  allow  creditors to  intervene with  firms’  
financial  policy  and  affect their  performance.  Covenant  violations  are  also  associated 
with  a  reduction  in  employment and  establishment closures (see  Falato and  Liang  
(2016) and  Ersahin  et  al.  (2016)).  
This paper  is  different  from  previous empirical  studies focusing  on  the  effects 
of  covenant  violations.  By  excluding covenant  violations  and  the  effects of  creditor 
intervention  on  firm  policies,  I  use  exogenous  variation  in  covenant  strictness at  
loan  origination  to  investigate the  treatment  effect  of  covenants through  incentives.  
Although  the  evidence in  the  previous section  are  consistent  with  this  interpretation,
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I  also  use  a  more direct  method  to  test  whether covenants affect firm  performance 
through  incentives.  
To  test  this  hypothesis I  identify  whether a  loan  package contains performance 
pricing  terms.  Performance pricing  terms  link  the  cost  of  debt  with  firm  performance;  
when  firms perform  poorly interest  rates  increase,  and  when  firm  performance improves 
interest  rates  decline.  Creditors use  performance pricing  as  a  “carrot  and  stick” 
incentive  mechanism  to  motivate managers to  exert higher  effort  (see  Manso  et  al.  
(2010)).  Therefore,  stricter covenants should  have a  larger effect  on  firms whose  loans 
do  not  have performance-linked  spreads.  
In  Table  1.9  I  split  firms into  two  groups,  based  on  whether their  cost  of  debt  is  
linked  with  the  debt  to  cash  flow  ratio,  or  interest  coverage  ratio.  The regression  
results  support  the  hypothesis that  stricter covenants affect performance through  
incentives.  Specifically,  an  increase  in  covenant  strictness leads to  a  statistically 
significant  effect  on  profitability only  for  firms whose  contracts do  not  contain  cash  
flow  based  pricing  grids  (column  2).  This result,  therefore,  is  consistent  with  the  
hypothesis that  stricter covenants  affect firm  efficiency  through  incentives.  
1.5  Robustness  
1.5.1  Matching  
As  a  source of  exogenous  variation  in  covenant  strictness, I  use  the  number  of  defaults 
on  the  portfolio of  the  lead  arranger  recently  prior  to  making a  new  loan.  To  construct 
the  IV,  I  calculate for  each  bank  in  the  sample the  number  of  firms that  defaulted  on
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a  bond  payment.  Unlike  violations  on  private agreements,  large defaults on  public  
debt  are  important events for  a  lender  that  significantly affect its assessment of  its 
screening and  monitoring process.  However,  this  methodology creates an  imbalance 
between  firms that  borrow from  a  lead  arranger  that  has suffered  at  least  one  default  
(treated  group)  and  firms that  borrow from  a  lead  arranger  that  is  less  likely  to  have 
made loans to  firms that  issue  bonds (control  group).  Smaller  banks make loans to  
smaller  firms,  which  are  less  likely  to  issue  bonds.  As  a  result,  firms in  the  treated  
group,  or  firms whose  lenders  tend  to  experience defaults in  their  portfolio, are  more 
likely  to  be  larger and  have different  characteristics than  firms in  the  control  group  
(firms  whose  lenders  suffer  no  defaults).  
Does  the  firm-bank  match  possibly  generate  a  selection  bias that  drives the  results  
in  this  paper? Although  I  explicitly control  for  firm  and  bank  characteristics in  the  
regressions,  to  further address  this  concern,  I  combine IV regressions  with  fixed  effects 
on  a  matched  sample.  Specifically,  I  match  firms whose  lead  arranger  in  the  six-month  
period  leading  to  the  new  loan  had  experienced at  least  one  default  (treated  group)  
with  firms whose  lead  arranger  had  not  suffered  from  any  defaults (control  group),  
on  the  basis of  the  following  characteristics: firm  size,  book leverage,  market-to-book 
value,  past  profitability, lead-lender  capitalization,  and  assets. Barber  and  Lyon  
(1996) argue  that  test  statistics of  empirical  methods based  on  measures  of  operating  
performance are  well  specified  when  treated  firms are  matched  to  a  control  group  of  
similar  pre-treatment  performance.  Matching firms on  these  characteristics following  
the  methodology  of  Abadie  and  Imbens (2006),  I  limit  my  sample in  the  common  
support  of  the  treated  and  control  group,  and  use  IV/2SLS  regressions  to  estimate
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the  effect  of  covenant  strictness on  firm  performance.  The second  panel  of  Table  
2.9  verifies  that  firms in  the  treated  and  control  group  have similar  characteristics, 
including  past  performance,  and  therefore  these  basic covariates are  well  balanced.  
Focusing  only  on  the  matched  sample,  the  top  panel  of  Table  2.9  presents  the  
results  from  the  OLS  regression  of  profitability on  covenant  strictness (first  column)  
and  instrumented  covenant  strictness (right  column).  Consistent  with  the  evidence in  
Table  1.3,  an  increase  in  covenant  strictness has a  positive effect  on  profitability only  
once  I  address  the  endogeneity  between  covenant  strictness and  firm  efficiency  using  
an  IV.  Overall,  the  results  in  the  matched  sample confirm  the  empirical  findings in  the  
previous sections,  and  suggest  an  increase  in  covenant  strictness has an  economically  
and  statistically significant  positive effect  on  profitability, even  after  addressing  
potential confounding  factors  attributed  to  significant  differences  between  firms in  
the  treated  and  control  groups.  
1.5.2  Robustness  Tests  
I  test  whether the  IV/2SLS  methodology spuriously generates a  positive effect  of  
covenant  strictness on  operating  performance.  I  randomly  assign  defaults in  the  
portfolio of  the  lead  arranger,  and  simulate 1,000  regressions  of  profitability on  
covenant  strictness (instrumented)  as  in  column  4  of  Table  1.3.  Because the  IV is  
random,  we  should  see  a  statistically significant  change  in  profitability in  fewer  than  
five out  of  100  simulations (to  satisfy  the  5%  confidence interval). Out  of  1,000  
simulations,  the  statistic is  greater  than  1.96  in  only  seven  instances  (Figure  1  in  the  
online  Appendix  shows  the  distribution  of  t-statistics).  The simulation  results  suggest
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the  statistical  significance of  the  IV/2SLS  results  fall  within the  desired  confidence 
interval,  and  the  observed  results  in  the  previous sections are  not  the  outcome  of  
chance.  
I  also  perform  a  Durbin-Wu-Hausman  test  (as seen  in  Hausman  (1978)) to  examine 
if  estimates from  OLS  regressions  are  biased.  The results  from  this  test  determine  
whether we  need  an  instrument  to  identify  the  relationship  between  covenant  strictness 
and  profitability. To  perform  this  test,  I  take the  residuals  from  the  first-stage 
regression  of  covenant  strictness on  the  IV (the  defaults count  measure),  and  then  
include  the  residuals  as  a  control  variable  in  a  regression  of  profitability on  debt  
covenant  strictness. If  a  significant  correlation  exists between  the  unexplained  portion 
of  covenant  strictness and  profitability in  the  second  stage,  it  would  strongly  suggest  
the  presence  of  endogeneity.  In  Table  1.11,  the  residuals  from  the  first-stage regression  
have a  significantly negative correlation  with  profitability. This result  implies  the  
unexplained  portion in  covenant  strictness in  a  normal OLS  framework  will  cause  a  
downward  bias in  our  estimates.  
1.6  Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  I  estimate the  causal  effects of  restrictive  loan  covenants on  firm  
profitability. As  an  instrument  for  covenant  strictness, I  use  the  number  of  defaults 
in  the  portfolio of  the  lead  arranger  leading  up  to  the  origination  of  a  new  loan.  
Focusing  on  syndicated loan  contracts,  a  major  source of  external finance for  firms,  I  
find  stricter debt  covenants cause  an  economically  and  statistically large increase  in
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profitability, and  a  reduction  in  operating  cost.  However,  stricter covenants improve 
firm  performance only  when  large shareholders have no  presence  on  the  firm’s board, 
when  managers are  entrenched, when  inside  directors dominate the  board, or  when  
firms face  softer  competition  in  their  product  market.  The results  support  the  view  
that  stricter debt  covenants act  as  a  governance  substitute and  mitigate agency  costs  
generated  by  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control.  
To  my  knowledge,  this  attempt  is  the  first  to  estimate the  causal  effect  of  loan  
covenants on  firms’  operating  efficiency. The main  advantage  of  the  IV approach  is  
that  it  allows  us  to  generalize  the  results  to  a  broader spectrum of  firms and  does 
not  limit  the  external validity  of  the  results  to  only  a  specific type  or  group  of  firms.  
For  instance,  previous studies exploit  threshold  discontinuities—such  as  covenant  
violations—and  estimate the  effects of  creditor intervention  on  firm  policies  on  the  
subsample of  poorly performing  firms that  violate  their  covenants.  Creditors could  
affect firm  performance  not  only  through  direct  intervention,  but  also  by  putting  the  
business  under  a  shorter  a  leash  and  increasing  the  threat  of  technical  violation  with  
more restrictive  debt  covenants.  The IV in  this  paper  provides exogenous  variation  
in  the  design  of  covenants at  origination  across a  broad spectrum of  firms,  and  allows  
us  to  identify  hidden  and  potentially important economic  relationships  between  the  
design  of  incentive  contracts and  firm  performance.
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1.7  Tables  Appendix  
APPENDIX: Definition of  Variables  
This table  provides details for  the  variables  used  throughout  the  paper.  Accounting  
data are  from  Compustat’s quarterly  file,  and  loan  data are  from  LPC  Dealscan.  I  
winsorize all  variables  at  the  1st  and  99th  percentile.
Variable Names  Description
Defaults  (180  days)  The number  of  firms whose  S&P credit rating  changed  to  
default  or  selective default  while they  still  had  an  active  
loan  180  days prior  to  a  new  loan  made by  their  lead  
arranger.  
Firm  Characteristics  
Book  Leverage  Total  Debt  /  Book  Assets  
Current Ratio  Current Assets  /  Current Liabilities  
Debt/Tangible  Net  Worth  Total  Debt  /  Tangible  Net  Worth  
EBITDA Sum  of  rolling  four-quarter operating  income before de-  
preciation  
EBITDA /  Assets  EBITDA /  Book  Assets  (ROA)  
Fixed  Charge  Coverage  EBITDA /  (Rolling  4-quarter  Interest and  Related  Ex- 
penses  +  Debt  in  current liabilities one  year  prior) 
Market  Equity Stock  Price ⇥  Shares Outstanding  
Market-to-Book  (Market  Equity +  Total  Debt  +  Preferred Stock  liquidat- 
ing  value  -  Deferred  Taxes  and  Investment Tax  Credits )  
/  Book  Assets  
EBITDA /  Sales EBITDA /  Sum  or  rolling  four-quarter sales  
Sales/Assets  Sum  of  rolling  four-quarter sales  /  Book  Assets  
Tangible  Net  Worth  Net  PPE  /  Book  Assets  
Total  Debt  Short-term  debt  +  Long-term  debt
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Z-Score  3.3  ⇥  Pre-tax  Income/Assets  +  0.999  ⇥  Sales/Assets  +  1.4  
⇥  Retained  Earnings/Assets  +  1.2  ⇥  (Current  Assets  
-  Current Liabilities)/Assets  +0.6  ⇥  Mkt  Equity/Total  
Liabilities  
Loan Characteristics  
Loan  Spread  The All-in-Drawn  Spread  from  Dealscan,  for  each  dollar 
borrower draw,  excluding fees  
Covenant  Number  Total  number  of  financial  covenants in  the  loan  contract  
Loan  Amount  The sum  of  all  amounts  in  a  certain  loan  package 
Loan  Maturity The number  of  months between  the  earliest  loan  origina-  
tion  date and  the  latest  maturity date in  a  certain  loan  
package 
Loan  Purpose Indicator  variables  for  the  following  categories  reported  in  
DealScan:  corporate purposes,  debt  repayment,  working 
capital,  takeover,  CP  backup,  or  other  
Loan  Participants The total  number  of  participating banks (non  lead-  
arrangers)  in  a  certain  loan  package 
Covenant  Strictness  Indicates the  probability that  the  firm  will  violate  at  least  
one  of  its covenants in  the  next  quarter.  To  construct 
the  measure,  I  follow  the  methodology of  Murfin  (2012).  
To  construct the  measure I  use  covenant  definitions from  
Demerjian  and  Owens (2014) and  also  include  additional  
ratios often  used  in  debt  contracts 
Governance  Characteristics  
Blockholder Ownership  The share of  a  firm’s shares owned  by  shareholders with  
at  least  5%  of  the  firm’s outstanding  shares (Source:  
Thomson  Reuters  13F)  
G-Index  Governance index  from  Gompers et  al.  (2003).  The 
measure ranges  from  between  1-24,  with  higher  values  
representing  lower  shareholder  rights
 40  
TNIC-3-HHI  Measure of  product  market  competition  constructed by  
Hoberg  and  Phillips (2010a) based  on  firm  pairwise sim- 
ilarity scores  from  text  analysis  of  firm  10K  product  
descriptions.  Data  are  available  at  http://cwis.usc.  
edu/projects/industrydata/  .  
Board  Independence The share of  independent  directors in  the  board of  a  
company  (Source:  Boardex)  
Bank  Characteristics  
Bank  Assets  Bank  Assets  (Sources:  Compustat  NA Bank,  Compustat  
Global,  Bankscope)  
Bank  Capitalization  Shareholder  equity /  Bank  assets (Sources:  Compustat  
NA Bank,  Compustat  Global,  Bankscope)
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Table  1.1  :  Summary  Statistics  
This  table  presents  summary  statistics  of  firm,  loan,  governance,  and  bank  characteristics.  
Accounting information  is  from  Compustat.  Loan  information  is  from  LPC  Dealscan.  Bank  
information  is  from  Compustat  NA Bank,  Compustat  Global,  and  Bankscope.  Governance  
variable  are  from  various  sources  cited  in  the  Appendix.  All  variables  are  described  in  detail  
in  the  Appendix.
Variable  N  Mean SD  10%  50%  90%
Firm  Characteristics
Total  Assets(m.$)  3701  3381.8  6482.1  157.0  1184.8  8418.1  
EBITDA/Assets  3701  0.15  0.07  0.07  0.14  0.23  
Market  Value/Book Value 3701  1.42  0.93  0.64  1.16  2.44  
Has  SP  rating  3701  0.50  0.50  0.00  1.00  1.00  
Tangibility 3700  0.35  0.24  0.08  0.29  0.74  
Book  Leverage  3701  0.27  0.15  0.07  0.26  0.47  
Altman-Z  3701  4.75  3.00  1.40  4.31  8.86
Loan  Variables
Cov.Strictness 3701  22.79  20.79  0.04  18.31  52.91  
Maturity (months)  3701  49.92  18.75  21.00  60.00  61.00  
Amount(m.$)  3701  475.20  679.14  40.00  250.00  1100.00  
Secured  3701  0.47  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Number  of  Participants 3701  9.76  8.14  1.00  8.00  21.00  
Number  of  Lead  Arrangers  3701  1.57  1.06  1.00  1.00  3.00
Governance Variables
Blockholder Ownership  2720  0.18  0.14  0.00  0.17  0.37  
G-index 1643  9.16  2.57  6.00  9.00  13.00  
TNIC-3-HHI  3135  0.20  0.20  0.04  0.13  0.47  
Independent Directors(%)  1423  0.56  0.26  0.11  0.64  0.83
Bank  Characteristics
Bank  Assets(b.$)  3409  843.6  754.9  111.0  619.9  2210.9  
Bank  Capitalization  3409  0.078  0.022  0.05  0.080  0.107
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Table  1.2  :  First-Stage  - OLS regressions  of  covenant  strictness  on lender  
defaults  
This table  presents  the  estimation  results  from  OLS  regressions  of  covenant  strictness. 
In  all  regressions  the  dependent  variable  is  covenant  strictness of  the  loan  contract;  
it  ranges  from  0-100  and  represents  the  probability that  the  firm  will  violate  at  
least  one  covenant  over  the  next  quarter.  To  construct the  loan  covenant  strictness 
measure I  follow  Murfin  (2012) (see  the  Appendix  Table  for  detailed  explanation  of  
its construction). The independent  variable  of  interest  is  the  number  of  outstanding  
loans in  the  portfolio of  the  lead  arranger  that  defaulted  180  days prior  to  the  
origination  of  the  new  loan.  In  all  regressions,  I  include  firm  controls (size,  leverage,  
cash  flows,  liquidity,  tangible  net  worth,  and  market-to-book value),  loan  controls 
(maturity,  amount,  participants, collateral,  and  spread),  and  bank  controls (size  
and  capitalization).  All  variables  are  defined  in  the  Appendix.  Standard errors are  
reported  below each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered at  the  firm  and  lender  
level.  Significance at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level  is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  
respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  
Cov  Strictness  Cov  Strictness  Cov  Strictness
Lender  Defaults  (past  180  days)  0.893⇤⇤⇤  0.825⇤⇤⇤  0.908⇤⇤⇤  
(0.207)  (0.217)  (0.302)  
(EBITDA/Assets)t     1  -54.093⇤⇤⇤  -55.214⇤⇤⇤  -58.918⇤⇤⇤  
(4.787)  (6.640)  (8.800)  
Ln(Assets)  -3.088⇤⇤⇤  -0.679  1.630  
(0.571)  (0.667)  (1.983)  
Book  Leverage  45.807⇤⇤⇤  48.504⇤⇤⇤  50.999⇤⇤⇤  
(2.741)  (4.123)  (5.938)  
Altman  Z-score  -0.557⇤⇤⇤  -0.431⇤⇤  -0.223  
(0.211)  (0.218)  (0.410)  
Observations  3379  3379  3379  
Adjusted  R2  0.299  0.390  0.560  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year,Lender,Purpose,Rating FEs  No  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  No  Yes  No  
Firm  FEs  No  No  Yes
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Table  1.3  :  OLS  vs  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  firm  profitability  on  covenant  strictness  
This  table  presents  the  estimation  results from  OLS  (1-3)  and  IV/2SLS  (4-6)  regressions  of  changes  in  profitability  
(ROA).  The  dependent  variable  is  the  change  in  EBITDA/Assets  one  year  after  the  loan  origination  date.  The  
independent variable  of  interest in  OLS  regressions  is  the  strictness  of  debt  covenants  (see  the  Appendix  for  measure  
details).  In  IV/2SLS  regressions,  the  instrumental  variable  for  debt  covenant  strictness  is  the  number  of  defaults  in  
the  lead  arranger’s  loan  portfolio in  the  past  180 days  before  the  origination  of  the  loan.  Columns  (1)  and  (4)  use  
the  full  sample  of  loans,  and  columns  (2)-(3)  and  (5)-(6)  use  the  sample  of  firms  that  have  an  existing  relationship  
with the  lead  lender (at  least  two  loans).  In  all  regressions,  I  include as  controls  the  lagged  dependent  variable  and  
its  squared  value.  The  regressions  also include firm  controls  (size,  leverage,  cash  flows,  liquidity,  tangible  net  worth,  
and  market-to-book  value),  loan  controls  (maturity,  amount,  participants,  collateral,  and  spread),  and  bank  controls  
(size  and  capitalization).  All  regressions  include year,  lender, purpose,  and  rating fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  are  
reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  lender level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  
and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
OLS IV/2SLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
 ROA t  +1   ROAt  +1   ROA t  +1   ROAt  +1   ROAt  +1   ROA t  +1
Cov.Strictness -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0002  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cov.Strictness (Instr)  0.0013⇤⇤  0.0025⇤⇤  0.0027⇤⇤  
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0013) 
Observations  2969  1466  1466  2969  1466  1466  
Adjusted  R2  0.182  0.255  0.464  -  -  -  
AR  p-value  -  -  -  0.001  0.00  0.001  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  
Firm  FEs  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
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Table  1.4  :  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  firm  profitability  (year  +1,+2,+3)  on  covenant  strictness  
This  table  presents  the  estimation  results from  OLS  and  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  changes  in  profitability  (ROA)  one,  
two,  and  three  years  after  loan  origination,  respectively. The  independent variable  of  interest is  an  instrument for  the  
strictness  of  debt  covenants  (for  details,  see  the  Appendix).  The  instrumental  variable  for  debt  covenant  strictness  
is  the  number  of  defaults  in  the  lead  arranger’s  loan  portfolio in  the  past  180 days  before  the  loan  origination  date.  
In  all  regressions,  I  include as  controls  the  lagged  dependent  variable  and  its  squared  value.  The  regressions  also 
include firm  controls  (size,  leverage,  cash  flows,  liquidity,  tangible  net  worth,  and  market-to-book  value),  loan  controls  
(maturity,  amount,  participants,  collateral,  and  spread),  and  bank  controls  (size  and  capitalization).  All  regressions  
include year,  lender, purpose,  and  rating fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  
and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  lender level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  
***,  respectively.
OLS IV/2SLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
 (ROA)t,t  +1   (ROA)t,t  +2   (ROA)t,t  +3   (ROA)t,t  +1   (ROA)t,t  +2   (ROA)t,t  +3
Cov.Strictness -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0005⇤⇤  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Cov.Strictness (Instr)  0.0013⇤⇤  0.0014  0.0023  
(0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
Observations  2969  2746  2080  2969  2746  2080  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
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Table  1.5  :  The  effect  of  covenant  strictness  on  cost  efficiency  and  R&D  expenses 
Starting from  the  regression  on  the  left  to the  right,  the  dependent  is:  change  in  EBITDA  over  sales  (profit  margins),  
change  in  sales  over  assets  (asset  utilization),  change  in  cost  of  goods  sold  over  sales,  change  in  administrative  expenses  
over  sales,  and  change  in  R&D  expenses  over  assets.  In  column  (5),  I  multiply the  change  in  R&D  expenses  by  100,  
so the  estimated  coefficients  represent the  percentage  change  in  R&D  over  assets.  In  all  columns,  the  change  in  the  
dependent  variable  is  based  on  the  date  of  loan  origination  and  the  year  after.  The  instrumental  variable  is  the  
number  of  defaults  the  lender has  suffered  in  its  portfolio 180 days  prior  to the  loan  origination  date.  The  regressions  
include firm  controls  (size,  leverage,  cash  flows,  liquidity,  tangible  net  worth,  and  market-to-book  value),  loan  controls  
(maturity,  amount,  participants,  collateral,  and  spread),  and  bank  controls  (size  and  capitalization).  All  regressions  
include year,  lender, purpose,  and  rating fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  
and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  lender level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  
***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
(Ebitda/Sales)  (Sales/Assets)  (Cost  of  goods/Sales)  (Adm.Exp./Sales)  (R&D/Assets)
Cov.Strictness (Instr)  0.0015⇤⇤  -0.0016  -0.0013⇤⇤⇤  0.0010  -0.0577⇤  
(0.0007) (0.0054) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0329) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.0017  0.0334⇤⇤⇤  -0.0031⇤  -0.0040⇤  0.0329  
(0.0021) (0.0109) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.1623) 
Book  Leverage  -0.0196  0.1728  0.0541⇤⇤⇤  -0.0512  2.1905  
(0.0373) (0.2373) (0.0115) (0.0623) (1.6307) 
Altman  Z-score  0.0064⇤⇤⇤  -0.0152⇤⇤  -0.0037⇤⇤⇤  -0.0005  0.0352  
(0.0010) (0.0077) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0409) 
Observations  2981  3052  3027  2696  1127  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
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Table  1.6  :  Do stricter  debt  covenants  affect  earnings  manipulation?  
The  dependent  variable  in  column  (1)  is  discretionary  current  accruals  as  in  Jones  (1991)  method.  In  column  (2),  
the  dependent  variable  is  discretionary  current  accruals  using the  modified Jones  (1991)  model  as  in  Dechow  et  al.  
(1995).  The  independent variable  is  an  instrument for  the  strictness  of  debt  covenants.  The  instrumental  variable  for  
debt  covenant  strictness  is  the  number  of  defaults  in  the  lead  arranger’s  loan  portfolio in  the  past  180 days  before  the  
origination  of  the  loan.  The  regressions  include firm  controls  (size,  leverage,  cash  flows,  liquidity,  tangible  net  worth,  
and  market-to-book  value),  loan  controls  (maturity,  amount,  participants,  collateral,  and  spread),  and  bank  controls  
(size  and  capitalization).  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  
and  lender level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  
Discretionary  Cur.  Accruals  Discretionary  Cur.  Accruals  
(Jones  method)  (Modified  Jones)
Cov.Strictness (Instr)  0.005  0.006  
(0.006)  (0.007)  
Observations  2871  2866  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  
Year,Lender,Purpose,Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes  Yes
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Table  1.7  :  Do stricter  debt  covenants  affect  risk  shifting?  
The  dependent  variable  in  all  regressions  is  the  trailing standard  deviation  of  four  quarter  changes  in  Ebitda/Assets  
(ROA).  In  columns  (1)-(3),  the  dependent  variable  is  the  trailing standard  deviation  of  quarterly  changes  in  ROA four  
quarters,  six  quarters,  and  eight  quarters  after  the  origination  of  the  loan,  respectively. The  independent variable  is  an  
instrument for  the  strictness  of  debt  covenants.  The  instrumental  variable  for  debt  covenant  strictness  is  the  number  
of  defaults  in  the  lead  arranger’s  loan  portfolio in  the  past  180 days  before  the  origination  of  the  loan.  The  regressions  
include firm  controls  (size,  leverage,  cash  flows,  liquidity,  tangible  net  worth,  and  market-to-book  value),  loan  controls  
(maturity,  amount,  participants,  collateral,  and  spread),  and  bank  controls  (size  and  capitalization).  Standard  errors  
are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  lender level. Significance  at  the  10%,  
5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  
ROA Volatility(4qtr) ROA Volatility(6qtr) ROA Volatility(8qtr)
Cov.Strictness (Instr)  -0.0015  -0.0041⇤⇤  -0.0052⇤⇤  
(0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
Observations  3001  2856  2752  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year,Lender,Purpose,Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes
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Table  1.8  :  OLS  vs.  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  firm  efficiency  on  covenant  strictness.  Low  Governance  
Firms  (Panel  A)  vs  High  Governance  Firms  (Panel  B)  
This  table  presents  the  estimation  results from  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  changes  in  profitability  (ROA).  The  dependent  
variable  in  all  regressions  across  both  panels  is  the  change  in  EBITDA/Assets  one  year  after  the  loan  origination  
date.  The  independent variable  of  interest is  an  instrument for  the  strictness  of  debt  covenants.  The  instrumental  
variable  for  debt  covenant  strictness  is  the  number  of  defaults  in  the  lead  arranger’s  loan  portfolio in  the  past  180 
days  before  the  origination  of  the  loan.  Regressions  in  Panel  A contain  only  firms  that  at  the  date  of  loan  origination  
have  low  governance,  and  in  Panel  B  firms  with high  governance.  A firm  is  poorly  governed  if  its  ownership  from  
large  shareholders  is  below  the  median  (  Blockholders  Low  ),  shareholder  rights  are  low  (  G-index  high  below  median),  
competition  in  its  product  market  is  below  the  median  (  Competition  Low  ),  and  the  share  of  independent directors  on  
the  board  is  less than  50%  (  Board  independence high  ).  In  all  regressions,  I  include as  controls  the  lagged  dependent  
variable  and  its  squared  value.  The  regressions  also include firm  controls  (size,  leverage,  cash  flows,  liquidity,  tangible  
net  worth,  and  market-to-book  value),  loan  controls  (maturity,  amount,  participants,  collateral,  and  spread),  and  bank  
controls  (size  and  capitalization).  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  
the  firm  and  lender level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
Panel  A:  Low  Governance  Firms  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
(Blockholders Low) (G-index High) (Competition Low) (Board Indep. Low) 
 (ROA)t  +1   (ROA)t  +1   (ROA)t  +1   (ROA)t  +1
Cov.Strictness (Instr)  0.0021⇤⇤  0.0024⇤⇤  0.0028⇤⇤  0.0019⇤  
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Observations  981  828  1397  348  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year,Purpose,Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Lender  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
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(Table  1.8— Continued )
Panel  B:  High Governance  Firms  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
(Blockholders High) (G-index Low) (Competition High) (Board Indep. High) 
 (ROA)t  +1   (ROA)  t  +1   (ROA)t  +1   (ROA)t  +1
Cov.Strictness (Instr)  -0.0025  -0.0002  -0.0010  -0.0009  
(0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0009) 
Observations  1249  590  1265  926  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year,Purpose,Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Lender  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
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Table  1.9  :  OLS  vs  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  firm  profitability  on  covenant  strictness  -  Performance  
Pricing 
This  table  presents  the  estimation  results from  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  changes  in  profitability  (ROA).  The  dependent  
variable  is  the  change  in  EBITDA/Assets  one  year  after  the  loan  origination  date.  The  independent variable  of  interest 
in  is  strictness  of  debt  covenants  (see  the  Appendix  for  measure  details).  The  instrumental  variable  for  debt  covenant  
strictness  is  the  number  of  defaults  in  the  lead  arranger’s  loan  portfolio in  the  past  180 days  before  the  origination  
of  the  loan.  Column  (1)  contains  only  firms  whose  loan  spread  is  linked to their  debt  to cash  flow  ratio,  or  interest 
coverage  ratio.  Column  (2)  contains  only  firms  whose  loan  does  not  contain  performance  pricing  terms  based  on  
debt  to cash  flow  or  interest coverage.  In  all  regressions,  I  include as  controls  the  lagged  dependent  variable  and  its  
squared  value.  The  regressions  also include firm  controls  (size,  leverage,  cash  flows,  liquidity,  tangible  net  worth,  and  
market-to-book  value),  loan  controls  (maturity,  amount,  participants,  collateral,  and  spread),  and  bank  controls  (size  
and  capitalization).  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  
lender level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  
(With Performance Pricing) (Without Performance Pricing) 
 (ROA)t  +1   (ROA)  t  +1
Cov.Strictness (Instr)  0.0012  0.0021⇤⇤  
(0.0015) (0.0009) 
Observations  1293  1675  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  
Year,Lender,Purpose,Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes  Yes
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Table  1.10  :  OLS  and  IV/2SLS  regressions  of  profitability  on  covenant  strict- 
ness  in  a matched  sample  
The  top  panel  of  this table  presents  the  estimation  results from  OLS  (left  column)  and  
IV/2SLS  (right  column)  regressions  of  changes  in  firms’  profitability  one  year  after  the  loan  
origination  date  on  covenant  strictness  (left  column)  and  its  instrument (right  column),  
respectively. I  match  treated  firms  (whose  principal  bank  has  suffered  at  least  one  default  
in  the  past  180 days  prior  to making a loan)  with a group  of  control  firms  (principal  bank  
has  suffered  no defaults  in  the  past  180 days  prior  to the  loan  origination  date)  based  on  
size,  book  leverage  and  market  to book,  lagged  ROA,  lead-lender  capitalization,  and  assets.  
The  bottom  panel  presents  the  standardized  differences of  these  variables  across  treated  
and  control  units.  Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  
respectively. 
Matched Sample
OLS IV/2SLS 
 (ROA)t  +1   (ROA)  t  +1
Cov  Strictness  0.0001  
(0.0001) 
Cov  Strictness  (Instr)  0.0021⇤⇤  
(0.0009) 
Observations  1243  1243  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  
Year,Lender,Purpose,Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes  Yes
Covariate  Balance  (Defaults=0)  (Defaults  >  0)  Standardized  Diff.  p-value
Ln(Assets)  7.42  7.55  0.13  0.100  
MB  1.39  1.45  0.06  0.294  
BL  0.27  0.26  -0.01  0.112  
ROAt     1  0.15  0.15  0.00  0.895  
Capitalization  0.07  0.07  0.00  0.236  
Ln(Bank  Assets)  13.55  13.54  -0.01  0.715
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Table  1.11  :  Hausman-Durbin-Wu  test  of  endogeneity  
This  table  presents  the  estimation  results from  OLS  regressions  of  changes  in  profitability,  
as  in  Table  III  (column  5).  The  dependent  variable  is  the  change  in  EBITDA/Assets  a year  
after  the  start  of  the  loan.  The  instrumental  variable  for  contract  strictness  is  the  number  
of  defaults  in  the  lender’s loan  portfolio 180 days  before  the  origination  of  the  loan.  The  
regression  includes as  an  independent variable  the  residuals  from  the  first-stage  regression  of  
contract  strictness  on  the  number  of  lenders’ defaults.  In  all  regressions,  I  include as  controls  
the  lagged  dependent  variable  and  its  squared  value.  The  regressions  also include firm  
controls  (size,  leverage,  cash  flows,  liquidity,  tangible  net  worth,  and  market-to-book  value),  
loan  controls  (maturity,  amount,  participants,  collateral,  and  spread),  and  bank  controls  
(size  and  capitalization).  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  
and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  lender level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  
indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
 (ROA)  t  +1
Cov.Strictness 0.0016⇤⇤  
(0.0008) 
Strictness  Residual  (Hausman)  -0.0016⇤⇤  
(0.0008) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.0092⇤⇤  
(0.0038) 
Book  Leverage  -0.0100  
(0.0385) 
Altman  Z-score  0.0110⇤⇤⇤  
(0.0009) 
Observations  2976  
Adjusted  R2  0.181  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  
Year,Lender,Purpose,Rating FEs  Yes  
Industry FEs  Yes
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— Chapter  2  — 
Loan Syndication Networks  and Loan Pricing  - 
Evidence  from  Bank  Mergers  
2.1  Introduction 
A small  number  of  interconnected  banks increasingly  dominate the  syndicated loan  
market.  In  2014,  the  top  5  financial  institutions had  underwritten  and  jointly  
participated in  more than  80%  of  all  loans syndicated inside  the  United  States.  The 
syndicated loan  market  is  a  hybrid  form  of  private and  public  financing,  whereby 
lenders  need  to  compete with  each  other  to  gain  the  coveted  role  of  the  lead  arranger,  
but  also  need  to  collaborate  to  share the  costs  associated with  the  loan  issue  (Dennis  
and  Mullineaux (2000)).  Therefore,  traditional  measures  of  market  concentration,  
such  as  the  bank’s market  share,  cannot  capture the  relationships,  the  connections,  
or  the  reciprocity  that  lenders  develop  with  each  other  over  years  of  collaborating  in  
loan  syndications. In  this  study, I  use  measures  from  network  analysis  to  investigate 
whether lender  interconnectedness  helps  explain  the  pricing  and  non-pricing  terms  of  
syndicated loans.  
Theory  suggests  that  lender  interconnectedness  may  have either a  positive or  
a  negative effect  on  loan  prices.  On  the  one  hand,  well-connected  underwriters 
can  exploit  their  position  in  the  banking industry  to  coordinate their  activities  and  
extract higher  rents  from  borrowers via  threat  of  adverse  selection  (see  Sharpe (1990),
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Rajan  (1992),  Hauswald  and  Marquez (2006)).  On  the  other  hand,  well-connected  
underwriters can  facilitate collaboration  with  other  lenders  and  improve the  efficiency  
of  their  screening and  monitoring decisions,  leading  to  a  reduction  in  firms’  cost  of  
debt  (Broecker  (1990),  Shaffer  (1998),  Marquez (2002)).  
To  measure the  interconnectedness  of  a  lender  in  the  syndicated loan  market,  I  
use  three  measures  of  network  centrality. These measures  capture three  different  
aspects of  a  bank’s position  in  the  network  of  lenders  that  originate  and  participate 
in  syndicated loans.  To  calculate the  first  measure of  centrality, degree centrality, I  
count  the  number  of  different  investors that  a  lender  has co-syndicated  with  over  
the  past  year  to  capture the  breadth  of  its network  of  collaborators.  To  create the  
second  measure of  lender  centrality, outdegree  centrality, I  count  the  number  of  
different  banks that  participated in  deals originated  by  that  lender;  this  measure is  
different  from  degree centrality because  it  captures a  lender’s  ability  to  find  investors 
to  participate in  its own  deals.  Finally,  for  every banks I  also  calculate its indegree 
centrality, by  counting the  number  of  different  lenders  that  invited  this  bank  to  
participate in  their  deals;  this  measure captures a  bank’s ability  to  access information 
about  borrowers they  otherwise  would  not  have access to.  These centrality measures,  
unlike market  share,  are  based  on  the  propensity  of  lenders  to  create and  participate 
in  syndicated loans,  and  capture different  dimensions  of  lenders’  influence  on  the  loan  
market.1
1Esty  (2001)  stresses  the  importance  of  maintaining close  connections  with other  banks  to compete  
for  the  role  of  the  lead  arranger  by  including a quote  from  loan  office  from  Chase:  “The key  to  
success  in  this  business  is  being close to  the market.  This  means  being in  touch  with  banks  on  a  
weekly,  if  not  daily, basis.  We started  with  a  universe of  90  banks  and  created  a  target  lender  list
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I  find  evidence that,  on  average,  highly  interconnected  lenders  offer 10-15  basis 
points lower  loan  spreads to  firms.  Lenders  with  a  large market  share also  offer lower  
interest  rates,  but  the  effect  of  market  share on  loan  prices  drops considerably  when  I  
include  both  interconnectedness  and  market  share in  the  regressions.  These findings 
suggest  that  measures  of  lender  interconnectedness  can  better  explain  the  variation  
in  loan  spreads.  
The main  challenge  in  testing  the  effects of  lender  interconnectedness  on  interest  
rates  is  that  firms with  lower  credit risk  may  choose  to  borrow from  lenders  that  
are  well-connected.  To  ensure that  borrowers do  not  match  endogenously  with  
well-connected  lenders,  I  focus  on  a  sample of  firms borrowing from  a  lender  that  
was  acquired  by  or  merged  with  another  bank.  Focusing  on  this  sample allows  
me  to  exploit  variation  in  lender  connectedness induced  by  bank  mergers,  and  is  
plausibly  exogenous  to  firm  characteristics or  bank-firm  relationships.2  For  instance,  
Schlumberger,  an  oil  gas  services company,  established  a  credit line  with  Chase  in  
August  1999  and  renewed  its credit line  with  JP  Morgan  Chase  after  their  merger  in  
2000.  The identifying  assumption  is  that  the  change  in  the  connectedness of  the  lead  
arranger  after  the  merger  is  exogenous  to  borrower characteristics because  the  firm  
had  an  existing relationship  with  one  of  the  lenders.
that might  be interested  in  this  deal.  [..]  Based  on  our  analysis for  the Disney  deal,  we expected  it  
would  be oversubscribed  by  57%.  This  kind  of  analysis illustrates  our  closeness  to  the market  and  
our  confidence in  the deal.” 
2Asker  and  Ljungqvist  (2010)  also use  bank  mergers  as  an  exogenous  shock  to borrowers’  information  
flows  across  banks.  In  Thakor  and  Boot  (2008),  Philip  Strahan  also argues  that  “The  ideal  empirical  
test  would  involve  exogenous  shocks  to relationship  duration,  such  as  what  might  occur  following a 
bank  merger  or  failure”.
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Using  variation  in  lead  arranger  centrality after  a  bank  merger,  I  find  that  firms’  
cost  of  debt  declines  by  8  basis points on  average,  but  only  if  the  borrowers’  lead  
arranger  experiences a  large increase  in  outdegree  centrality. Interestingly, increases  
in  market  share,  degree centrality, and  indegree centrality do  not  appear  to  have a  
statistically significant  effect  on  borrowers’  cost  of  debt.  These results  corroborate 
the  view  that  interconnectedness  does not  simply proxy for  bank  size.  Lenders  with  
high  outdegree  centrality have a  larger network  of  lenders  that  participate in  their  
deals and  can  credibly convey  information they  extract about  borrowers to  other  
investors.  
Loan  syndication  networks may  reduce  the  cost  of  debt  by  facilitating the  trans-  
mission  of  information across lenders  and  reducing  information asymmetries  between  
lenders  and  borrowers (Marquez  (2002)).  If  this  hypothesis is  true,  the  effect  of  lender  
interconnectedness  on  the  cost  of  debt  should  be  economically  larger for  firms that  
exhibit higher  levels  of  information asymmetry.  Consistent  with  this  hypothesis,  I  
find  that  an  exogenous  increase  in  outdegree  centrality leads to  15-17  basis points 
reduction  in  firms’  cost  of  borrowing on  average,  but  only  for  private or  unrated  
firms.  The results  are  also  more pronounced  for  well-performing firms,  consistent  
with  the  view  that  well-connected  lenders  improve loan  terms  for  high  quality  and  
credit constrained  borrowers.  The results  are  qualitatively  similar  when  I  also  focus  
on  a  matched  sample of  firms.  
I  also  investigate whether well-connected  lenders  affect other  dimensions  of  loan  
contract  terms,  such  as  loan  maturity, package amount,  or  the  number  and  the  
strictness of  financial  covenants.  I  find  that  well-connected  lenders  are  more likely  to
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offer extended loan  maturities,  and  are  less  likely  to  demand  collateral.  However,  I  
do  not  find  evidence that  interconnectedness  affects loan  amount,  or  the  strictness of  
financial  covenants  in  new  loans.  
This paper  is  related  to  a  number  of  different  studies. The findings are  consistent  
with  theoretical  and  empirical  studies that  focus  on  the  organizational  structure 
of  underwriting  syndicates and  its effect  of  loan  contracts.  Specifically,  theory  
suggests  that  relationships  between  underwriters can  mitigate syndicate moral hazard,  
such  as  free-riding in  screening and  monitoring (Holmstrom  (1982),  Pichler  and  
Wilhelm  (2001)).  The existence of  information asymmetry  between  lenders  implies  
that  standard  industrial  organizational  results  may  not  apply  for  the  loan  market  
(Dell’Ariccia  (2001),  Marquez (2002)).  This paper  contributes to  the  literature by  
providing empirical  support  to  the  hypothesis that  well-connected  underwriters can  
convey  information about  loan  value  to  other  investors through  the  loan  syndication  
process  and  affect the  pricing  of  loan  contract  terms.  Despite  the  significant  reduction  
in  the  number  of  banks that  are  active  in  the  syndicated loan  market,  I  do  not  to  
find  evidence that  lenders  collude or  extract higher  rents  due  to  market  power.  
The results  complement  several  empirical  studies that  investigate the  role  of  
investor  networks.  Grullon et  al.  (2014) find  that  investment  banking networks 
affect trading  behavior. Using  measures  of  network  centrality, Hochberg  et  al.  (2007) 
find  that  VC  networks affect fund  performance,  and  Bajo  et  al.  (2016) show  that  
underwriter  networks affect IPO  characteristics. Houston  et  al.  (2015) find  that  
connections through  lenders’  boards facilitates information flows,  and  Cai  et  al.  (2011) 
show  that  lender  connectedness increases  systemic risk.  This paper  also  relates
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to  Barth  et  al.  (2009),  who  find  that  information sharing between  lenders  reduces  
information asymmetry  and  improves the  efficiency  of  lending  decisions.  Finally,  the  
findings in  this  paper  also  complement  the  work  of  Sufi  (2007) and  Ivashina (2009),  
who  show  that  information asymmetry  between  lenders  affects the  structure of  loan  
syndicates and  has a  significant  impact  on  loan  prices.3  
The rest  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  I  describes  the  dataset  and  
the  main  variables  of  the  empirical  methodology. Section  II  presents  the  empirical  
results,  and  section  III  concludes.  
2.2  Data  and Empirical  Strategy  
2.2.1  Data  and summary  statistics  
I  collect  data for  all  loans syndicated in  the  U.S.  between  1992  and  2014  from  
Loan  Pricing Corporation’s (LPC)  Dealscan  database. Dealscan  contains detailed  
loan  contract  information, such  as  the  loan  spread,  maturity, amount,  and  financial  
covenants.  I  merge loan  information from  Dealscan  with  accounting  information 
from  Compustat’s quarterly  fundamental  file using  the  link  by  Chava  and  Roberts  
(2008).  After  excluding financial  companies,  my  final  sample consists of  4,457  firms 
and  32,722  unique loan  facilities.  Firms  with  access to  the  syndicated loan  market  
are  large,  with  a  median  firm  size of  $1.5  billion  (median  firm  in  Compustat  is  about
3Focusing on  municipal  bonds,  corporate  bonds,  and  IPO/SEO  underwriting,  many  studies  highlight  
the  importance  of  information  asymmetry  due  to geographical  distance  or  past  relationships  with a 
firm  on  the  choice  and  the  structure  of  underwriting  syndicates  (see  Lee  and  Mullineaux  (2004),  
Corwin  and  Schultz  (2005),  Yasuda (2005),  Ljungqvist  et  al.  (2006),  and  Butler  (2008).
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$150  million).  Syndicated  loans are  large,  the  average  loan  amount  is  $450  million,  
and  require  multiple banks to  participate to  underwrite a  deal.  With  an  average  
maturity of  5  years,  syndicated loans have shorter  maturities than  bonds and  are  
commonly  secured  with  collateral.  
Dealscan  provides the  name of  the  lender,  often  using  regional  branch  names,  or  
the  name of  a  subsidiary. I  combine regional  branches and  subsidiaries operating  with  
a  different  brand  name under  a  common  parent  company.4  I  exclude from  the  sample 
lenders  that  have been  the  lead  arranger  for  fewer  than  20  loans throughout  the  
whole  sample period.  This filter does not  affect considerably  the  size of  the  sample as  
the  top  100  lenders  originate  more than  80%  of  loans in  Dealscan.  The final  dataset  
contains 158  lenders,  including  both  depository and  non-depository institutions,  with  
an  average  of  $960  billions in  assets. 
2.2.2  Bank  consolidations  
Mergers are  important events for  firms and  have a  large impact  on  their  organizational  
and  capital  structure. Mergers between  large firms can  also  cause  significant  changes  in  
the  structure of  their  industries  (Gabaix  (2011)).  In  the  banking industry,  deregulation 
has led  to  significant  M&A  activity  between  banks and  changed  the  shape  of  the  
financial  services industry  (Berger  et  al.  (1999)).  Figure  2.1  shows  the  total  number  
and  the  average  size of  lenders  that  originate  loans and  participate in  the  syndicated 
loan  market.  It  is  evident that  the  number  of  lenders  has declined  since 1990,  and
4I  am  particularly  thankful  to Justin  Murfin  for  his  help  linking regional  branches  at  the  parent  
level.
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their  average  size has increased.  The reduction  in  the  number  of  banks participating 
in  the  syndicated loan  market  started  before the  repeal  of  the  Glass  Steagall Act  and  
continued  after  the  great  recession.  
The consolidation  in  the  banking industry  has affected the  syndicated loan  market  
and  as  a  result  a  small  number  of  large lenders  dominate the  market.  The propensity  
of  a  few  large banks to  co-syndicate loans has increased  considerably, creating a  small  
number  of  highly  interconnected  lenders.  Because bank  mergers cause  significant  
changes  in  banking industry,  I  use  these  large events as  a  source of  variation  in  bank  
connectedness to  investigate its effect  on  debt  contracting.  
I  first  identify  all  mergers between  lenders  in  the  sample.  I  use  SDC Plantinum to  
track  all  mergers between  lenders  and  search  their  individual  histories to  confirm  the  
effective date of  the  merger.  Dealscan  does not  provide identifiers  for  lenders  at  the  
parent  level,  so  I  hand-match  lenders  from  Dealscan  with  SDC Plantinum. To  ensure 
that  these  mergers have a  significant  impact  on  the  new  lender,  I  keep  only  bank  
mergers that  involve a  change  in  control.  From  this  procedure I  identify  79  mergers 
between  U.S.  and  international lenders  during  the  sample period.5  
2.2.3  Bank  interconnectedness  
To  measure the  interconnectedness  of  a  lender  I  use  tools from  network  analysis.  Social  
network  analysis  is  helpful  in  studying different  types  of  relationships  that  lenders
5I  am  very  thankful  to Alvaro Taboada for  his  help  identifying bank  mergers  that  involved  a change  
in  control.
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develop  through  frequent interactions with  each  other  during  the  loan  syndication  
process.  
For  every lender,  I  calculate three  different  measures  of  network  centrality to  
capture its interconnectedness:  degree centrality, outdegree  centrality, and  indegree 
centrality. Degree  centrality counts the  number  of  ties  an  agent  has with  every 
member  in  the  network.  To  calculate degree centrality, I  count  the  number  of  different  
lenders  that  a  bank  has co-syndicated  with  during  the  past  four  quarters  and  divide 
this  number  by  the  total  number  of  lenders.  For  instance,  assume  there  are  four  
banks in  the  network,  bank  A,  bank  B,  bank  C,  and  bank  D.  In  this  example,  every 
bank  has the  potential to  work  with  three  different  banks (  Cmax =  3).  If  bank  A 
co-syndicated  loans with  bank  B  and  C  over  the  last  year,  then  its degree centrality 
is  2  (  ci  =  2),  and  its normalized  measure of  degree centrality is  2/3  or  0.66  (=  
ci
Cmax
).  
Moreover,  syndicated loan  networks are  directed  networks,  creating significant  
heterogeneity  in  the  types  of  relationships  that  lenders  develop  with  each  other.  
Specifically,  a  bank  can  be  the  lead  underwriter  for  a  syndicated loan  and  can  create 
a  relationship  with  other  lenders  by  inviting  them  to  participate in  its own  deals.  But  
a  bank  can  also  develop  a  relationship  with  other  lenders  by  joining  as  a  participating 
agent  in  their  loan  deals.  Unlike  market  share,  centrality measures  can  capture 
different  dimensions  of  the  relationships  embedded  in  different  roles  that  banks have 
in  loan  deals.  
To  capture the  heterogeneity  in  the  relationships  between  lenders,  I  calculate for  
every bank  its outdegree  and  indegree centrality. To  measure outdegree  centrality for  
a  lender,  I  count  the  number  of  different  banks that  have agreed  to  join  in  its deals as
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participants (  ci(  l  ead  )),  and  normalize by  the  total  number  of  banks in  the  network  
(  ci(  l  ead  )Cmax  ).  This measure captures the  bank’s confidence in  underwriting  new  loans and  
attracting  investors in  its own  deals.  In  the  previous example,  assume  that  bank  A 
has co-syndicated  with  banks B  and  C  in  two  different  deals,  but  only  with  bank  B  it  
has worked  as  a  lead  arranger.  In  this  case,  the  outdegree  centrality of  bank  A is  1/3  
or  0.33.  
I  also  calculate a  bank’s indegree centrality to  capture a  bank’s ability  to  access 
information about  borrowers’  they  otherwise  would  not  have access to.  To  calculate 
indegree centrality, I  count  the  total  number  of  banks that  bank  A has a  relationship  
with  by  joining  their  deals as  a  participant (  ci(  par  t.  ))  and  normalize by  the  total  
number  of  banks in  the  network  (  ci(  par  t.  )Cmax  ).  In  the  previous example,  if  bank  A joins  a  
loan  syndicate arranged  by  bank  C,  its normalized  indegree centrality measure will  
be  1/3  or  0.33.  
Figure  2.2  shows  the  time-series  average  of  degree and  outdegree  centrality of  
banks in  the  sample based  on  relationships  developed  through  loan  syndicates over  
a  rolling  four-quarter period.  The figure confirms that  bank  interconnectedness,  
measured  by  average  degree centrality, has increased  alongside  the  propensity  of  
banks to  co-syndicate loans.  From  this  figure the  increase  in  outdegree  centrality 
stands out,  especially  after  the  most  recent  financial  crisis.  The large increase  in  
outdegree  centrality is  driven  by  the  consolidation  between  some  of  the  largest  lenders  
in  the  industry  in  2008-2009  such  as  Bank  of  America  and  Merrill Lynch,  Wells  Fargo 
and  Wachovia, and  JP  Morgan  and  Bear  Stearns.
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Along  with  the  measures  of  lender  centrality, I  also  calculate the  market  share 
of  the  average  lender  in  the  sample.  To  calculate the  market  share for  a  lender,  I  
count  the  total  dollar amount  of  its loans and  divide it  by  the  total  dollar amount  of  
loans issued  by  all  banks during  the  past  four  quarters.  The challenge  in  calculating 
market  share is  that  multiple banks contribute funds to  underwrite a  loan  deal,  and  
it  is  common  for  banks—even  for  the  lead  arranger—  to  contribute  20%  of  the  total  
amount  of  the  loan  or  less.  Therefore,  when  I  measure the  total  market  share for  
a  lender,  I  multiply  the  total  loan  amount  by  the  percentage share that  the  lender  
contributes to  this  loan.  However,  Dealscan  does not  always  report  the  share that  
lenders  contribute to  a  loan;  for  these  cases  I  assume  that  all  participating banks 
contribute equally  to  the  loan.  This simplifying assumption  eases  the  construction 
of  the  variable  market share ,  but  underestimates the  share that  large lead  arrangers  
have in  the  market.  
I  find  that  throughout  the  sample period  the  median  lender  has market  share of  
approximately  5.4%.  As  we  would  expect, lenders  with  a  large market  share are  also  
more interconnected,  with  correlations ranging  from  0.38  to  0.67  (see  Table  2.2).  In  
Table  2.1,  the  average  measure of  degree centrality is  0.46,  which  implies  that  the  
average  bank  is  connected  to  46%  of  the  other  banks in  the  network.  Average  indegree 
centrality is  also  high  (45%),  which  suggests  that  banks frequently join  syndicates 
originated  by  other  banks.  As  we  would  expect, outdegree  centrality is  considerably  
lower;  the  median  bank  in  the  sample invites in  its own  deals approximately  one  out  
of  four  banks in  the  sample.
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2.3  Empirical  Results  
2.3.1  Lender  networks  and loan  pricing  
To  study the  effects of  lender  interconnectedness  on  borrowers’  cost  of  debt,  I  begin  
by  regressing  loan  spreads on  lead  arrangers’  network  centrality measured  by  degree,  
outdegree,  and  indegree centrality. Because the  effects of  lender  interconnectedness  
on  the  cost  of  borrowing may  be  non-linear,  I  create three  groups  of  lender  centrality 
(High,  Medium,  and  Low)  based  on  the  yearly  distribution  of  each  measure.  The 
baseline  specification  I  use  to  explain  the  effect  of  lender  interconnectedness  on  loan  
spreads is  the  following:  
Loan  Spreadi,t,b  =  ↵i  +  ↵t  +    Xi,b,t  +     (Lender  Centrality High)b,t  +  ✏i,t  .  (2.1)  
In  the  regression  above,  i  indexes  borrowers receiving  a  loan  from  lender  b.  The 
set  of  control  variables  Xi,b,t  capture a  set  of  time  varying  borrower characteristics 
(assets,  market-to-book, leverage,  and  Altman  Z-score),  loan  characteristics (maturity,  
amount,  secured  by  collateral,  and  number  of  banks that  participate in  the  syndicate), 
and  lender  characteristics (bank  assets, bank  deposits).  To  control  for  unobservable 
and  fixed-over-time borrower characteristics, the  regressions  include  borrower fixed  
effects.  The regression  also  includes  year  and  rating  fixed  effects.  
Table  2.3  shows  the  results  of  the  baseline  specification.  The results  suggest  that  
highly  interconnected  lenders  offer, on  average,  lower  interest  rates  to  borrowers.  In  
column  (1),  the  cost  of  debt  for  a  firm  borrowing from  a  lender  with  high  degree
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centrality is  approximately  12  basis points lower  compared  to  a  lender  with  low degree 
centrality. Because more interconnected  lenders  are  also  larger in  size,  I  include  a  
control  variable  for  bank  size to  mitigate the  possibility  that  large lenders  make more 
competitive interest  rates.  The results  remain  quantitatively  identical  when  I  control  
for  bank  deposits as  well  (not  tabulated),  but  I  do  not  include  deposits in  the  baseline  
regressions  because  some  lenders  do  not  carry  deposits and  drop  from  the  sample.  
From  Table  2.3,  there  are  two  results  that  stand  out.  First,  among  the  different  
measures  of  lender  interconnectedness  outdegree  centrality appears  to  have the  largest  
effect  on  the  cost  of  debt.  Specifically,  a  lender  with  high  outdegree  centrality offers 
borrowers on  average  15.6  basis point  lower  debt  spreads.  This result  suggests  that  
banks make loans with  lower  interest  rates  if  they  are  confident  in  their  ability  to  
underwrite a  loan  deal  by  attracting  other  investors to  participate in  its loan  deals.  
I  find  evidence that  a  large market  share also  leads to  lower  interest  rates.  The 
second  result  that  stands our  from  Table  2.3,  however,  is  that  when  I  include  both  
outdegree  centrality and  market  share in  the  regression  in  Column  (5),  the  economic  
effects of  market  share on  interest  rates  drops considerably. This is  not  the  case  for  
outdegree  centrality, which  remains  economically  large and  statistically significant.  
Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  lender  interconnectedness  explains a  different  
part  of  the  variation  of  borrowers’  cost  of  debt.
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2.3.2  Lender  interconnectedness  and loan  pricing  - Evidence  from  bank  
mergers  
A potential problem  in  studying the  effects of  lender  interconnectedness  on  debt  
contracting is  the  endogenous  matching  between  well-connected  banks and  low-risk  
borrowers.  Specifically,  if  highly-interconnected  lenders  lend  to  borrowers with  low 
credit risk,  the  effect  of  interconnectedness  on  cost  of  borrowing could  be  due  to  
self-selection  bias.  
To  address  this  type  of  endogeneity,  I  exploit  shocks in  the  structure of  bank  
networks after  bank  mergers.  Bank  mergers serve a  dual  role  in  identifying  the  effect  
of  lender  interconnectedness  on  the  cost  of  debt.  First,  bank  provide significant  
variation  in  bank  size and  centrality. Specifically,  the  average  increase  in  banks’  assets 
after  a  merger  is  21%,  and  the  increase  in  degree centrality is  17%.  Second,  and  
more importantly, I  identify  firms that  had  a  relationship  with  the  acquired  bank  and  
extend this  relationship  with  the  new  bank  after  the  merger.  The merger,  therefore,  
provides variation  in  lender  connectedness that  is  exogenous  to  firm  characteristics 
and  firm-bank  matching.  In  other  words,  by  focusing  on  the  sample of  firms that  
have an  existing relationship  with  one  of  the  merging  banks,  the  match  between  the  
firm  and  a  lender  with  high  centrality is  plausibly  random.
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To  identify  the  effects of  an  exogenous  increase  in  lender  interconnectedness  after  
a  bank  merger  on  the  cost  of  borrowing, I  use  the  following  regression  model:  
Loan  Spreadi,t,b  =  ↵i  +  ↵t  +    Xi,b,t+  
+   1(Post  Merger)  +   2 (Lender  Centrality)-High  
+   3(Post  Merger)  ⇥   (Lender  Centrality)-High  +  ✏i,t  .  
(2.2)  
In  regression  (2.2),  Post-merger  is  a  dummy  variable  that  is  equal  to  one  if  the  
loan  origination  date is  after  the  date the  lead  arranger  merged  with  the  previous 
lender  of  the  firm.  I  also  impose the  restriction  that  the  firm  must  have had  at  least  
two  loans in  the  past  five years  with  the  acquired  bank  to  ensure that  the  borrower 
had  a  relationship  with  that  bank.  Coefficient   1  captures the  change  in  the  cost  of  
debt  for  borrowers after  the  current lender  acquired  their  previous lender.  
   (Lender  Centrality) High is  an  indicator variable  that  takes  the  value  of  one  if  
the  firm  borrows from  a  lender  with  a  large change  in  centrality. The change  in  lender  
centrality is  large if  it  belongs in  the  top  tercile  of  changes  of  the  yearly  distribution  
of  network  centrality (degree,  outdegree,  and  indegree).  These network  measures  
capture the  average  effect  of  a  large increase  in  lead  arranger  interconnectedness  on  
the  cost  of  debt.  
Table  2.4  presents  the  regression  results.  The average  effect  of  borrowing from  a  
highly  interconnected  lender  varies  between  9  and  15  basis points.  The coefficient  
of  interest  is   3  and  identifies  the  change  in  the  cost  of  debt  after  a  merger,  for  a  
borrower whose  lead  arranger  interconnectedness  changed  from  low to  high.  The
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interaction term  between  Post-merger  and     (Lender  Centrality) High ,  therefore,  
provides a  causal  estimate of  an  increase  in  network  interconnectedness  on  the  cost  
of  debt.  
One  main  result  that  stands out  from  Table  2.4  is  that  outdegree  centrality is  
the  only  measure of  interconnectedness  that  remains  statistically significant  and  
economically  large.  I  find  that  loan  spreads decline  by  an  average  of  8  basis points 
after  a  merger  that  significantly increases  a  lenders’  outdegree  centrality. The results  
suggest  that  outdegree  centrality increases  lenders’  ability  to  find  other  banks to  
participate in  its deals and  can  underwrite loans with  improved  loan  terms.  
Despite  the  decline  in  the  number  of  banks that  are  active  in  the  syndicated loan  
market  and  the  increase  in  their  market  share,  I  do  not  find  evidence that  highly  
interconnected  lenders  extract rents  from  their  borrowers.  On  the  contrary, the  
evidence in  this  paper  suggests  that  highly  interconnected  banks lower  borrowers’  
cost  of  debt.  
2.3.3  Lender  networks,  loan  pricing,  and information asymmetry 
Theory  suggests  that  interconnected  underwriters,  by  collaborating  with  other  lenders,  
improve their  ability  to  screen  and  monitor borrowers (Esty  (2001),  Marquez (2002)).  
Bajo  et  al.  (2016) find  that  well-connected  IPO  underwriters can  better  extract and  
disseminate  information to  investors,  and  Barth  et  al.  (2009) find  that  information 
sharing across lenders  improves the  efficiency  of  lending  decisions.  
If  well-connected  lenders  reduce  borrowing costs  by  mitigating information asym-  
metries  between  the  borrower and  other  lenders,  the  reduction  in  the  cost  of  debt
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should  be  higher  for  firms that  exhibit higher  levels  of  information asymmetry.  To  
test  this  hypothesis,  I  investigate whether the  marginal effect  from  a  change  in  lender  
interconnectedness  is  different  for  private or  unrated  firms.  These firms exhibit higher  
levels  of  information asymmetry  to  investors,  so  I  hypothesize that  an  increase  in  
interconnectedness  should  lead  to  larger decrease  in  the  cost  of  debt  for  private or  
unrated  firms.  
To  test  this  hypothesis,  I  split  the  sample between  firms with  high  and  low 
information asymmetry.  I  present  the  estimates of  a  regression  specification  as  in  
equation  (2.2)  in  Table  2.5.  The top  panel  regressions  use  a  subsample of  firms with  
high  information asymmetry—private  firms (column  1)  and  unrated  firms (column  
2).  The bottom panel  focuses  only  on  the  subsample of  firms with  low information 
asymmetry—public  firms (column  1)  and  rated  firms (column  2).  
The results  in  Panel  A of  Table  2.5  suggest  that  an  exogenous  increase  in  lender  
outdegree  centrality from  low to  high  leads approximately  to  a  15-17  basis point  
reduction  in  the  cost  of  debt,  but  only  for  private and  unrated  borrowers.  This effect  
is  economically  larger than  the  full  sample results  in  Table  2.4.  On  the  other  hand,  
an  exogenous  switch  to  a  lender  with  high  outdegree  centrality does not  affect the  
cost  of  debt  for  borrowers that  present  lower  levels  of  information asymmetry  (Panel  
B).  
To  further corroborate the  hypothesis that  highly  connected  lenders  mitigate 
information asymmetries  without  affecting the  riskiness  of  their  loan  portfolio, I  also  
investigate the  change  in  the  cost  of  debt  for  firms that  are  close  to  distress.  A firm  
is  closer  to  distress  if  it  is  at  the  top  tercile  of  the  yearly  distribution  of  Z-score
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in  the  sample.  Columns (1)  and  (2)  in  Table  2.6  show  the  regression  estimates of  
an  exogenous  increase  in  lender  outdegree  centrality on  loan  spreads for  low-  and  
high-risk  firms,  respectively.  Interestingly, outdegree  centrality leads to  a  statistically 
significant  reduction  in  the  cost  of  debt  only  for  high  quality  firms,  which  suggests  
that  the  reduction  in  interest  rates  is  not  due  to  a  race-to-the-bottom  effect.  
2.3.4  Lender  networks  and non-pricing  contract  terms  
It  is  also  possible  that  except  for  the  reduction  in  the  cost  of  borrowing, lender  
interconnectedness  also  affect non-pricing  contract  terms,  such  as  loan  maturity, 
package amount,  or  covenant  strictness. Previous literature shows  that  prior  lending  
relationships  and  information asymmetry  affects the  strictness of  loan  covenants 
(Hollander  and  Verriest  (2016),  Prilmeier (2016)),  or  the  maturity and  amount  of  new  
contracts.  The regressions  control  for  loan  characteristics, but  in  this  section  I  test  
directly  whether lender  interconnectedness  affects non-pricing  loan  contract  terms.  
I  use  the  regression  model  in  specification  (2.2)  to  identify  exogenous  variation  
in  network  centrality of  a  borrower’s lead  arranger,  and  test  the  effects of  lender  
interconnectedness  on  loan  maturity, loan  amount,  and  collateral  requirements.  The 
results  in  Table  2.7  suggest  that  an  increase  in  lender  interconnectedness  after  a  
merger  increases  loan  maturity approximately  by  4%  (column  1).  Well-connected  
lenders  are  also  less  likely  to  require  firms to  use  their  assets as  collateral  (see  column  
3).  Although  these  changes  are  not  economically  large,  the  results  are  consistent  with  
the  previous findings in  this  paper.
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I  also  investigate whether lender  interconnectedness  affects the  number  of  financial  
covenants,  or  the  strictness of  loan  contract  terms.  Table  2.8  presents  the  regression  
results.  An  exogenous  increase  in  lender  interconnectedness  does not  affect the  number  
or  the  strictness of  loan  covenants that  lenders  impose on  borrowers.  Taken  together,  
the  evidence suggests  that  well-connected  lenders  do  not  exploit  their  position  in  the  
network  to  extract rents  from  their  borrowers,  and  alternatively  improve the  pricing  
and  non-pricing  terms  of  new  loan  issues.  
2.3.5  Robustness  - Matching  estimators  
Well-connected  lenders  are  different  from  lenders  that  are  not  well-connected  in  the  
network  of  lenders  that  frequently underwrite and  participate in  syndicated loans.  
In  Panel  A of  Table  2.9  I  test  for  covariate balance between  lenders  that  have high  
outdegree  centrality versus  those  that  have low outdegree  centrality. Well-connected  
banks are  considerably  larger, they  have more deposits,  and  they  tend  to  make loans 
to  larger firms with  higher  credit quality.  
These differences  could  confound  the  estimated  effect  of  high  lender  centrality 
on  loan  contract  terms.  To  address  these  concerns,  I  focus  on  a  matched  sample of  
treated  and  control  firms.  A treated  observation  is  a  firm-loan  unit  originated  by  a  
bank  that  has a  previous relationship  with  the  firm,  and  the  its outdegree  centrality 
increases  from  low to  high  after  the  merger.  I  match  treated  and  control  firms on  the  
basis of  their  size,  leverage,  market-to-book ratio,  and  riskiness  (Altman’s  Z-score),  as  
well  as  lender  size and  bank  deposits.  The matching  is  produces a  set  of  treated  and  
control  firm-loan  observations  with  balanced  characteristics (see  Table  2.9).  Finding  a
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good  match  for  large and  highly  interconnected  banks is  possible  because  the  sample 
includes  numerous international banks,  such  as  Credit Acrigole  or  UBS,  that  are  large 
in  size but  not  as  highly  connected  in  the  U.S.  syndicated loan  market  as  domestic 
banks.  
In  Panel  B,  I  use  the  Abadie  and  Imbens (2006) nearest-neighbor,  bias-corrected,  
and  heteroskedasticity-consistent  estimator  to  estimate the  average  treatment  effect  on  
the  treated  (ATT).  The estimated  treatment  effect  of  borrowing from  a  well-connected  
lead  arranger  is  approximately  -16  basis point.  This estimate is  consistent  with  the  
full  sample OLS  estimator,  and  economically  identical  with  the  effect  of  outdegree  
centrality on  borrowing costs  of  firms with  high  levels  information asymmetry.  
2.4  Conclusion 
I  find  that  a  small  number  of  interconnected  banks dominates the  syndicated loan  
market.  In  this  market,  measures  of  market  concentration  are  irrelevant  because  
banks share information and  resources  with  syndicate members.  I  test  whether lender  
interconnectedness  is  good  for  borrowers resulting  in  efficiency  gains,  or  bad  resulting  
on  rent  extraction through  market  power.  Using  bank  consolidations  to  assign  
borrowers exogenously  to  a  new  lender,  I  find  that  an  increase  in  outdegree  centrality 
leads to  a  significant  reduction  in  firms’  cost  of  debt.  The effect  is  economically  larger 
for  private and  unrated  borrowers,  consistent  with  the  hypothesis that  syndication  
networks reduce  the  cost  of  debt  and  other  loan  contract  terms  by  facilitating the  
transmission  of  information across lenders.
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2.5  Tables  & Figures  Appendix  
2.5.1  Tables  
APPENDIX: Definition of  Variables  
This table  provides details for  the  variables  used  throughout  the  paper.  The sample 
period  is  1994  through  2015.  Accounting  data are  from  Compustat’s quarterly  file.  
Loan  information is  from  Dealscan.  Bank  information is  from  Compustat  NA Bank,  
Compustat  Global,  and  Bankscope.  I  winsorize all  variables  at  the  1st  and  99th  
percentile.
Variable Names  Description
Firm  Characteristics  
Assets  Book  Assets  
Book  Leverage  Total  Debt  /  Book  Assets  
ROA EBITDA /  Book  Assets  
Market-to-Book  (Market  Equity +  Total  Debt  +  Preferred Stock  liquidating 
value  -  Deferred  Taxes  and  Investment Tax  Credits )  /  Book  
Assets  
Z-Score  3.3  ⇥  Pre-tax  Income/Assets  +  0.999  ⇥  Sales/Assets  +  1.4  
⇥  Retained  Earnings/Assets  +  1.2  ⇥  (Current  Assets  -  Cur- 
rent  Liabilities)/Assets  +0.6  ⇥  Mkt  Equity/Total  Liabilities  
Loan Characteristics  
Loan  Spread  The All-in-Drawn  Spread  from  Dealscan,  for  each  dollar 
borrower draw,  excluding fees.  
Loan  Amount  The sum  of  all  amounts  in  a  certain  loan  package. 
Loan  Maturity The number  of  months between  the  earliest  loan  origination  
date and  the  latest  maturity date in  a  certain  loan  package. 
Loan  Participants The total  number  of  participating banks (non  lead-  
arrangers)  in  a  certain  loan  package. 
Covenant  Number  Total  number  of  financial  covenants in  the  loan  contract.
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Contract  Strictness  Indicates the  probability that  the  firm  will  violate  at  least  
one  of  its covenants in  the  next  quarter  (following  method- 
ology  from  Murfin  (2012)).  
Bank  Network  Characteristics  
Market  Share The percent  of  total  loan  volume  (rolling  four-quarter) orig-  
inated  by  the  lender.  
Degree  Centrality The percent  of  all  lenders  that  a  lender  has co-syndicated  
with  over  the  past  year  (rolling  four  quarter).  
Outdegree  Centrality The percent  of  all  lenders  that  a  lender,  while acting  as  a  
lead  arranger,  has invited  in  loan  syndications during  the  
past  year  (rolling  four  quarters).  
Indegree Centrality The percent  of  all  lenders  that  a  lender,  has been  invited  
(as a  non-lead  arranger)  in  loan  syndications during  the  
past  year  (rolling  four  quarters).
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Table  2.1  :  Summary  Statistics  
This  table  presents  summary  statistics  of  firm,  loan,  governance,  and  bank  characteristics.  
Accounting information  is  from  Compustat.  Loan  information  is  from  LPC  Dealscan.  Bank  
information  is  from  Compustat  NA Bank,  Compustat  Global,  and  Bankscope.  Governance  
variable  are  from  various  sources  cited  in  the  Appendix.  All  variables  are  described  in  detail  
in  the  Appendix.
Variable  N  Mean SD  10%  50%  90%
Firm  Characteristics
Total  Assets(m.)  32722  6510.205  12990.5  119.145  1563.85  17428  
ROA 32060  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.06  
Market  Value/Book Value 32722  1.390  .940 .607 1.127  2.445  
Has  SP  rating  32722  .547 .497 0  1  1  
Altman-Z  32722  3.844  4.419  -.252  3.606  8.639  
Book  Leverage  32722  .343 .243 .056 .303 .658
Loan  Variables
Spread  32722  215.473  132.289  52.5  200  375  
Amount  32722  453.781  650.394  17.922  200  1225  
Maturity 32722  48.849  22.014  12  60  72  
Secured  32722  .497 .500 0  0  1  
Participants (#)  32722  5.372  4.058  1  4  11  
Cov.Strictness 12367  20.799  17.328  .115 18.558  45.038
Bank  Characteristics
Bank  Assets(b.)  32722  967.537  821.679  91.122  686.36  2289.24  
Bank  Deposits(b.)  31548  472.887  374.290  49.994  356.664  1079.177
Bank  Network  Characteristics
Market  Share 32712  0.056  0.035  0.012  0.054  0.100  
Degree  Centrality 32722  0.462  0.061  0.422  0.476  0.505  
Indegree Centrality 32722  0.451  0.060  0.412  0.462  0.496  
Outdegree  Centrality 32722  0.282  0.116  0.131  0.242  0.455
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Table  2.2  :  Pairwise  Correlations  
This  table  presents  pairwise  correlations  of  lender network  measures  and  market  share.  
Degree  centrality  is  the  percent  of  all  lenders that  a lender has  co-syndicated  with over  
the  past  year  (rolling four  quarter).  Indegree  centrality  is  the  percent  of  all  lenders that  a 
lender, has  been  invited  (as  a non-lead  arranger)  in  loan  syndications  during  the  past  year  
(rolling four  quarters).  Outdegree  centrality  is  the  percent  of  all  lenders that  a lender, while 
acting as  a lead  arranger,  has  invited  in  loan  syndications  during  the  past  year  (rolling four  
quarters).  Market  share  is  the  percent  of  total  loan  volume  (rolling four-quarter)  originated  
by  the  lender. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  
respectively.
Centrality Centrality Centrality Market  Share 
Degree  Indegree Outdegree
Degree  Centrality 1  
Indegree Centrality 0.982⇤⇤⇤  1  
Outdegree  Centrality 0.791⇤⇤⇤  0.737⇤⇤⇤  1  
Market  Share 0.431⇤⇤⇤  0.380⇤⇤⇤  0.679⇤⇤⇤  1
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Table  2.3  :  Lender  networks  and  loan  prices  
The  dependent  variable  in  all  regressions  is  the  loan  spread  measured  in  basis  points.  In  
regressions  (1)-(5),  the  independent variable  of  interest is  an  indicator  for  a loan  originated  
by  a lead  arranger  at  the  top  tercile  of  the  yearly  distribution  of:  (1)  the  percent  of  all  
lenders that  the  lead  arranger  has  co-syndicated  with over  the  past  year  (  Degree centrality  );  
(2)  the  percent  of  all  lenders that  the  lead  arranger  has  invited  in  its  loan  syndications  
during  the  past  year  (  Outdegree centrality  );  (3),  the  percent  of  all  lenders that  have  invited  
the  lead  arranger  in  their  loan  syndications  during  the  past  year  (  Indegree centrality  );  
And  (4)  the  percent  of  total  loan  volume  originated  by  that  lead  arranger  (  Market  Share  
High  ).  The  regressions  include firm,  bank,  and  loan  controls,  and  also year,  rating,  and  
borrower  fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  
are  clustered  at  the  firm,  lender, and  year  level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level 
is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Spread  Spread  Spread  Spread  Spread
Degree  (High)  -11.9⇤⇤⇤  
(3.0)  
Outdegree  (High)  -15.6⇤⇤⇤  -13.4⇤⇤⇤  
(3.9)  (3.8)  
Indegree (High)  -10.4⇤⇤⇤  
(2.2)  
Market  Share (High)  -10.3⇤⇤⇤  -4.6⇤  
(3.0)  (2.2)  
Book  Leverage  51.4⇤⇤⇤  51.3⇤⇤⇤  52.3⇤⇤⇤  51.2⇤⇤⇤  51.4⇤⇤⇤  
(10.8)  (10.7)  (10.8)  (10.8)  (10.7)  
Market  Value/Book Value -11.8⇤⇤⇤  -11.7⇤⇤⇤  -11.7⇤⇤⇤  -11.8⇤⇤⇤  -11.8⇤⇤⇤  
(1.5)  (1.6)  (1.5)  (1.6)  (1.6)  
Altman-Z  -3.1⇤⇤⇤  -3.1⇤⇤⇤  -3.0⇤⇤⇤  -3.1⇤⇤⇤  -3.1⇤⇤⇤  
(0.4)  (0.4)  (0.5)  (0.4)  (0.4)  
Ln(Assets)  -18.3⇤⇤⇤  -17.6⇤⇤⇤  -18.2⇤⇤⇤  -18.1⇤⇤⇤  -17.8⇤⇤⇤  
(3.5)  (3.4)  (3.5)  (3.4)  (3.4)  
Ln(Bank  Assets)  -1.2  0.8  -2.1  -0.3  1.4  
(1.8)  (2.0)  (1.9)  (2.0)  (2.1)
Observations  31681  31681  31662  31670  31670  
Adjusted  R2  0.667  0.667  0.666  0.666  0.667  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
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Table  2.4  :  Variation  in  interconnectedness  due  bank  M&A  activity  
The  dependent  variable  in  all  regressions  is  the  loan  spread  in  basis  points.  Post-merger  
is  a dummy  variable  that  is  equal  to one  if  the  loan  origination  date  is  after  the  date  the  
lead  arranger  merged  with the  previous  lender of  the  firm.  The  independent variable  of  
interest is  the  interaction  between Post Merger  and  an  indicator  whether  the  lead  arranger  
is  at  the  top  tercile  of  the  yearly  distribution  of:  Market  Share  High  (column  1),  Degree 
centrality  (column  2),  Outdegree centrality  (column  3),  and  Indegree centrality  (column  
4).  Section  2.2.3 provides  details  for  the  construction  of  these  variables.  The  regressions  
also include the  following loan  controls:  maturity,  amount,  participants,  collateral,  and  
spread.  All  regressions  include firm,  year,  and  rating fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  are  
reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm,  lender, and  year  
level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Spread  Spread  Spread  Spread
Post  Merger  -5.9  -5.3  -6.5⇤  -3.3  
(3.5)  (3.4)  (3.4)  (3.1)  
Degree  (High)  -9.3⇤⇤⇤  
(3.0)  
Outdegree  (High)  -15.3⇤⇤⇤  
(4.4)  
Indegree (High)  -9.4⇤⇤⇤  
(2.5)  
Market  Share (High)  -7.8⇤⇤  
(2.9)  
Post  Merger(X)High-Degree  -6.1  
(4.0)  
Post  Merger(X)High-Outdegree  -8.1⇤⇤  
(2.9)  
Post  Merger(X)High-Indegree  -6.2  
(4.4)  
Post  Merger(X)High-Mkt.Share  -3.8  
(3.4)
Observations  14766  14766  14764  14761  
Adjusted  R2  0.658  0.659  0.658  0.683  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
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Table  2.5  :  Bank  networks  and  information  asymmetry  
This  table  shows the  regressions  of  loan  spreads  on  changes  of  bank  industry measures  
after  bank  M&A  activity.  Firms  exhibits  high  (low)  information  asymmetry  if  it  is  private  
(public)  or  it  is  not  rated  by  S&P  (rated).  Post-merger  is  a dummy  variable  that  is  equal  
to one  if  the  loan  origination  date  is  after  the  date  the  lead  arranger  merged  with the  
previous  lender of  the  firm.  The  independent variable  of  interest is  the  interaction  between 
Post Merger  and  an  indicator  whether  the  lead  arranger  is  at  the  top  tercile  of  the  yearly  
distribution  of  Outdegree centrality  (=the percent  of  all  lenders that  the  lead  arranger  has  
invited  in  its  loan  syndications  during  the  past  year).  The  regressions  include firm,  bank,  
and  loan  controls  (more  details  in  the  Appendix),  as  well  as  rating,  year,  and  borrower  fixed  
effects.  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  
the  firm,  lender, and  year  level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  
*,  **,  and  ***,  respectively. 
(A:  High  Information  Asymmetry)
(1)  (2)  
Spread  Spread  
(Private Firms) (Unrated Firms)
Post  Merger(X)High-Outdegree  -17.31⇤⇤  -15.15⇤⇤⇤  
(6.41)  (4.28)
Observations  3376  4295  
Adjusted  R2  0.626  0.615  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  
Year-Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes
(B:  Low  Information  Asymmetry)
(1)  (2)  
Spread  Spread  
(Public Firms) (Rated Firms)
Post  Merger(X)High-Outdegree  -6.09⇤  -3.07  
(3.51)  (3.07)
Observations  11366  10400  
Adjusted  R2  0.686  0.710  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  
Year-Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes
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Table  2.6  :  Changes  in  lender interconnectedness  and  firm  risk  
This  table  shows the  regressions  of  loan  spreads  on  changes  of  bank  industry measures  after  
bank  M&A  activity.  The  sample  includes only  observations  for  firms  who  had  a relationship  
with a lender that  got  acquired  by  another  bank.  A firm  is  a high-risk  (low-risk)  firm  
if  Altman’s  Z-score  is  below  (above)  the  yearly  median.  The  dependent  variable  in  all  
regressions  is  debt  spreads  measured  in  basis  points.  Post-merger  is  a dummy  variable  
that  is  equal  to one  if  the  loan  origination  date  is  after  the  date  the  lead  arranger  merged  
with the  previous  lender of  the  firm.  The  independent variable  of  interest is  the  interaction  
between Post Merger  and  an  indicator  whether  the  lead  arranger  is  at  the  top  tercile  of  the  
yearly  distribution  of  Outdegree centrality  .  The  regressions  include firm,  bank,  and  loan  
controls  (more  details  in  the  Appendix),  as  well  as  rating,  year,  and  borrower  fixed  effects.  
Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm,  
lender, and  year  level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  
***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  
Spread  Spread  
(Low Risk Firms) (High Risk Firms)
Post  Merger  -3.82  -3.69  
(4.34)  (3.09)  
Outdegree  (High)  -15.92⇤⇤⇤  -15.57⇤⇤⇤  
(4.58)  (4.65)  
Post  Merger(X)High-Outdegree  -6.64⇤⇤⇤  -9.34  
(2.29)  (10.32)
Observations  10292  4376  
Adjusted  R2  0.695  0.588  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  
Year-Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes
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Table  2.7  :  Bank  networks  and  debt  contract  terms  
In  columns  (1)-(3)  the  dependent  variable  is,  respectively: (1)  the  maturity  of  the  loan  
measured  in  months,  (2)  the  loan  amount,  and  (3)  secured  is  an  indicator  variable  that  
takes  the  value  of  1 if  the  loan  issue is  secured  with collateral.  Post-merger  is  a dummy  
variable  that  is  equal  to one  if  the  loan  origination  date  is  after  the  date  the  lead  arranger  
merged  with the  previous  lender of  the  firm.  The  independent variable  of  interest is  the  
interaction  between Post Merger  and  an  indicator  whether  the  lead  arranger  is  at  the  top  
tercile  of  the  yearly  distribution  of  Outdegree centrality  .  The  regressions  include firm,  bank,  
and  loan  controls  (more  details  in  the  Appendix),  as  well  as  rating,  year,  and  borrower  fixed  
effects.  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  
the  firm,  lender, and  year  level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  
*,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  
Ln(Maturity)  Ln(Amount)  Secured
Post  Merger  0.0280  0.102⇤⇤  -0.0229  
(0.0196) (0.0365) (0.0165) 
Outdegree  (High)  -0.0364⇤  0.0867⇤⇤⇤  0.0108  
(0.0201) (0.0288) (0.0114) 
Post  Merger(X)High-Outdegree  0.0388⇤⇤  -0.0312  -0.0183⇤  
(0.0169) (0.0317) (0.00934) 
Book  Leverage  -0.0644  0.0969  0.0571  
(0.0745) (0.117)  (0.0738) 
Market  Value/Book Value -0.0299  0.0939⇤⇤⇤  -0.0301⇤  
(0.0189) (0.0286) (0.0152) 
Altman-Z  0.0151⇤⇤  0.0124  0.0000187  
(0.00575) (0.00947) (0.00370) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.0323  0.454⇤⇤⇤  -0.104⇤⇤⇤  
(0.0226) (0.0372) (0.0183) 
Ln(Amount)  0.0816⇤⇤⇤  -0.000917  
(0.0136) (0.00788) 
Ln(Maturity)  0.174⇤⇤⇤  0.0668⇤⇤⇤  
(0.0307) (0.00687)
Observations  15791  15791  15791  
Adjusted  R2  0.330  0.681  0.510  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes
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Table  2.8  :  Bank  networks  and  debt  contract  terms  
In  column  (1),  the  dependent  variable  is  the  strictness  of  loan  covenants  and  represents 
the  probability  that  the  firm  will violate  at  least  one  covenant  over  the  next  quarter  (see  
Murfin  (2012)).  In  column  (2),  the  dependent  variable  is  the  number  of  covenants  in  
the  contract.  The  independent variable  of  interest is  the  interaction  of  Post Merger  and  
an  indicator  whether  the  lead  arranger  is  at  the  top  tercile  of  the  yearly  distribution  of  
Outdegree centrality  .  The  regressions  include firm,  bank,  and  loan  controls  (more  details  
in  the  Appendix),  as  well  as  rating,  year,  and  borrower  fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  are  
reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm,  lender, and  year  
level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  
Cov.Strictness Covenants  (#)
Post  Merger  -1.320  -0.0671  
(0.937)  (0.0661) 
Outdegree  (High)  -0.685  -0.0724⇤  
(0.491)  (0.0372) 
Post  Merger(X)High-Outdegree  0.957  -0.00742  
(0.939)  (0.0564) 
Book  Leverage  46.57⇤⇤⇤  0.377  
(5.892)  (0.269)  
Market  Value/Book Value -4.393⇤⇤⇤  -0.125⇤⇤⇤  
(1.029)  (0.0403) 
Altman-Z  0.293  0.0298⇤  
(0.325)  (0.0144) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.0160  -0.105⇤⇤  
(0.840)  (0.0491) 
Ln(Maturity)  -0.185  0.0765⇤⇤  
(0.372)  (0.0296) 
Ln(Amount)  -0.854⇤⇤  -0.0311  
(0.315)  (0.0183)
Observations  5340  5340  
Adjusted  R2  0.627  0.676  
Firm-Bank  Controls Yes  Yes  
Year-Rating FEs  Yes  Yes  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes
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Table  2.9  :  Matching Estimator  
This  table  compares  the  effect  of  borrowing from  a lender with high  outdegree  centrality  
and  a lender with low  outdegree  centrality.  In  this sample,  a treated  observation  is  a 
loan  of  a firm  whose  prior  lender got  acquired  by  a lender and  the  merged  bank  has  high  
outdegree  centrality  (top  tercile).  A control  observation  is  a loan  of  a firm  whose  prior  
lender got  acquired  by  a lender and  the  merged  bank  has  low  outdegree  centrality  (bottom  
two  terciles).  I  calculate  outdegree  centrality  based  on  the  share  of  all  banks  that  a lender, 
acting as  a lead  arranger,  has  invited  in  loan  syndications  during  the  past  four  quarters.  I  
match  treated  and  control  firms  on  the  basis  of  their  size,  leverage,  market-to-book  ratio,  
and  riskiness (Altman’s  Z-score),  as  well  as  lender size  (assets)  and  deposits.  Panel  A shows 
the  imbalance  between treated  and  control  observations  for  the  full  sample  and  for  the  
matched  sample.  In  Panel  B,  the  matching estimator  is  the  Abadie  and  Imbens (2006)  
nearest-neighbor,  bias-corrected,  and  heteroskedasticity  consistent  estimator  for  the  average  
treatment  effect  on  the  treated  (ATT).  I  report  robust  standard  errors  in  parethenses.  
Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
Treated  =  Post  merger  transfer  to  lender  with  high  outdegree  centrality 
Control  =  Post  merger  transfer  to  lender  with  low outdegree  centrality
A:  Covariate  Balance
Outdegree  Outdegree  Difference  Difference  
(High)  (Low)  (full  sample)  (matched  sample)
Ln(Bank  Assets)  13.69  12.65  1.04⇤⇤⇤  0.05⇤  
Bank  Deposits  6.12  5.12  0.97⇤⇤⇤  0.00  
Ln(Firm  Assets)  7.58  6.93  0.65⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤  
Leverage  0.32  0.31  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.00  
Mkt-Book  1.44  1.44  0.00  -0.01  
Altman-Z  4.05  3.52  0.53⇤⇤⇤  0.02
B:  Matching  Estimators
Difference  in debt  spread (bp)  
(Treated-Control)
Abadie-Imbens  estimator  -16.39⇤⇤⇤  
(Avg.  treatment  effect  on  treated)  (3.50)
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2.5.2  Figures  
Figure  2.1  :  Number  of  banks  and  average  bank  size.  
This  figure  shows the  total  number  of  banks  (straight  line)  and  the  average  size  (dashed  
line)  for  lenders participating and  arranging loans  in  the  syndicated  loan  market  from  1994 
to 2015.  Banks  or  finance  companies  without  information  on  size  of  assets,  or  that  have  
arranged  fewer than  20 loans  during  the  sample  period  are  excluded.  Lenders  information  
is  aggregated  at  the  parent  level. The  first  vertical  line  represents the  date  of  repeal  of  
Glass-Stegall  Act,  and  the  second  vertical  line  represents the  date  of  Lehman  Brothers’  
collapse.
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
Ba
nk
 S
ize
 (b
il $
)
 
50
60
70
80
90
10
0
Nu
m
be
r o
f B
an
ks
 
199
4q4
199
5q4
199
6q4
199
7q4
199
8q4
199
9q4
200
0q4
200
1q4
200
2q4
200
3q4
200
4q4
200
5q4
200
6q4
200
7q4
200
8q4
200
9q4
201
0q4
201
1q4
201
2q4
201
3q4
201
4q4
Number of banks (left axis) Bank Size (right axis)
Average Size and Number of Banks
 85  
Figure  2.2  :  Degree  and  Outdegree  Centrality  
This  figure  shows the  sample  average  degree  measure  (straight  line)  and  outdegree  measure  
(dashed  line)  of  bank  network  centrality.  The  sample  period  is  1994 through  2015.  Average  
degree  centrality  measures  the  percent  of  all  banks  that  the  average  bank  has  co-syndicated  
with over  the  past  year  (rolling four  quarter).  Average  outdegree  centrality  measures  the  
percent  of  all  banks  that  the  average  bank,  while acting as  a lead  arranger,  has  invited  in  
loan  syndications  during  the  past  year.  Lenders  without  information  on  assets,  or  lenders 
that  have  arranged  fewer than  20 loans  during  the  sample  period,  are  excluded.  Information  
for  lenders is  aggregated  at  the  parent  level. The  vertical  line  represents the  date  of  Lehman  
Brothers’  collapse.
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— Chapter  3  — 
Creditor  Rights  and Debt  Structure  in the  Zone  
of  Insolvency  
3.1  Introduction 
How  do  firms determine  their  corporate debt  structure? Firms  issue  secured  or  
unsecured  debt,  senior  or  subordinated bonds,  and  provide different  control  rights  
and  priorities to  creditors (Diamond  (1991),  Boot  and  Thakor  (1993),  Park  (2000),  
Rauh  and  Sufi  (2010)).  However,  despite  the  significant  heterogeneity  in  types  of  debt  
on  firms’  capital  structure, we  have little evidence about  the  factors  that  affect the  
structure of  corporate debt.  In  this  paper,  I  investigate whether creditor protection 
rights  explain  part  of  the  heterogeneity  in  firms’  debt  structure. 
Theory  offers mixed  predictions for  the  effects of  creditor control  rights  on  firms’  
debt  structure. On  one  hand,  increasing  creditors’ ability  to  enforce contracts should  
expand  creditors’ supply of  secured  debt  and  lower  the  cost  of  capital  (Shleifer  and  
Vishny  (1986),  Lopez-De-Silanes  and  La  Porta  (1997),  Vig  (2013)).  On  the  other  
hand,  allowing  senior  secured  creditors to  interfere  with  firm  policies  when  they  are  
near  distress,  may  also  lead  to  a  reduction  in  firms’  demand  for  secured  debt  to  
mitigate conflicts of  interest  between  senior  and  subordinated stakeholders (Aghion  
et  al.  (1992),  Diamond  (1993),  Ayotte  and  Morrison  (2009)).
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Disentangling  the  effects of  creditor protection rights  on  debt  structure faces  two  
empirical  challenges.  First,  corporate debt  structure is  determined  by  existing agency  
conflicts in  a  firm,  and  therefore,  one  needs  exogenous  change  in  creditor control  
to  identify  a  causal  relationship.  Second,  changes  in  creditor protection rights  may  
affect simultaneously firms’  demand  for  secured  debt,  but  also  creditors’ supply of  
secured  debt.  If  the  supply side effect  of  creditor rights  dominates,  an  increase  in  
creditor protection should  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  share of  secured  to  total  debt;  
if  the  demand  side effect  dominates,  firms may  choose  to  reduce  their  exposure to  
secured  debt  and  the  share of  secured  to  total  debt  should  decline.  
To  address  the  endogenous  relationship  between  creditor control  rights  and  debt  
structure, I  use  a  1991  Delaware  court  ruling  as  a  source of  exogenous  variation  in  
creditor protection rights.  The Delaware  court  ruling  resolved  a  legal  case  between  
Credit Lyonnais  and  Pathe Communications in  favor  of  Credit Lyonnais,  the  senior  
secured  creditor. The court  ruling  favored  creditors and  determined  that  in  the  
vicinity  of  insolvency  the  board of  directors owes its duty  not  only  to  shareholders but  
creditors alike.  The court  held  in  dictum:  “At least where a corporation is operating 
in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue 
risk bearers, but owes its duties to the corporate enterprise.” The court  decision,  by  
acknowledging  the  management’s duty  to  protect  creditors’ interest  when  the  firm  is  
close  to  bankruptcy, implied  a  significant  change  from  the  status quo  and  received  
extensive coverage  from  the  media,  as  well  as  from  business  and  law related  journals.1
1Footnote  55 of  the  decision  received special  attention  from  legal  companies:  “Such  directors  will  
recognize that in  managing the business  affairs of  a  solvent  corporation in  the vicinity  of  insolvency,
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In  2004,  Delaware’s  court  reversed  1991’s  court  decision  by  limiting  lenders’  ability  
to  sue corporate executives for  a  breach  of  fiduciary responsibility  to  senior  secured  
creditors. 
Using  the  1991  Delaware  court  ruling  as  an  exogenous  increase  in  creditor control  
rights,  I  find  that  the  share of  secured  to  total  debt  of  firms incorporated in  Delaware  
(treated  firms) increased  by  approximately  2.5%.  This result  is  consistent  with  
La  Porta  et  al.  (1998),  who  suggest  that  protecting creditor rights  expands firms’  
access to  secured  debt.  However,  the  court  decision  was  mostly  relevant  for  firms 
at  the  vicinity  of  insolvency,  so  I  hypothesize that  the  demand  side effects should  
dominate in  firms that  are  close  to  bankruptcy. Consistent  with  this  hypothesis,  I  
find  that  an  increase  in  creditor protection leads to  an  economically  large reduction  
in  the  share of  secured  debt  for  firms close  to  distress.  The reversal  of  the  regulation  
in  2004  lends  further support  to  the  demand  side effects of  creditor rights  (Aghion  
et  al.  (1992)).  Specifically,  I  find  evidence that  the  2004  court  decision,  by  removing  
creditors’ ability  to  sue managers for  breach  of  fiduciary duty,  led  to  a  significant  
increase  in  the  share of  secured  debt  for  firms close  to  insolvency.  
I  use  a  sample of  primary issues  of  public  bonds and  private loans to  investigate 
whether the  change  in  creditor rights  affects the  characteristics of  new  debt  issues.  I  
begin  by  testing  whether creditor protection rights  affect the  seniority of  new  bonds.  I  
find  that  an  increase  in  creditor rights  increases  the  likelihood  that  firms issue  senior,  
relative  to  subordinated, bonds by  6-13%.  This probability reaches  approximately
circumstances  may  arise when  the right  (both  the efficient  and  the fair)  course to  follow  for  the 
corporation may  diverge from  the choice that the stockholders  (or  the creditors,  or  the employees,  
or  any  single group  interested  in  the corporation)  would  make if  given  the opportunity to  act”.
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38%  for  firms that  are  close  to  bankruptcy. The reduction  in  the  share of  secured  debt  
and  the  concurrent increase  in  senior  unsecured  bonds suggests  that  firms structure 
their  debt  to  reduce  creditors’ ability  to  intervene with  firm  policies,  but  also  to  reduce  
creditor heterogeneity.  Legal  contests across different  classes  of  bondholders are  costly  
(Welch  (1997));  recent  litigation battles initiated  by  junior  bondholders  of  Ceasars  
and  Banco  Espirito Santo in  Portugal,  among  others,  highlight how heterogeneity  
in  creditor protection rights  exacerbate and  increase  the  costs  of  bankruptcy and  
reorganization.2.  Along  with  the  increase  in  bond  seniority, I  find  that  new  bond  
issues  are  more likely  to  contain  covenants that  protect  the  bondholders’  seniority 
and  cross-default  clauses  that  trigger  default  if  the  borrower becomes  delinquent  or  
violates  the  terms  of  any  other  contract.  These findings suggest  that  bondholders 
include  bond  terms  in  the  bonds that  mimic  the  control  rights  of  senior  secured  
creditors. 
Using  a  sample of  private loan  issues,  I  also  find  evidence that  changes  in  creditor 
protection have a  significant  effect  on  loan  prices  and  non-pricing  contract  terms.  
Banks  typically  have the  highest  seniority in  firms’  debt  structure and  usually  require  
collateral  in  return  for  credit lines  or  term  loans (Park  (2000)).  I  find  that  the  2004  
court  ruling,  by  reversing  the  1991  statute that  allowed  creditors to  sue managers for  
breach  of  fiduciary duty,  led  to  a  20  basis points increase  in  borrowers’  cost  of  debt  
on  average.  Banks  are  also  more likely  to  require  collateral  and  substitute the  loss
2From  The  Wall  Street  Journal  (January  12th,  2015):  “Bondholders  Attempt  to Push  Caesars  Unit  
Into  Bankruptcy”,  and  from  the  Financial  Times  (August  4th,  2014):  “BES  rescue saves  senior  
bondholders”
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of  control  rights  by  reducing  the  maturity of  loan  issues;  the  reduction  in  maturity 
further increases  bank  seniority over  the  assets of  borrowers (Diamond  (1993)).  
This paper  brings together  the  law and  finance literature with  studies that  
investigate the  determinants of  corporate debt  structure. Despite  the  large number  
of  studies that  focus  on  capital  structure, most  empirical  work  treats  corporate 
debt  as  uniform  (Rauh  and  Sufi  (2010)).  Focusing  on  Delaware  legal  rulings  to  
exploit  variation  in  creditor protection rights,  this  study contributes  to  literature by  
providing evidence in  support  of  the  hypothesis that  creditor rights  explain  part  of  
the  heterogeneity  in  firms’  debt  structure. 
The results  in  this  paper  relate  to  a  number  of  different  studies. Becker  and  
Stro¨mberg (2012) investigate the  effects of  the  1991  Delaware  court  ruling  on  firms’  
capital  structure decisions  and  show  that  improving creditor protection increases  
equity issuance  and  reduces  risk  taking.  Ayotte  and  Morrison  (2009) find  that  debt  
heterogeneity  exacerbates inefficiencies  during  the  bankruptcy process  and  suggest  
that  the  onset  of  senior  secured  creditors has an  ambiguous  effect  on  firms’  debt  
structure. This paper  is  also  related  to  Qian  and  Strahan (2007),  who  find  that  loan  
spreads are  lower  and  the  probability of  issuing  secured  debt  is  higher  in  countries 
with  stronger  creditor protection rights.  Using  a  natural experiment in  India,  Vig  
(2013) finds that  allowing  creditors to  speed  up  the  asset liquidation process  leads 
to  a  reduction  in  the  issuance  of  secured  debt  due  to  an  increase  in  liquidation bias.  
The findings in  this  paper  are  also  related  to  Erel  et  al.  (2009),  who  find  that  stock  
market  conditions affect borrowers’  choice  of  debt.
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The paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  I  describes  the  data and  provides more 
details about  the  legal  ruling  in  Delaware  and  the  empirical  strategy.  Section  II  
presents  the  results  of  the  empirical  analysis,  and  section  III  concludes.  
3.2  Data  and Empirical  Strategy  
3.2.1  Data  
To  test  the  effects of  creditor protection rights  on  debt  structure I  collect  three  different  
samples.  The main  source for  firms’  accounting  and  debt  structure information comes  
from  Compustat’s annual  database. My  original  sample consists of  16,153  firms,  
58%  of  which  are  firms incorporated in  Delaware.3  I  split  the  sample in  two  periods,  
1989-1995  and  2000-2007,  because  these  periods center  around  significant  legal  rulings  
in  Delaware  that  shifted  managers’ fiduciary duties  of  distressed  firms towards  senior  
secured  creditors. Specifically,  the  first  period  centers around  December  1991,  the  
date that  Delaware’s  court  ruled  in  favor  of  Credit Lyonnais,  a  senior  secured  creditor, 
and  established  that  the  management of  a  firm  that  is  close  to  insolvency  has a  
fiduciary responsibility  to  protect  creditor interests  as  well.  The second  period  centers 
around  December  of  2004,  the  date that  Delaware’s  court  reversed  1991’s  decision  by  
restricting  the  ability  of  creditors to  sue corporate executives for  breach  of  fiduciary 
duty.
3Compustat  provides  backfilled  information  for  firms’  state  of  incorporation.  As  a result,  the  actual  
state  of  incorporation  of  a firm  in  1991 potentially  may  be  different  from  the  one  recorded  in  
Compustat.  However,  firms  cannot  change  their  state  of  incorporation  quickly,  and  therefore,  given  
the  unexpected  nature  of  the  court  ruling there  is  little  concern  that  firms  anticipate  and  respond  
strategically  to the  change  in  the  legal  environment  (Hennessy  and  Strebulaev  (2015)).
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I  collect  information on  firms’  book value  of  total,  secured,  and  senior  unsecured  
debt.  I  also  calculate the  book value  of  assets and  tangible  assets, cash  flow  (ROA),  
market-to-book value  (MB),  and  book leverage (BL).  The average  firm  in  the  sample 
has approximately  $834  million  in  assets and  book value  of  debt  at  approximately  
30%  of  its assets. To  identify  firms operating  near  bankruptcy I  use  Altman’s  Z-score  
(see  Altman  (1968)),  a  measure that  reflects  whether a  firm  is  close  to  bankruptcy. 
I  group  firms into  terciles  of  the  yearly  distribution  of  Z-score  and  define  firms in  
the  lowest  tercile  as  close  to  bankruptcy. I  also  create a  measure of  financial  distress  
based  on  a  firm’s market-to-book ratio  similar  to  Davydenko  and  Rahaman  (2011).  
Specifically,  I  define  a  firm  as  close  to  bankruptcy if  its market  value  of  equity is  
below the  book value  of  its total  debt.  The correlation  of  the  two  proxies for  financial  
distress  is  44%  and  it  is  statistically significant.  
I  collect  data on  primary debt  issues  from  two  sources.  First,  I  use  Capital  IQ  for  
new  issues  of  corporate bond  debentures.  The merged  Compustat-Capital  IQ  dataset  
for  the  period  1989-1995  has 3,244  bond  issues.  The average  corporate bond  maturity 
in  this  sample is  approximately  13  years,  the  average  amount  is  $130  million,  three  
quarters  of  new  issues  are  senior,  and  the  average  number  of  bond  covenants is  3.5.  
For  each  bond  issue,  Capital  IQ  provides information on  its seniority, which  can  be  
Junior  Subordinate, Senior  Subordinate, Subordinate, Preferred, Senior  Secured  and  
Senior  Unsecured.  Bonds are  rarely  secured  and  less  than  5%  of  bonds in  my  sample 
are  secured.  The small  amount  of  secured  bond  issues  is  not  surprising because  
banks commonly  hold  the  majority of  firms’  secured  debt.  I  group  bonds into  two  
broad seniority categories  most  commonly  used  in  the  literature.  I  classify  a  bond
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issue  as  senior  if  its seniority is  either Senior  Secured  or  Senior  Unsecured.  In  the  
“Junior”  status I  include  the  rest  of  the  bonds.  On  average,  74%  of  bond  issues  in  the  
sample are  senior.  I  also  count  the  number  of  bond  covenants and  identify  their  type.  
The first  type  of  covenants includes  provisions that  protect  bondholders (such  as  
“cross-acceleration”), and  the  second  type  includes  provisions that  restrict  borrowers’  
actions  (such  as  sale  of  assets). Unfortunately  Capital  IQ  does not  often  report  bond  
yields  and  less  than  half of  the  bonds contain  information on  bond  spreads.4  
I  also  use  information on  private loan  issues  from  Loan  Pricing Corporation’s  (LPC)  
Dealscan  database for  the  period  2000-2007.  Dealscan  contains  detailed  information 
for  syndicated loan  prices  and  loan  characteristics, including  financial  covenants.  I  
use  the  link  by  Chava  and  Roberts  (2008) to  match  loan  information with  firms’  
accounting  data from  Compustat.  The Compustat-Dealscan  sample consists of  large 
firms with  approximately  $3.1  billion  in  assets, which  is  larger than  the  average  
firm  in  compustat  ($1.8  billion).  Syndicated  loans are  large,  approximately  $300  
million,  and  their  average  maturity is  four  years,  which  is  considerably  shorter  than  
the  average  maturity of  bonds.  It  is  common  for  bank  loans to  be  short-term; theory  
and  empirical  evidence suggests  that  creditors use  collateral  and  maturity to  protect  
their  seniority in  borrowers’  debt  structure (Diamond  (1993),  Park  (2000)).  The 
median  contract  has three  financial  covenants and  there  is  14.8%  probability that  the  
median  firm  will  violate  at  least  one  of  its financial  covenants  in  any  given  year.
4Mergent  FISD  is  another  source  that  includes information  on  bond  yields. However,  for  the  period  
1989-1994 the  availability  of  bond  issues in  Mergent  is  considerably  smaller  than  Capital  IQ.
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To  reduce  the  effect  of  outliers  I  winsorize all  accounting  variables  at  the  1%  
level.  I  exclude financial  firms (SIC  codes  6000-6999)  the  financial  sector  is  heavily  
regulated  and  a  Delaware  court  ruling  is  not  as  relevant  for  these  types  of  firms.  I  
also  exclude utilities (SIC  codes  4900-4999)  because  the  deregulation of  the  energy  
industry  in  the  early  1990s  may  have confounding  effects on  investors’  response  to  
the  court  ruling.  
3.2.2  Empirical  Strategy  
The identification  strategy  is  based  on  a  quasi-natural  experiment  that  provides 
exogenous  variation  to  creditor control  rights.  I  define  the  treated  group  based  on  
firms that  are  incorporated in  Delaware.  The control  group  consists of  non-Delaware 
incorporated firms because  these  firms are  not  subject  to  the  same  legal  changes.  I  
use  the  following  differences  in  differences  regression  model  to  study the  impact  of  
creditor protection rights  on  debt  structure: 
(Secured/Total  Debt)i,t  =  ↵i  +  ↵t  +    (  P  ost  1991)(  D el  aw  ar  e  )  +     Xit  +  "it  .  (3.1)  
Subscripts  i  and  t  represent  the  firm  and  year,  respectively.  ↵i  is  an  indicator variable  
for  each  firm  and  controls for  the  effects of  unobservable firm  characteristics that  
remain  constant  in  time.  ↵t  captures systematic factors  in  year  t  effecting all  firms 
equally. Xit  is  a  set  of  controls used  to  capture variation  in  the  dependent  variable.  
The set  of  controls I  use  in  the  regressions  are  firm  size,  book leverage,  tangibility,  
return  on  assets (ROA),  and  market-to-book value.
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The dependent  variable  Secured/Total Debt in  regression  (3.1)  is  the  share of  
secured  to  total  debt.  Post1991 is  an  indicator variable  that  takes  the  value  of  
one  during  the  period  1992-1995  and  proxies for  an  increase  in  creditor protection. 
Delaware is  an  indicator variable  that  takes  the  value  of  one  if  the  firm  is  incorporated 
in  Delaware  and  identifies  firms affected by  the  court  ruling.  The coefficient  of  
interest  is    and  captures the  estimated  difference  in  the  share of  secured  to  total  
debt  between  Delaware  and  non-Delaware firms after  the  court  ruling.  If    is  positive 
(negative)  implies  that  the  Delaware  1991  court  ruling  leads to  an  increase  (decrease)  
in  the  share of  secured  to  total  debt.  Firm  and  year  fixed  effects absorb  the  variation  
from  the  base effect  of  Post1991 and  Delaware ,  so  I  do  not  include  in  the  regressions.  
The court  rulings  were relevant  mostly  for  firms closer  to  bankruptcy. So  I  
hypothesize that  the  impact  of  the  court  ruling  should  be  stronger  for  the  group  
of  firms in  the  zone  of  insolvency.  To  test  this  hypothesis I  create a  new  variable,  
Bankruptcy zone ,  to  identify  firms that  are  close  to  distress.  Bankruptcy zone is  a  
dummy  variable  that  equals one  if  a  firm  belong  in  the  lowest  tercile  of  Altman’s  
Z-score  yearly  distribution.  To  test  the  hypothesis that  the  change  in  debt  structure 
should  be  larger for  firms close  to  distress,  I  use  the  following  regression  model:  
(Secured/Total  Debt)i,t  =    (  P  ost  1991)(  D el  aw  ar  e  )(  B  ank  r  uptcy  z  one  )+  
+  interaction terms  +     Xit  +  ↵i  +  ↵t  +  "it  .  (3.2)  
The coefficient    of  the  above  regression  model,  if  negative and  statistically significant,  
would  suggest  that  the  increase  in  creditor rights  increases  the  share of  secured  debt
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in  financially  distressed  Delaware  firms by    %  more than  non-Delaware firms.  In  all  
regressions  I  also  include  all  possible  combinations of  the  interaction terms.  
Identification of  causal  effects in  differences-in-differences  regressions  relies  on  the  
assumption  that  the  dependent  variable  (secured/total  debt)  follows  a  similar,  or  
parallel,  trend  for  treated  and  control  units before the  change  in  Delaware’s  regulatory  
statute. Figure  1  in  the  Appendix  confirms that  the  share of  secured  debt  for  Delaware  
and  non-Delaware firms move in  parallel  until  1991.  
Bertrand  et  al.  (2004) find  that  difference  in  difference  regressions  reject  the  null  at  
the  5%  level  approximately  45%  percent  of  the  times.  I  account  for  the  potential bias 
in  the  standard  errors using  the  appropriate  variance-covariance  matrix by  clustering 
at  the  firm  and  year  level.  Clustering by  borrowers’  state of  incorporation does not  
affect the  size of  the  standard  errors.  I  also  address  a  few  more of  these  statistical  
properties in  the  next  section.  
3.3  Empirical  Results  
3.3.1  Creditor  Protection Rights  and Debt  Structure  
This section  presents  the  empirical  results  from  estimating the  effects of  creditor 
control  rights  on  corporate debt  structure. I  exploit  variation  in  creditor protection 
rights  using  two  Delaware  court  rulings;  a  1991  legal  ruling  that  established  an  
increase  in  creditor protection rights,  and  a  2004  court  ruling  that  reversed  1991’s  
decision  by  limiting  creditors’ ability  to  sue managers for  breach  of  fiduciary duty.
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Increase  in Creditor  Protection Rights:  Period 1989-1995  
I  begin  by  plotting the  share of  secured  debt  for  a  matched  sample of  Delaware  firms 
(treated)  and  and  non-Delaware firms (control).  In  Figure  1a,  the  share of  secured  
to  total  debt  for  treated  and  control  firms follows  a  similar  pattern  from  1988  until  
the  passing  of  the  regulation  in  1991,  and  starts diverging after  1992.  Assuming  
that  in  the  absence of  the  court  ruling  the  share of  secured  debt  for  Delaware  and  
non-Delaware firms would  maintain a  parallel  trend,  we  can  infer  that  Delaware’s  
court  decision  led  to  a  significant  reduction  in  the  share of  secured  debt  for  firms 
close  to  distress.  The results  reverse  after  2004,  when  Delaware’s  court  decision  
reversed  the  1991  ruling  by  limiting  the  ability  of  creditor to  sue managers for  breach  
of  fiduciary duty.  Prior  to  2004  the  share of  secured  debt  for  Delaware  firms follows  a  
similar  trend  to  non-Delaware firms,  but  increases  considerably  after  the  2004  court  
decision.  
I  test  the  effects of  creditor control  rights  on  debt  structure using  a  large sample 
of  firms from  Compustat.  Table  3.2  presents  the  estimates from  a  differences-in-  
differences  regression  model  as  in  (3.1).  The results  in  column  1  suggest  that  an  
increase  in  creditor protection does not  have an  effect  on  the  share of  secured  debt.  
However,  Delaware’s  court  shifted  control  rights  towards  creditors only  for  firms 
that  are  close  to  bankruptcy. Therefore,  the  court  ruling  should  have a  different  effect  
on  firms that  are  close  to  distress  from  well-performing firms.  To  test  this  hypothesis 
I  use  a  dif-in-dif-in-dif  regression  model  as  in  (3.2).  To  identify  whether a  firm  is  close  
to  insolvency,  I  use  the  indicator variable  Low Z ,  which  identifies  firms that  belong  at
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the  lowest  tercile  of  the  yearly  distribution  of  Altman’s  Z-score.  This regression  model  
allows  me  to  test  whether the  marginal effect  of  an  increase  in  creditor protection is  
different  for  firms close  to  bankruptcy. 
Table  3.2  shows  the  regression  estimates of  regression  (3.2).  I  find  that  the  increase  
in  creditor protection rights  increases  the  share of  secured  debt  for  firms incorporated 
in  Delaware,  but  decreases  considerably  for  firms closer  to  distress  (coefficient  next  
to  Post(1991)(DE)(Low Z) .  Specifically,  the  share of  secured  debt  for  firms closer  to  
distress  declines  approximately  by  4.8%,  which  is  1/5  of  a  standard  deviation change  
of  secured  debt.  
According  to  theory,  there  are  two  reasons  why  firms might  choose  to  reduce  
the  share of  secured  debt  in  response  to  an  increase  in  creditor control.  First,  to  
mitigate creditors’ ability  to  interfere  with  firm  policy  or  reduce  the  risk  of  excessive 
liquidation (Hart  et  al.  (1997),  Stro¨mberg (2000)).  The second  explanation  is  that  
firms choose  to  issue  senior  than  subordinated bonds to  reduce  creditor heterogeneity  
and  minimize  the  litigation costs  from  legal  contests across senior  and  junior  creditors 
(Welch  (1997)).  If  this  hypothesis is  true,  firms that  are  closer  to  bankruptcy should  
replace  secured  debt  with  senior  unsecured  bonds.  The results  in  column  (4)  of  Table  
3.2  provide evidence consistent  with  this  hypothesis.  
However,  it  is  also  possible  that  the  reduction  in  the  share of  secured  debt  is  due  
to  a  reduction  in  firms’  overall  leverage.  I  do  not  find  evidence consistent  with  the  
view  that  creditor control  rights  have a  significant  impact  on  leverage.  Table  3.4  
presents  the  regression  results  of  book leverage on  changes  in  creditor control  rights.
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Taken  together,  the  results  in  Tables  3.2  and  3.4  suggest  that  the  shift  in  managers’ 
fiduciary duties  towards  creditors affects the  composition  of  corporate debt,  but  not  
book leverage.  In  other  words,  firms replace  senior  secured  debt  with  senior  unsecured  
bonds.  The next  sections provide more evidence and  expand  the  results  of  this  section  
by  focusing  on  primary issues  of  bonds and  syndicated loans.  
Reversal  in Creditor  Protection Rights:  Period 2000-2007  
Starting in  2004,  Delaware’s  court  reversed  its 1991  decision  by  limiting  lenders’  
ability  to  sue corporate executives for  a  breach  of  fiduciary responsibility.5  This 
court  ruling  is  directly  related  with  Delaware’s  1991  court  decision,  and  offers a  good  
empirical  setting to  test  whether the  reversal  in  creditor protection has the  opposite  
effect  on  the  share of  secured  debt  for  firms affected by  the  statutory changes.  
Figure  1b  plots the  share of  secured  to  total  debt  for  a  sample of  Delaware  and  
non-Delaware firms that  are  close  to  distress  and  have similar  characteristics. The 
share of  secured  to  total  debt  for  Delaware  and  non-Delaware firms follows  a  parallel  
trend  until  2004.  After  2004,  however,  the  share of  secured  debt  for  Delaware  firms 
increases  significantly. 
Table  3.3  presents  the  results  of  dif-in-dif  (columns  1  and  2)  and  dif-in-dif-dif  
regressions.  The coefficient  of  Post(2004) ⇥  (DE) ⇥  (Low Z) is  positive and  economically  
large,  consistent  with  the  hypothesis that  a  reduction  in  creditor protection rights  
leads to  an  increase  in  the  share of  secured  to  total  debt.  However,  the  results  are
5The  Official  Committee  of  Unsecured  Creditors  of  PHD,  Inc.  on  Behalf  of  the  Estate  of  PHD,  Inc.  
v.  Bank  One,  N.A.,  et  al.  Case  No.  03-CV-2466 (U.S.  District  Court,  Northern  District  of  Ohio)
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statistically significant  only  at  the  10%  level,  and  the  effect  of  creditor rights  on  
senior  unsecured  debt  does not  appear  to  be  significant.  
3.3.2  Creditor  Control  and the  Structure  of  Corporate  Bond Seniority  
In  this  section,  I  investigate the  effects of  the  1991  Delaware  court  ruling  on  the  
seniority of  new  bond  issues.  Table  3.5  presents  the  coefficient  estimates of  probit  and  
linear  probability regressions  of  bond  seniority on  the  interaction of  Post1991 and  
Delaware .  In  column  (1),  the  coefficient  is  0.069,  which  suggests  that  after  the  court  
ruling  in  1991  the  probability of  issuing  senior  debt  of  firms incorporated in  Delaware  
is  approximately  6.9%  higher  than  non-Delaware firms.  Using  a  Probit  regression  
in  column  (2),  I  find  that  the  increase  in  creditor protection leads approximately  to  
a  13.2%  increase  in  the  probability of  issuing  senior  relative  to  junior  bonds.  The 
results  in  Table  3.5  corroborate the  findings in  section  3.3.1,  and  suggest  that  the  
increase  in  creditor control  rights  leads to  a  significant  increase  in  the  likelihood  that  
firms issue  senior  unsecured  bonds.  
The shift  in  managers’ fiduciary duties  towards  creditors was  relevant  for  firms 
that  are  closer  to  bankruptcy. Therefore,  I  hypothesize that  the  effect  of  creditor 
protection on  bond  seniority should  be  larger for  firms that  are  close  to  distress.  To  
test  this  hypothesis,  I  estimate a  triple  interaction regression  model  as  in  equation  
(3.2).  I  use  two  proxies for  firms close  to  distress.  Low Z is  an  indicator variable  
for  firms that  belong  to  the  lowest  tercile  of  the  yearly  distribution  of  Altman’s  
Z-score,  and  M  V  E  <  T  D is  an  indicator variable  for  firms whose  market  value  of
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equity (MVE)  is  less  than  its total  debt  (TD).6  The regression  estimates in  column  
(3)  suggest  that  after  the  court  ruling,  financially  distressed  firms in  Delaware  are  
approximately  37%  more likely  to  issue  senior  debt  relatively  to  subordinated debt.  
This is  an  economically  large effect,  and  robust  to  alternative  definitions of  distressed  
firms (column  (4)).  
Along  with  the  increase  in  the  probability of  issuing  senior  debt,  I  also  find  that  
new  bonds are  more likely  to  contain  covenants that  protect  bondholders’  seniority 
and  the  collateral  of  the  firms’  assets (see  also  Figure  2,  panel  B).  New  bonds are  
also  more likely  to  include  cross-default  clauses  that  trigger  default  if  the  borrower 
becomes  delinquent  or  violates  the  terms  of  any  other  contract.  
3.3.3  Creditor  Control  and Private  Loan Characteristics  
The law and  finance literature suggests  that  creditor protection rights  play  an  
important role  in  financial  development  and  expands firms access to  debt  markets by  
reducing  their  cost  of  borrowing (see  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1986),  Lopez-De-Silanes  
and  La  Porta  (1997),  La  Porta  et  al.  (1998),  Levine  (1998),  Qian  and  Strahan (2007),  
Vig  (2013)).  Theory  predicts  that  an  increase  in  creditor protection rights  should  
lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  cost  of  debt  and  a  loosening  of  non-pricing  terms  such  as  
covenants,  asset collateral,  or  loan  maturity. 
To  test  whether changes  in  creditor rights  affect the  pricing  and  the  characteristics 
of  private loans,  I  focus  on  private issues  of  syndicated loans from  Dealscan.  This
6Note  that  lower  values  of  the  z-score  suggest  that  the  firm  is  closer  to bankruptcy.
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part  of  the  analysis  focuses  only  on  the  2004  legal  ruling  in  Delaware  because  loan  
pricing  information of  bond  issues  in  Capital  IQ  and  Dealscan  before 1993  is  not  
available.  
I  begin  by  testing  the  effects of  creditor protection rights  on  firms’  cost  of  debt.  
Given  that  the  regulation  is  more relevant  for  firms closer  to  distress,  I  hypothesize 
that  the  effects of  the  2004  court  ruling  on  debt  spreads should  be  larger for  Delaware  
firms that  are  close  to  bankruptcy. Table  3.6  presents  the  estimation  results  of  the  
dif-in-dif-in-dif  regression  of  loan  spreads.  The results  are  consistent  with  theoretical  
predictions suggesting  that  a  reduction  in  creditor protection should  lead  to  an  
increase  in  the  cost  of  debt.  Specifically,  I  find  that  the  cost  of  borrowing for  Delaware  
firms that  are  close  to  distress  increases  by  almost  11%  more than  non-Delaware 
firms.  This an  economically  large effect  and  corresponds approximately  to  a  20  basis 
points increase  in  debt  spreads.  
I  also  investigate whether the  reversal  of  creditors’ ability  to  sue managers for  
breach  of  fiduciary duty  affects non-pricing  loan  terms.  Table  3.7  shows  the  estimates 
of  the  effect  of  a  change  in  creditor protection on  covenant  strictness (column  1),  
collateral  requirement  (column  2),  loan  maturity (column  3),  and  loan  amount  (column  
4).  I  find  that  collateral  requirements  increase  after  2004  for  Delaware  firms that  are  
close  to  distress.  Specifically,  banks are  8.2%  more likely  to  secure new  loan  issues  
with  collateral.  Creditors are  also  more likely  to  substitute the  loss of  control  by  
reducing  the  maturity of  loan  issues,  which  effectively increases  their  seniority over  
firm  assets.
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I  find  little evidence that  banks change  the  amount  of  new  loan  issues  or  the  
strictness of  loan  covenants (see  columns 1  and  4  of  Table  3.7).  However,  the  bar  
chars in  Figure  3  suggest  that  the  difference  in  the  median  covenant  strictness is  
considerably  larger after  the  reduction  in  creditor rights,  even  though  the  difference  
in  average  strictness does not  change.  
3.4  Conclusion 
I  test  the  hypothesis that  creditor control  rights  affect the  structure of  corporate 
debt.  Stronger creditor protection rights  outside  of  bankruptcy increase  the  ability  
of  creditors to  intervene with  firm  policies,  and  as  a  result,  firms might  choose  to  
replace  secured  debt  for  unsecured  bonds.  However,  according  to  the  law and  finance 
literature,  giving  stronger  protection rights  to  senior  secured  creditors may  also  
increase  firms’  use  of  secured  debt  by  reducing  its cost.  
Using  exogenous  variation  from  Delaware  legal  rulings  that  increase  creditors 
control  outside  of  bankruptcy, I  find  that  firms closer  to  distress  replace  secured  debt  
for  unsecured  bonds.  Bonds are  also  more likely  to  contain  covenants that  protect  the  
seniority of  junior  lenders  and  the  collateral  value  of  firm’s assets. Reducing  creditor 
protection by  limiting  creditors’ ability  to  sue managers for  breach  of  fiduciary duties  
affects pricing  and  non-pricing  terms  of  new  private loans.  Specifically,  weakening 
of  creditor rights  leads to  an  increase  in  the  cost  private loans,  higher  collateral  
requirements,  and  an  increase  in  loan  seniority by  shortening loan  maturities.
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Treating debtholders as  a  heterogeneous class  of  creditors is  critical  in  under-  
standing the  determinants of  corporate debt  structure. Aligning  incentives  among  
shareholders,  managers, senior  secured  creditors, and  junior  unsecured  bondholders is  
particularly difficult,  especially  when  firms are  near  distress.  The evidence in  this  
paper  support  the  hypothesis that  stronger  creditor protection rights  explain  part  
of  firms’  debt  structure, and  affect the  seniority and  the  characteristics of  new  loan  
issues.  
3.5  Tables  & Figures  Appendix  
3.5.1  Tables  
Definition of  Variables  
This table  provides details for  the  variables  used  in  the  paper.  Accounting  data are  
from  Compustat’s quarterly  file,  bond  data is  from  Capital  IQ,  and  syndicated loan  
data is  from  LPC  Dealscan.  I  winsorize all  variables  at  the  1st  and  99th  percentile.
Variable Names  Description
Firm  Characteristics  
Firm  Size  Ln(Assets)  
Book  Leverage  Total  Debt  /  Book  Assets  
ROA EBITDA /  Book  Assets  
Market-to-Book  (Market  Equity +  Total  Debt  +  Preferred Stock  liquidating 
value  -  Deferred  Taxes  and  Investment Tax  Credits )  /  Book  
Assets  
Tangible  assets Net  PPE  /  Book  Assets
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Secured/Total  debt  Secured  Debt  (Compustat  debt-mortgages and  other  se-  
cured) divided  by  Total  debt  (=short  term+long  term  )  
Total  Debt  Short-term  debt  +  Long-term  debt  
Z-Score  3.3  ⇥  Pre-tax  Income/Assets  +  0.999  ⇥  Sales/Assets  +  1.4  
⇥  Retained  Earnings/Assets  +  1.2  ⇥  (Current  Assets  -  Cur- 
rent  Liabilities)/Assets  +0.6  ⇥  Mkt  Equity/Total  Liabilities  
Loan Characteristics  
Secured  Indicates whether loan  is  secured  with  collateral  
Loan  Spread  The All-in-Drawn  Spread  from  Dealscan,  for  each  dollar 
borrower draw,  excluding fees  
Covenant  Number  Total  number  of  financial  covenants in  the  loan  contract  
Loan  Amount  The sum  of  all  amounts  in  a  certain  loan  package 
Loan  Maturity The number  of  months between  the  earliest  loan  origination  
date and  the  latest  maturity date in  a  certain  loan  package 
Covenant  Strictness  Indicates the  probability that  the  firm  will  violate  at  least  
one  of  its covenants in  the  next  quarter.  To  construct 
the  measure,  I  follow  the  methodology  of  Murfin  (2012).  
To  construct the  measure I  use  covenant  definitions from  
Demerjian  and  Owens (2014) and  also  include  additional  
ratios often  used  in  debt  contracts
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Table  3.1  :  Summary  Statistics  
This  table  presents  summary  statistics  for  three  samples.  The  top  panel  shows firm  
characteristics  for  all  firms  in  Compustat  from  1989-2007.  The  middle panel  shows bond  
characteristics  for  all  corporate  debentures  from  Capital  IQ  during  the  period  1989-1995.  
The  bottom  panels  shows the  characteristics  from  all  syndicated  loans  in  Dealscan  during  
the  period  2000-2007.  All  variables  are  described  in  detail  in  the  Appendix.
Variable N  Mean SD  P10  Median P90
Compustat  (Full  Period)
Assets  -  Total  152728  834.59  2696.52  2.35  66.26  1663.18  
Mkt-to-Book  129747  3.09  7.10  0.58  1.25  5.12  
B.Leverage  151384  0.29  0.34  0.00  0.20  0.69  
Tangible  Assets  151710  0.27  0.24  0.03  0.19  0.66  
Altman-Z  124948  2.85  14.66  -2.09  3.05  11.58  
Secured/Total  Debt  127025  0.35  0.37  0.00  0.19  0.96
Bond Variables  (Period:  1989-1995)
Maturity (months)  3244  161.375  103.857  61  122  365  
Amount  (m.$)  3243  128.728  191.522  2  100  300  
Senior  3244  0.745  0.436  0  1  1  
Number  of  Covenants 3244  3.568  4.077  0  3  10
Syndicated Loan Variables  (Period:  2000-2007)
Cov.  Strictness  9253  25.19  27.07  0.00  14.81  66.54  
Covenants #  9340  2.83  0.95  1.00  3.00  4.00  
Loan  Amount  9340  297.41  455.88  14.07  135.16  750.00  
Loan  Maturity 9260  44.23  20.76  12.00  45.11  66.00  
Spread  9006  199.24  132.22  50.00  175.00  360.00  
Secured  8335  0.72  0.45  0.00  1.00  1.00
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Table  3.2  :  Increase  in  creditor  protection  rights  and  debt  structure:  1991 
Delaware  legal  ruling  (Period  1989-1995)  .  
This  table  presents  coefficient  estimates  of  fixed  effect  regressions  that  examine  the  effect  
of  an  increase  in  creditor  protection  on  the  share  of  secured  to total  debt  (columns  1 and  2)  
and  senior  unsecured debt  to total  debt  (columns  3 and  4).  DE  is  an  indicator  variable  
that  takes  the  value  of  1 if  the  state  of  incorporation  of  the  issuing firm  is  Delaware.  Post 
1991  is  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 during  the  period  1992-1995.  In  
columns  2 and  4,  Low  Z  is  an  indicator  variable  that  is  equal  to 1 if  the  firm  belongs  to 
the  bottom  tercile  of  the  yearly  distribution  of  Altman’s  Z-score.  All  regressions  include 
firm  and  year  fixed  effects.  I  also include a set  of  firm  controls:  size  (  Ln(Assets)  ),  tangible  
assets,  ROA,  book  leverage,  and  market-to-book  value.  All  variables  are  defined  in  the  
Appendix.  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  
at  the  firm  and  year  level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  
and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
(Secured/Tot)  (Secured/Tot)  (Senior/Tot)  (Senior/Tot)
Delaware Rulings 
Post(1991)  ⇥  (DE)  0.003  0.025⇤⇤⇤  -0.013  -0.028⇤⇤⇤  
(0.005)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  
Post(1991)  ⇥  (DE)  ⇥  (Low Z)  -0.048⇤⇤  0.039⇤  
(0.015)  (0.020)  
Controls 
Ln(Assets)  -0.008⇤⇤  -0.008⇤⇤  0.011⇤⇤  0.0012⇤⇤  
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
Tangible  Assets  0.087⇤⇤⇤  0.089⇤⇤⇤  -0.114⇤⇤⇤  -0.114⇤⇤  
(0.032)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.034)  
ROA 0.034⇤⇤  0.036⇤  -0.050⇤⇤  -0.046⇤⇤  
(0.017)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.016)  
B.Leverage  -0.045⇤⇤  -0.050⇤⇤  -0.031  -0.036  
(0.022)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.031)  
Mkt-to-Book  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Observations  18244  17297  22730  21654  
AR2  0.080  0.081  0.387  0.391  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
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Table  3.3  :  Decrease  in  creditor  protection  rights  and  debt  structure:  2004 
Delaware  legal  ruling  (Period  2000-2007).  
This  table  presents  coefficient  estimates  of  fixed  effect  regressions  that  examine  the  effect  of  
enhanced  creditor  rights  on  the  share  of  secured  to total  debt  (columns  1 and  2)  and  senior  
unsecured debt  to total  debt  (columns  3 and  4).  DE  is  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  
the  value  of  1 if  the  state  of  incorporation  of  the  issuing firm  is  Delaware.  Post 2004  is  an  
indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 during  the  period  2005-2007.  In  columns  2 and  
4,  Low  Z  is  an  indicator  variable  that  is  equal  to 1 if  the  firm  belongs  to the  bottom  tercile  
of  the  yearly  distribution  of  Altman’s  Z-score.  All  regressions  include firm  and  year  fixed  
effects.  I  also include a set  of  firm  controls:  size  (  Ln(Assets)  ,  tangible  assets,  ROA,  book  
leverage,  and  market-to-book  value.  All  variables  are  defined  in  the  Appendix.  Standard  
errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  year  
level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
(Secured/Tot)  (Secured/Tot)  (Senior/Tot)  (Senior/Tot)
Delaware Rulings 
Post(2004)  ⇥  (DE)  0.016⇤⇤  0.004⇤⇤⇤  -0.032  0.021  
(0.005)  (0.001)  (0.022)  (0.042)  
Post(2004)  ⇥  (DE)  ⇥  (Low Z)  0.025⇤  -0.100  
(0.013)  (0.107)  
Controls 
Ln(Assets)  -0.012⇤⇤⇤  -0.013⇤⇤  0.031⇤⇤  0.036⇤⇤  
(0.004)  (0.006)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Tangible  Assets  0.059⇤  0.069⇤⇤  -0.232⇤⇤  -0.249⇤⇤  
(0.034)  (0.033)  (0.996)  (0.341)  
ROA 0.013⇤  0.011⇤  -0.002  -0.003  
(0.007)  (0.006)  (0.020)  (0.018)  
B.Leverage  0.017⇤⇤⇤  0.016⇤⇤⇤  -0.044⇤⇤⇤  -0.038⇤⇤  
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.019)  
Mkt-to-Book  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.001  
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Observations  17115  16589  18835  18261  
AR2  0.075  0.076  0.411  0.411  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
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Table  3.4  :  Creditor  protection  rights  and  book  leverage  
This  table  presents  coefficient  estimates  of  fixed  effect  regressions  that  examine  the  effect  
of  creditor  rights  on  book  leverage  (columns  1 and  2).  The  dependent  variable  in  all  
regressions  is  book  leverage.  DE  is  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 if  the  
state  of  incorporation  of  the  issuing firm  is  Delaware.  Post 2004  is  an  indicator  variable  
that  takes  the  value  of  1 during  the  period  2005-2007.  In  columns  2 and  4,  Low  Z  is  an  
indicator  variable  that  is  equal  to 1 if  the  firm  belongs  to the  bottom  tercile  of  the  yearly  
distribution  of  Altman’s  Z-score.  All  regressions  include firm  and  year  fixed  effects.  The  
regressions  control  for  a set  of  firm  characteristics  (assets,  tangible  assets,  ROA,  book  
leverage,  market-to-book  value)  and  loan  characteristics  (maturity,  amount,  participants,  
collateral,  and  spread).  All  variables  are  defined  in  the  Appendix.  Standard  errors  are  
reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  year  level. 
Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(  1991: Creditor  Rights " )  (  2004: Creditor  Rights # )  
(Leverage)  (Leverage)
Delaware Rulings 
Post(1991)  ⇥  (DE)  ⇥  (Low Z)  -0.004  
(0.006)  
Post(2004)  ⇥  (DE)  ⇥  (Low Z)  -0.005  
(0.032)  
Controls 
Post(1991)  ⇥  (DE)  0.005⇤⇤  
(0.002)  
Post(2004)  ⇥  (DE)  0.007  
(0.007)  
Ln(Assets)  0.027⇤⇤⇤  0.021⇤⇤⇤  
(0.002)  (0.004)  
Mkt-to-Book  -0.000  -0.001  
(0.001)  (0.001)  
Tangible  Assets  0.141⇤⇤⇤  0.172⇤⇤⇤  
(0.014)  (0.038)  
ROA -0.115⇤⇤⇤  -0.079⇤⇤⇤  
(0.017)  (0.012)
Observations  40777  24695  
AR2  0.196  0.153  
Firm  FEs  Yes  Yes  
Year  FEs  Yes  Yes
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Table  3.5  :  Increase  in  creditor  protection  rights  (1991)  and  bond  seniority:  (Period  1989-1995)  
DE  is  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 if  the  state  of  incorporation  of  the  issuing firm  is  Delaware.  Post 
1991  is  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 during  the  period  1992-1995.  Low  Z  is  an  indicator  variable  that  
is  equal  to 1 if  the  firm  belongs  to the  bottom  tercile  of  the  yearly  distribution  of  Altman’s  Z-score.  MVE <  TD  is  an  
indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 if  the  firm’s  market  value  of  equity  is  less than  its  total  debt.  All  regressions  
include firm  and  year  fixed  effects.  I  also include a set  of  firm  controls:  size  (  Ln(Assets)  ),  tangible  assets,  ROA,  book  
leverage,  and  market-to-book  value.  All  variables  are  defined  in  the  Appendix.  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  
each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  year  level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  
indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Variables (Senior  Bond)  (Senior  Bond)  (Senior  Bond)  (Senior  Bond)  
(  OLS with FEs )  (  Probit )  (  OLS with FEs )  (  OLS with FEs )  
(Low Z)  (MVE  <  TD)
(DE)  ⇥  (Post  1991)  0.069**  0.132***  0.039  0.046  
(0.029)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.029)  
(Post  1991)  ⇥  (DE)  ⇥  (Low Z)  0.378**  
(0.179)  
(Post  1991)  ⇥  (DE)  ⇥  (MVE  <  TD)  0.261*  
(0.141)
Observations  2345  2345  2345  1831  
(Pseudo)  R2  0.838  0.430  0.840  0.842  
Firm  FE  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Year  FE  Yes  No  Yes  Yes
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Table  3.6  :  Decrease  in  creditor  protection  rights  (2004)  and  cost  of  debt  
(Period  2000-2007).  
This  table  presents  coefficient  estimates  of  fixed  effect  regressions  that  examine  the  effect  
of  enhanced  creditor  rights  on  the  cost  of  debt.  DE  is  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  
value  of  1 if  the  state  of  incorporation  of  the  issuing firm  is  Delaware.  Post 2004  is  an  
indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 during  the  period  2005-2007.  In  columns  2 and  
4,  Low  Z  is  an  indicator  variable  that  is  equal  to 1 if  the  firm  belongs  to the  bottom  tercile  
of  the  yearly  distribution  of  Altman’s  Z-score.  All  regressions  include firm  and  year  fixed  
effects.  The  regressions  control  for  a set  of  firm  characteristics  (  Ln(Assets)  ,  tangible  assets,  
ROA,  book  leverage,  market-to-book  value)  and  loan  characteristics  (maturity,  amount,  
participants,  collateral,  and  spread).  All  variables  are  defined  in  the  Appendix.  Standard  
errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  year  
level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
Ln(Spread)
Delaware Rulings 
Post(2004)  ⇥  (DE)  ⇥  (Low Z)  0.114⇤⇤  
(0.045)  
Base Effects and Interactions 
Post(2004)  ⇥  (DE)  -0.027  
(0.049)  
(DE)  ⇥  (Low Z)  -0.001  
(0.049)  
Post(2004)  ⇥  (Low Z)  -0.156⇤⇤  
(0.066)  
(Low Z)  0.210⇤⇤⇤  
(0.045)  
(DE)  0.040  
(0.051)
Observations  5019  
AR2  0.668  
SIC-3  FEs  Yes  
Year  FEs  Yes
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Table  3.7  :  Decrease  in  creditor  protection  rights  and  loan  contracting (Period  
2000-2007).  
In  column  (1)  the  dependent  variable  is  covenant  strictness  following the  method  from  
Murfin  (2012)  and  measures  the  probability  that  the  firm  will violate  at  least  one  of  
performance  covenants  in  the  next  quarter.  In  column  (2)  the  dependent  variable  is  an  
indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 if  the  bank  required  to secure  the  loan  issue 
with collateral.  In  columns  (3)  and  (4),  the  dependent  variable  is  the  natural  log of  loan  
maturity  and  loan  amount,  respectively. DE  is  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  
1 if  the  state  of  incorporation  of  the  issuing firm  is  Delaware.  Post 2004  is  an  indicator  
variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 during  the  period  2005-2007.  In  columns  2 and  4,  Low  Z  
is  an  indicator  variable  that  is  equal  to 1 if  the  firm  belongs  to the  bottom  tercile  of  the  
yearly  distribution  of  Altman’s  Z-score.  All  regressions  include industry (SIC-3)  and  year  
fixed  effects.  The  regressions  control  for  a set  of  firm  and  loan  characteristics.  All  variables  
are  defined  in  the  Appendix.  Standard  errors  are  reported  below  each  regression  coefficient,  
and  are  clustered  at  the  firm  and  year  level. Significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  level is  
indicated  by  *,  **,  and  ***,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Cov.Strictness Secured  Ln(Maturity)  Ln(Amount)
Delaware Rulings 
Post(2004)  ⇥  (DE)  ⇥  (Low Z)  3.199  0.082⇤⇤  -0.123⇤  -0.067  
(4.170)  (0.030)  (0.063)  (0.096)  
Base Effects and Interactions 
Post(2004)  ⇥  (DE)  1.128  -0.045⇤  -0.046⇤⇤  0.117⇤  
(2.460)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.051)  
(DE)  ⇥  (Low Z)  -1.081  0.004  0.080⇤  0.089  
(3.730)  (0.030)  (0.037)  (0.060)  
Post(2004)  ⇥  (Low Z)  2.333  -0.005  0.150⇤⇤  0.011  
(2.584)  (0.033)  (0.056)  (0.069)  
(Low Z)  2.287  0.090⇤⇤⇤  -0.227⇤⇤⇤  -0.333⇤⇤⇤  
(1.930)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.055)  
(DE)  -3.045  0.050⇤⇤  0.042  -0.116⇤⇤  
(2.344)  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.040)
Observations  5020  5211  5530  5748  
AR2  0.282  0.409  0.246  0.807  
SIC-3  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year  FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
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3.5.2  Figures  
Figure  3.1  :  Share  of  secured  debt  (period:  1989-1995)  
This  figure  illustrates  the  share  of  secured  debt  during  the  1999-2007 period.  I  match  firms  
with similar  characteristics  in  Delaware  (DE)  and  non-Delaware  (non-DE)  that  belong in  
the  bottom  tercile  of  Altman’s  Z-score  yearly  distribution.
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Figure  3.2  :  Share  of  secured  debt  (period:  2000-2007)  
This  figure  illustrates  the  share  of  secured  debt  during  the  1999-2007 period.  I  match  firms  
with similar  characteristics  in  Delaware  (DE)  and  non-Delaware  (non-DE)  that  belong in  
the  bottom  tercile  of  Altman’s  Z-score  yearly  distribution.
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Figure  3.3  :  Bond  seniority  and  covenants  
The  top  panel  illustrates  the  issuance  of  senior  debt  from  Delaware  firms  (treated  group)  
and  non-Delaware  firms  (control  group)  from  1989-1995.  The  panel  at  the  bottom  illustrates  
the  difference  in  the  number  of  restrictive  covenants  between Delaware  and  non-Delaware  
firms  (absolute  number)  from  1989-1995.
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Figure  3.4  :  Median  covenant  strictness  (top  panel)  and  average  covenant  strictness  
(bottom  panel)  for  Delaware  firms  and  non-Delaware  firms.
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